Commonwealth and Foreign
SELF-CONFIDENT POLAND
By FRANK CLEMENTS
I SUPPOSE that I was one of the first Englishmen to benefit from the understanding with Poland. On the evening when I left Kaunas for Warsaw the papers came out with the news of a definite pact, and the substance of their headlines was obvious even to one whose Polish consists of " No, thank you," " No," and " Certainly not." With some diffidence— for what hitherto has been more foreign than a Pole?—I entered into conversation with my fellow-travellers. Once my nationality had been established, the pace became hot. Flasks of brandy appeared from corners where they had rested unobtrusively while sleepy but curious Customs officials called on us, and a miscellaneous collection of drinking vessels came to light. We drank the health of King George, we drank to Pilsudski, we drank to the new understanding, and then a young man proposed the toast " The perdition of the Boche."
Out of deference to my incomprehensible reluctance to drink to anyone's perdition, the toast was not accepted, but I could see that the majority of my companions were a little dis- appointed. Yet I suppose it is true to say that the fact that such a toast was offered would surprise most Englishmen. Without really knowing much about the country, we have been inclined to regard Poland as being within the German orbit and by no means unfriendlily disposed towards her western neighbour. To some extent that is indeed true of the Government, which, however, in its policy towards Germany has never reflected public opinion in Poland. Without mincing words, the average Pole loathes the Germans ; the intellectual will try and explain his hatred and to justify it on historical or other grounds, but he only tries half-heartedly ; the peasant or the railway porter will merely say he is ready to fight " them " whenever they want, and leaves it at that.
This feeling is so widespread among the Poles that it was bound sooner or later to influence the country's foreign policy, although the Government was certainly wise in attempting to check the pressure as long as some sort of tolerable under- standing with Germany seemed possible. Even now, when the nation's leaders have definitely placed Poland outside any German bloc, they are still reserved in their language and have by no means taken up such a stiff attitude towards Germany as popular opinion not only would allow but even definitely requires. Here, again, they are probably very wise. Whatever the German Press may say, the German authorities must be aware of the true position and of the enormous reserves of moral popular support the Polish Government can draw on if German pressure makes this necessary.
Great as are the advantages of this Polish unanimity, there lies in it also a danger. The people would accept the loss of Danzig, " which is German already, as long as we retain trading rights, for the port lives on Poland," but no matter how much the Government might wish it, there can be no question of a compromise over the Corridor question. Talks with Poles of every type and class revealed that they were un- willing to make the slightest concession. The general opinion is best summarised in the words of my hotel waiter : " We will not give up an inch of the Corridor unless we lose it in a war."
This in itself may eventually lead to difficulties, but there is moreover among a large number of Poles a definitely aggres- sive spirit, typified by the slogan " Back to Griinewald "—a battle in the Middle Ages when the Teutonic knights were beaten by a Slavonic combination under the leadership of Poland. They are anxious for war with Germany, and have dreams of recapturing " the lost province " of East Prussia
and of establishing a Polish frontier on the Oder. Too much importance must not be given to these extremists, who, for all their numbers, are still a minority, but their influence seems to be increasing, and they are carrying out some very clever propaganda which may profit from the general feeling of exasperation against Germany. They have, for example, neatly copied the Nazi trick of drawing old maps to justify r'12inl% and one can see prominently displayed in Warsaw
shop-windows maps of an era when Poland extended from Central Germany to the Black Sea.
The great danger in this is that the Pole does not regard the recently concluded pact in quite the same way as we do. He is inclined to see in it a guarantee of support for any sort of action against Germany, and if the extremists ever get the upper hand bitter misunderstandings might result. One can detect in conversation with Government Press circles an awareness of the necessity to enlighten Polish opinion on this matter, but it is difficult to see how they can do much while emotions are so inflamed without bewildering the public and shaking the confident self-reliance of the nation.
For confidence in herself is what Poland most needs at the moment, and there cannot be the slightest doubt that she has it in abundance. When one thinks of the relative strength of . the Polish and German Armies, one can perhaps be forgiven for wondering whether the Poles are not a little over-confident. " Why are you afraid of the Germans? " they ask. " We know them, and we can beat them. They make a lot of noise, but if you shout back they keep quiet. If they try anything, then we'll beat them." Any apologetically mumbled doubts as to the physical possibility of anything on earth withstanding an attack from two fronts in the north of the Corridor are brushed aside. Only concerning the air weapon are they a little un- certain, though here again they are all inclined to exaggerate the strength of Poland's front-line fleet, which can hardly reach two thousand machines. As a result, however, the new air-defence loans and measures are enthusiastically—almost fanatically—supported, so that, given time, Poland may even- tually be able to defend herself in the air, although she certainly cannot yet.
Here is Poland's great weakness, for, although the influence of air-power on infantry war is not yet certainly established, it seems most probable that overwhelming predominance in the air will lead to success on land It is difficult to find a Pole to take this seriously, and it must in this connexion not be forgotten that Poland, the land where cavalry still carry pennants and lances and where uniforms are perhaps the most dashing in Europe, has had no real experience of war as it is known to the Western Powers. I do not think that anyone is qualified to forecast what the effect of a fully equipped attack on the undeniably brave but rather inexperienced Polish Army would be. Bravery in itself can at the most make victory for the opponent more costly.
It may be that, in spite of his bravado, the Pole himself realises this, which is one possible explanation for a toning down of the violent antagonism towards everything Russian. Modern Russia is still the nation of " bandits who murdered four million," and real friendship between Poland and the Soviet must for long remain out of the question, yet signs are not lacking that the old intransigence is fading as the opinion gains favour that the Soviet has no territorial claims on Poland. The majority of people are still firmly opposed to any full military pact, for the old mistrust of the Russian soldier has not died, but there is lively interest in the possi- bility of an air-pact between the Soviet and Great Britain, which, it is felt, would be in Poland's favour, while saving her from the necessity of making a still unpopular break with a traditional policy of watchful enmity. It is significant that one often hears a paraphrase of that remark of a French general : " Poland may lose the war or Russia may win it."
Although the pact has probably already avoided war for some short time at least, if the future is to be honestly faced it must frankly be realised that in certain circumstances it may lead to quite another war, unless both countries fully understand how both peoples interpret the agreement. For us the pact is entirely defensive, drawn up to meet a certain set of circumstances ; for the Pole it is a through-thick-and- thin alliance. And in the long run it is not so much what Governments but what nations think of pacts that really matters.
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