Political Commentary

Who's for musical chairs?

Patrick Cosgrave

At the beginning of a new parliamentary session there is bound to be an outburst of speculation both about the timing and charac

ter of the next Cabinet reshuffle, and about the date of the next general electio\ri. Having

already unburdened myself of the idea that the election could well come this autumn — thereby fitting neatly in between the apparently successful Phase 2 and the potentially far more difficult Phase 3, and being unlikely in the climate of the time to generate a bitter government-union confrontation — I now propose to say something about the prospects for a reshuffle. It is true, as the editor reminds me, that I have been notably un successful in looking into Mr Heath's mind on such matters in the past, but that is at least partly because the Prime Minister is closer about what he thinks of his ministers and what he plans to do with them than was any predecessor: indeed, he is, one might say, totally close. Anyway, if at first you don't succeed....

This closeness of the Prime Minister is worth a further word. However he reshuffles Mr Heath can be relied upon not to bring forward any possible successor or potential rival. (He can also be relied upon to be dull, because it is in his nature to prefer continuity of departmen tal administration 'to the glamour and high jinks that have attended reshuffles in the past.) Now, such determination not to promote the interests of another is supposed to be characteristic of every Prime Minister, and supposed, also, to be present in Mr Heath merely to an unusual degree. Not so. Mr Macmillan certainly intrigued against Mr (now Lord) Butler as a successor, but he did nothing to deny him the opportunity to entrench himself as such; and every difficult task could be seen as another chance for Mr Butler to establish himself as undisputed Crown Prince. That he had failed to do so by October 1963 was his own fault, and partly the result of his unwillingness to appear to be ambitious. Mr Wilson, likewise a paranoid in office, more than once handed over a commanding position in government to a man who was not merely a potential challenger, but indisputably a harsh critic. Mr Jenkins, for example, was given the Treasury in circumstances which made him undisputed master of the Cabinet's economic policy, when Mr Crosland would probably have been an economically wiser and politically safer choice. Every prime minister, of course, spends part of his time looking over his shoulder, but only Mr Heath in recent years has destroyed the necessity of doing so, because his arrangements are such as ensure that there is nobody there.

It is a commonplace that Mr Heath has established his own complete dominance over his Cabinet and that, in particular, there is nobody holding one of the senior offices of state who will seriously dispute with him. This Is not necessarily to their discredit: loyalty, the conviction that Mr Heath is a leader of exceptional strength and remarkable potential, the gloomy character of the economic situation, combine to create a bunker mentality. But it is unfortunate. Cabinets thrive and grow on disputation, their collective identity in this way emerges, and the emergence of major Political figures in a government itself increases that government's public stature. The evident independence of mind of lain Macleod, combined with his obvious loyalty, and his gift for combining in his rhetoric the technical, economic and the politico-philosophical aspects of the Government's message are, for these reasons, ever more keenly missed.

In spite of all this, reshuffles are, from time to time, necessary. Even discounting the exagger ated nature of the rumours that Mr Whitelaw is to leave the Northern Ireland Office, it is clear that he cannot for ever sustain so heavy a burden. Mr Barber has made no secret of the fact that there is a limit to the number of Budgets and Finance Bills a Chancellor can present. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, while he still clearly loves the Foreign Office, and is perform ing more than ordinarily well there, has already told the Prime Minister that he is prepared to go at any time. On movement between these three positions all — at Cabinet level at least — depends, since Mr Rippon, Mr Walker, Sir Geoffrey Howe, Mr Carr, Mr Prior, and Mrs Thatcher are all, for various reasons, immovable for the moment.

We must assume that the Northern Ireland problem will be, if not solved, at least on the way to stabilisation, with the new assembly in existence, before any change in Mr Whitelaw's office can be contemplated. We can, I think, also make certain other assumptions. Unless he feels urgently the need to ginger up the team before an early election — there is no indication that he does — Mr Heath will want to make changes only when the more creative and earlier appointments to senior posts have carried out their main work of innovation.

With the exception of Mr John Davies, most of Mr Heath's first appointments (I include Mr Barber in that category) were well prepared with Conservative Party briefs to make fairly serious changes in their departments and, with the exception of Trade and Industry, most of those changes have been, or are being, made.

Mr Heath will therefore be looking for men to administer effectively newly established situations.

We can also assume, I think, that Mr Barber

will not get the Foreign Office, though he has set his heart on it: and we can assume Mr Whitelaw will not get the Treasury. A second major office — perhaps even now the third

most prestigious in the whole Cabinet — cannot be allowed to go Mr Barber's way, because it might go to his head. And Mr Whitelaw cannot have the Treasury, not merely because he is not gifted in economic matters, but because his potential as a major political figure, developed in Ulster, but contained within that province, would be too greatly enhanced by such a move.

Bearing these considerations in mind, and assuming that Sir Alec, Mr Barber and Mr Whitelaw resign or are moved, what can happen? Well, if the reshuffle comes before a general election, Mr Heath, without in any way being critical of Sir Keith Joseph's efficient performance at Health and Social Services, may well feel that, for all his capacity to attract the sympathetic understanding of experts in the social field, and for all the politically useful innovations he has made there, Sir Keith lacks public punch. Mr Whitelaw does not, and has a powerfully humane image. Moreover, when asked before the last election what' real ' (i.e.

heavily administrative) department he would like to head, Mr Whitelaw expressed strong interest in the DHSS. So Mr Whitelaw goes to the Elephant and Castle from Great George Street.

Lord Carrington must be first choice for the Foreign Office. In the polite but unrelenting struggle that has been going on since 1970 between the Foreign Office and the Defence Department on the proper attitude to be

adopted towards detente with the East—Lord Carrington has been far less optimistic than Sir Alec — Mr Heath's sympathies have clearly lain with the Department of Defence. And Lord Carrington is safely in the Lords.

Two of the remaining appointments then make themselves — Mr Barber to Defence, and Sir Keith Joseph to the Treasury. There is no way in which a Chancellor can move, save to the Foreign Office, without accepting some diminution in his position. But, if Mr Barber leaves behind a going economic concern at the Exchequer, and if his tax reforms have all gone through, that diminution would be minimal.

Again, assuming the economy is, or appears to be, on an even keel, and likely to remain so until an election (if it is evidently not, then all these speculations must give way to analysis of a far more critical situation) Sir Keith would have little to do except keep the show on the road, and he appears to lack the panache to make such a job a power base for himself. Both of these appointments would be politically safe, and give exceptionally competent men important and refreshing work to do. Filling the Northern Ireland office would be more difficult but, if Ulster is more or less quiescent, Lord Windlesham, the present Minister of State, would do very nicely, unless the Labour Party were undulyunwilling to have the Secretary of State in the Upper House. Even if this were the case, the problem that would be created by moving, say, Mr Mark Carlisle in over the head of Mr David Howell and Lord Windlesham, would create many complications at a lower level, where I would expect Mr Heath to confine his attentions to shifting around the Parliamentary Under-Secretaries. Anyway, if Ulster were not quiescent, Mr Whitelaw could not be moved; and if it were, Labour's indignation would be no more than ritual.

None of this may happen; or events may overwhelm all the possibilities I have suggested. But it does seem clear that, in the present situation, and saving crisis, no over whelmingly obvious candidates for new jobs and better ones are going to emerge from the ranks of Mr Heath's ministers. And that is where I came in: however fascinating the game of Cabinet-making, this Prime Minister allows the merest crumbs of evidence to escape from the prison of his mind, where he no doubt builds his own castles.