PRINCE BISMARCK'S ALTERNATIVE PLAN.
IF Prince Bismarck entertained, when in power, the ideas he is expressing now, Europe may have eseJped great dangers through his dismissal. It is evident from his recent and repeated utterances—utterances quite in accord with some obiter dicta in his speeches as Chancellor—that while he professes to rely upon the League of Peace, which was his own work, as a permanent defence against a coalition, he has thought out an alternative plan which, by detaching Russia from all European interests, would make Germany independent of Austria, and comparatively fearless of France. This plan, remarkable for its adroitness and its knowledge of the general situation, is remarkable also for its unscru- pulous selfishness : the interests of the whole world, those of allies included, being treated as trifles when the safety, or rather the ascendency, of Germany is concerned. The Prince's idea, avowedly, is that whenever the danger of a coalition drew near, Russia might be invited to seize Constantinople by a coup de main, dismiss the Sultan to a luxurious captivity as a mediatised Mussulman prince, garrison the great city with forty thousand men, and wait, from that point of vantage, to see who would declare war on behalf of Turkey. France clearly would not, for her interests in the matter are not direct ; and she would continue to hope on for the Russian alliance. Germany clearly would not, for on the hypothesis the plan would be her own, and Austria would be most reluctant to fight all by herself, —would probably, if abandoned, prefer, as the late Crown Prince Rudolph once confessed that he pre- ferred, a partition of the Balkans. There would remain Eng- land, and two chances, both of them favourable to Germany. England might decline the contest, only retaining Egypt, in which case she would be the object of French hostility, and therefore an ally against France ; or she might fight in defence of Turkey, in which case Russia would be fully occupied, it might even be greatly weakened, for a genera- tion. This latter alternative would be even better if Austria joined England in defending Constantinople, for then Russia might be really defeated, and forced for many years to abstain from taking any menacing part in European politics. Prince Bismarck evidently believes that England would fight, for he speaks of her defence of India ; but even assuming that she did not, Russia, once in possession of Constantinople, would be face to face with Southern Asia, and would find conquest there such a necessity and such a temptation that she would neither have time nor energy left for serious interference in German affairs. The world, in short, would be thrown into com- motion if Russia seized Constantinople ; but Germany would be comparatively safe, her only active enemy who remained powerful being France. Therefore, Prince Bismarck invites the Czar to seize Constantinople.
It is a large scheme in its way, not discreditable to the Prince's high repute as a diplomatist ; but just look what it involves in the way of treachery to allies. We will say nothing of Great Britain, for, in the first place, Prince Bis- marck has always resented her policy of standing aloof from the Continental struggle, and does not regard her as an ally ; and, in the second place, we doubt if the independence of Constantinople is by any means vital to the interests of this country. We could defend Egypt much more easily, and the appearance of Russia in the Mediterranean would not be to our ultimate harm. She could appear there only as a Maritime Power, and as a Maritime Power she would be far more assailable by Great Britain than she is at present, when she offers nothing that could be attacked, except possibly the Caucasus, and could not be invaded by any army at our statesmen's disposal. Moreover, such an appearance would literally drive Italy, for her own pro- tection, into a close and permanent alliance with this country, which could alone preserve her from instant dis- memberment by a French and Russian coalition. Although, therefore, it is not pleasant to perceive that the Prince would give England away at any moment if that were even the apparent interest of Germany, it is not from any pessi- mistic view of our position that we call attention to his scheme. It is because in pure " patriotism "—that is, selfishness—he gives away the future of Italy, which, if Russia enters the Mediterranean, must maintain through ages a fleet of crushing magnitude, and the direct interests of Austria, which, if she did not advance to &ionic-, would feel herself throttled, and every chance of freedom for all the States of the Balkans. It is simply impossible for Russia to owu Constantinople and not desire a free road thither by land, and the only road lies right through the Balkan States. Those States must all be crushed, even if Austria consented to a partition ; and if she did not, they must become the object of contests between the Romanoffs and Hapsburgs for generations to come, and could no more develop them- selves in peace than a field could grow corn with an army camped upon its furrows. Those contests, too, as the Austrian statesmen are well aware, could hardly end to Austrian advantage, for Russia, with her limitless supply of men, could attack the Balkans from two sides at once, from Bessarabia and from Constantinople, and, if she had even moderate Generals, or decent fortune, could hardly fail to claim victory in the end, victory which would mean for Austria the loss of control over the Danube.
The Prince's scheme, if not fatal to Austria, for great Empires are slow to die, would at least be fatal to all the ideas and hopes which have induced the Hapsburgs, imme- diately after a defeat by Germany, to accept a German alliance. Austria, in Hungarian belief, at all events, would be sold to her enemy in order to purchase for Germany a respite from a dangerous war, and this by the very man who offered her a protecting alliance. No duty to his neighbours, it is clear, at all bound the Prince's action, and he would have offered Russia anything outside Germany,—Norway, for example, if only by that means he could have made Germany permanently secure.
It may be said that Prince Bismarck's plans are now only academic, and need, therefore, attract no notice ; but that is only partially true. They throw, to begin with, a singular and a sinister light upon his political character, and upon the consequences which might have followed his exclusive devotion to German interests, even when they conflict with the ordinary morality of statesmen. They explain, too, the restless sensitiveness of Vienna, which is always uneasy at the merest rumour of friendship between St. Petersburg and Berlin, and that curious distrust of Germany which never entirely abandons either of the Austrian Parliaments, and is perpetually being soothed away by assurances from the Throne. Moreover, though the German Emperor can be trusted, and perhaps the body of his people, who dislike the Slays as much as they love safety, the ex-Chancellor is by no means alone in his idea,. There is a strong party in Conservative Germany which holds that much of the policy of the last few years has been mistaken, that it has brought upon Germany almost insup- portable burdens in the way of military dangers, and that it would have been far wiser to adhere to the old idea that Russia and Prussia were naturally allied. The Emperor William retained something of that idea all through his life, and almost with his dying breath exhorted his present successor to retain a friendship for Russia which he himself had never quite forgotten. If, through any accident, such as a change in the occupancy of the Throne, the fidelity of Austria became less assured, or if the Conservative Party in Germany regained the upper hand, the desire to " conciliate Russia," or at all events, to detach her from the side of France, would again become strong; and the most obvious way is to offer her the bait of Constantinople, which Alexander II., be it re- membered, actually took. It was in consequence of per- mission to declare war with Turkey, that Alexander U. watched the German invasion of France with benevolent neutrality, and wrote the " little note" of a few lines which practically conveyed to the Hapsburgs the sovereignty of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. We may hope that such a policy will not be resumed, and that the present arrange- ments will continue, at least until the Balkan States are federated, and can speak their minds as to to their own destiny and that of Constantinople; but it is vain to assume that those arrangements are laws of Nature, or that Continental statesmen have not thought out alterna- tives far less acceptable to many of those concerned. Certainly, if we may judge by Prince Bismarck's con- fessions, those statesmen will not be restrained by any superfine morality, or any interests, even of their own most intimate allies. Buy Russia if she is too dangerous to fight,—that is the alternative policy to which Prince Bis- marck had clearly made up his mind, and which his countrymen will not condemn. because, in their minds, patriotism excuses every kind of political offence.
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