PRINCE LOBANOF'S DEATH.
PRINCE LOBANOF had the essential quality of a- great man. He knew what he wanted and he knew how he wanted to attain his desire. In other words, both end and means were clear to him, and he had a policy in the true sense of the word. Lesser statesmen have only a vague general idea of doing something to help their country, or to further a particular cause, or to further their own ambition. They want to be successful, but they hardly know how to be more specific than that, and a clear settled plan for being successful they are utterly without. Such men sometimes blunder into triumphs as they often blunder into failures, but as a rule they exert little or no influence upon the course of the world. They live from hand to mouth, and when they resign or die little or nothing is felt. It is very different in the case of men such as Prince Lobanof. When they die the world feels that a great force has been extin- guished,—a force that was urging it consciously and per- sistently in a special direction. It may be that the exact nature and direction of the force exerted were not recog- nised by Europe. The horses, though they feel the driver's hand, do not know his intention, but for all that they note the change the moment the directing influence is relaxed.
We do not pretend to be able to lay down exactly what were Prince Lobanof's aims, objects, and methods. Many of them he purposely concealed, and others were only partially revealed, but there is enough information pro- curable to get a general idea of his policy and to catch its main drift. Prince Lobanof's great object was to secure and keep pre-eminence for Russia in Europe and Asia. He wanted primarily to make Russia the supreme Power in the Far East, and to place China under her influence and control. In order to attain this object it was neces- sary for him to keep the peace in Europe. He knew that if war were to break out in Europe, Russia must be involved, and a European war in which Russia was engaged would prevent her expansion in the Far East. Hence his aim became, as we have said, the maintenance of peace in Europe. The best way to secure peace was, he saw, to produce such an equilibrium among the Con- tinental Powers as would make it worth no one's while to enter upon war. To secure this it was necessary to put an end to the isolation of France, and to balance the Triple Alliance with a Dual Alliance. Accordingly he worked for and secured an alliance between France and Russia. But at the same time he was careful that this alliance should in no sense be an alliance directed against or essentially hostile to the Triple Alliance. He never made a step in the direction of pleasing France without at the same time making it clear to Germany and Austria that he had no intention of injuring them. For example, he took care that the Czar's visit to Paris should be " corrected " by previous visits to Vienna and Germany, and by an expression of friendly feeling towards Italy. Naturally this plan of neutralising his advances towards France was likely to be ill received in France. There was always a danger of the French people saying, 'What is the good of an ally who is always protesting that his friendship means nothiug ? ' Prince Lobanof managed, however, so well that this feeling was always kept under. His chief instrument for effecting this was the jealousy of France for England. Though he could not make common cause with his ally against Germany, he was able to make France feel that she was not duped, by inflicting various diplomatic humiliations on England. Though we cannot injure Germany, we can, at any rate, abate the arrogance of England.' That was, in effect, Prince Lobanof's line of policy, and very well, from his point of view, did it succeed. The secret of his policy was thus the neutralising of French jealousies by a show of un- friendliness towards England. This opposition to England served, too, another purpose. It pleased Germany as well as France, and enabled the Germans to observe with satisfaction that England was getting her just reward for not joining the Triple Alliance. How far Prince Lobanof meant to carry his hostility towards England it is difficult to say. It is asserted that he seemed lately far more anxious to worry us about Egypt than the French Government, and that his action in that direction was far more strenuous and persistent. It is not likely, however, that he would have cared to go beyond the administration of diplomatic rebuffs. Had he actually succeeded in getting us to evacuate Egypt, he would have found himself in a very awkward predicament. France would no longer have had a grievance against this country, and would have been in a position, after the first excitement had cooled down, to consider whether after all an understanding with England might not be better worth having than one with Russia. Depend upon it, Prince Lobanof was too good a diplomatist not to see the value to Russia of the open sore in Egypt. It has been said that Prince Lobanof's policy of putting Europe as a whole in opposition to England was due to a personal dislike of this country. That is possible, but we think not likely. It is more probable that he had no special likes or dislikes among the Powers, but was merely led into his anti-English policy by the necessities of the diplomatic game. As we have shown above, he could not manage to ally himself with France, and yet conciliate Germany and Austria, without "taking it out" of some one, and, under the circumstances, that some one was bound to be England. Our attitude on the Eastern question made it especially easy for Prince Lobanof to take up an anti-English position. He had determined that Russia's true policy was not to worry about the possession of Constantinople, but to be content with controlling and pro- tecting the Sultan, and he was therefore in an excellent position for Checkmating and snubbing England in her attempts to help the Armenians. (Again and again he was able to combine Europe against this selfish firebrand who would rather run the risk of firing the powder magazine than give up her whim about the wickedness of the Porte.) Such action suited Prince Lobanof's policy beautifully. It enabled him to prove to Austria the perfect bona-fides of Russia, and also to please both Germany and France, always delighted to see an injury inflicted upon England.
Is it possible that the death of Prince Lobanof will enable the Emperor of Russia to map out a policy of his own and return to the older aspirations of Russia ? We cannot of course answer this question but at any rate it may be pointed out that there is a splendid opportunity for a new departure. The riots and massacres at Con- stantinople go far to show that Prince Lobanof's Turkish policy was based on a delusion. He believed that the Turkish Empire might easily go on for many years as it was,—until, in fact, Russia, strengthened by her expansion in the Far East, should be in a position to take its place. Events, however, are showing that a catastrophe may take place at any moment, and that Europe may be forced even against its will to partition Turkey. But if that were to happen it is clear that Russia would, as things are now, be at a great disadvantage. If the Turkish Empire is really going to collapse, Russia, as the Power most vitally interested, should be ready with a scheme for the disposal of the provinces. Again, it is surely worth the Czar's while to consider whether, after all, the best policy for Russia is not a policy based upon her history, upon her religion, and upon the race-feeling of her people. The policy of taking Constantinople and freeing the Christian subjects of the Porte is a truly national policy, and to revive it and act upon it would be an act worthy of the Czar. The final overthrow of the Sultan's Government and the partition of Turkey must, no doubt, mean a Kurdish, and possibly an Albanian, war, but it need not mean a European conflict. If Russia is reason- able in her demands, Austria, as we have said elsewhere, has no choice but to submit.
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