COBDEN CLUB ESSAYS: SECOND SERIES.* IT would be impossible, within
the limits usually accorded in this newspaper to a single review, to discuss all the subjects which are treated in the present volume. We should have to pass rapidly from the causes of war to Trade-Unions and from coinage to primogeniture, glancing on our way at a proposal to substitute an income tax of a shilling in the pound for customs and excise duties. The probable result would be that while all the essays would be mentioned, none would have justice done them, and that our readers would be spared the necessity of consulting the table of contents, but would not have gained much more information than it could supply. For these reasons we think it better to con-
fine ourselves to a consideration of each of the Essays as appear to us most important, either in subject or in treatment. M. de
Laveleye's paper on "The Causes of War and the means of re-
ducing their number," Mr. Brodrick's paper on Primogeniture, and Mr. Fowler's on "The present aspect of the Land Question," are
those which best answer that definition. Of course the first of these essays must derive a peculiar interest at this moment from the events which have followed the signature of the Washington Treaty. Yet M. de Laveleye writes from a much wider point of view than the one suggested either by temporary agreements or disagreements, and it would not be fair to judge his essay by reference to present complications. No doubt if he had foreseen the immediate consequences of the Washington Treaty he would not have written of it with such confidence. He would hardly have said on one page that it "will form an epoch in the history of international relations," and on the next that it is "an event on which all humanity may justly congratulate itself—first, because it restores harmony between the two great branches of the race that represents freedom in the world ; and next, because it gives an authoritative sanction to the principle of international arbitration."
Reading these passages now, we think the irony of events has been too severe on M. de Laveleye. But if we examine the pro- poeals of his essay, we see that he has more than once laid himself open to some such treatment.
The enumeration of the chief causes which have led to war is careful and complete, and is also likely to reassure us by giving rise to the thought that many of those causes have ceased to • Cobden Club Essays: Second Series, 1871-2. London: Cassell, Patter and Galpiu. 1872. operate. Wars of religion, wars for the balance of power, wars of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, wars of historical origin, wars of race, wars for natural boundaries, wars of conquest, wars for colonial possessions, wars for influence over other countries, wars arising from the duties of neutral States, and wars arising from accident, make up M. de Laveleye's bat, which we hope will not be enlarged as yet by the addition of another kind, wars arising from agreement. It is safe to assume that most of the earlier kinds of wars are unlikely to be renewed, but that does not bring us much nearer the proposed end. So long as any causes of war remain, so long as any national disputes are left without the means of settlement, there is always the danger of an outbreak. The main question is, can any means be adopted for the settlement of national disputes ? Let us hear what M. de Lave- leye proposes. We may remark that he is not as sanguine as some are with regard to the universal success of any system of arbitration. All that he expects is a reduction of the number of the chief causes of war. This, he thinks, may be effected by "the settlement of a code of international law, defining the reciprocal rights and duties of nations in time both of peace -and war ; and the institution of a system of arbitration to arrange such international differences as may arise." The im- portance of the first of these requirements is shown by the multi- plicity of questions which may arise as to the duties of neutral powers, and which are thus stated by M. de Laveleye :— " A neutral State cannot allow its ports to be used by a belligerent for the fitting out of privateers. Is a neutral responsible for insufficient supervision, and how far does that responsibility extend? If a merchant vessel sails from a neutral port, and receives on the high seas her arma- ment and her crew, what are the duties and the responsibilities of the neutral government ? What is an effective blockade ? What obliga- tions does a blockade impose upon neutral powers? Ought all blockad- ing not to be renounced, as Cobden proposed ? What cargoes ought to be considered contraband, of war ? What are the limits of the right of search ? Can an enemy be seized on board a neutral ship? Has a belligerent any right to requisition neutral property, provided indemnity be paid, as was done by the Prussians when they sank English steamers to bar the navigation of the Seine ? May neutral vessels carry coal and provisions for the use of belligerents ?
"Can a neutral state allow belligerents to pass through its territory ? What are its duties if preparations are made on its territory to reprovi- sion a besieged fortress, or to facilitate the escape of prisoners, as was complained of by Prussia in the case of Luxemburg ?
"When a neutral bay is more than six miles in width, has a belligerent a right to pursue and fight his enemy's ships in it? A hundred ques- tions of this nature could be quoted, that have given rise to grave disputes, and might lead to war. Is it not a disgrace to humanity that civilised nations should not yet have come to an understanding to settle these doubtful points by common consent ? Is it not time to agree to a code of international law, which need be imposed upon no one, but which would become law among nations freely adhering to it, as was done in 1865 by the monetary convention between France, Italy, Switzerland, and Belgium, and which has been since agreed to by Spain and Greece ?"
We think it will be generally admitted that there ought to be some agreement, or rather nnderstanding, upon these matters. But it may be a question how far such an under- standing would deserve the name of a code of international Jaw, and how far the existence of such an understanding in time of peace would act upon national passions when any disturbance threatened. An understanding which would "become law among nations freely adhering to it" lacks the very essence of law, authority. Nations which freely adhered might as freely re- nounce, and probably would renounce whenever such a course tended to their advantage. M. de Laveleye virtually admits all this when he says that the independence of no power would be jeopardised by its submitting to arbitration, because the decisions of the proposed tribunal would only be binding on those who acquiesced in them, and because "in the event of an unjust judg- ment the aggrieved State might decline to submit to it." But who is to be the judge of the justice or injustice of any decision? What is the use of submitting to an arbitration by which you will only be bound if the result is in your favour, and which in that case will not be binding on your adversary ? M. de Laveleye says that the decisions of the tribunal would probably be accepted because "what the State decided against may lose by the deci- sion is nothing as compared to what a war would cost it." But if there were any chance of the cost of a war being calmly con- sidered before the first step was taken, we might dispense with all these considerations. We might then trust to the common-sense of nations preferring anything save dishonour to such a fearful alternative. M. de Laveleye says, "had the public known that the twenty-third protocol of the Treaty of 1856 morally com- pelled France in her quarrel with Prussia to call in the good offices of the other powers before resorting to arms, its voice would pro- bably have forced the French Emperor to take that step, and the
war might have been averted." Yet, assuming that the voice of the peaceful public could have influenced one who went to war for the purpose of regaining popularity with the army, and hoped to reconcile the nation to war by conquest, may we not say with greater certainty that if the public had considered the coat of the war it would have been much more likely to use such pressure ?
We must turn, however, from M. de Laveleye's essay to the other two with which we proposed to deal, and which, from the similarity of their subjects, we may place together. The tendency of both these papers is towards the abolition of all land tenures except fee simple. Mr. Brodrick looks upon settlements and life estates in land as the real cause of the evils of the present system of primogeniture ; while Mr. Fowler traces to the same source the unproductiveness of land, and the low return it makes to an inadequate capital. In Mr. Brodrick's essay there occurs that passage about the supposed number of landowners in England which has already been cited a propog of Lord Derby's proposal. Mr. Fowler's figures as to the quantity of land held in settlement or in mortmain are equally worthy of notice. We are told that "70 per cent. of the whole cultivated area of the country is still in the hands of limited owners holding under settlements," while it is Mr. Fowler's- " strong impression that something like a sixth of the whole real property of the nation, worth about £500,000,000, is practically held in mortmain." What with the vast property held by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, the Universities, and the various. corporations, there must be a considerable total, while of the manner in which such estates are almost sure to be mangaged we may judge from one of the instances given by Mr. Fowler. He tells us of an estate belonging to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners where there is not a single cottage on 2,000 acres. If the land held by these bodies lacks the indispensable element of personal supervision, that which is held by limited owners suffers equally from the want. of capital. We are told of a property in Sussex which was bought in 1810 for £50,000, and remained in strict settlement for forty years. By that time it had become so depreciated through neglect. that it was sold for £25,000. The new purchaser, however, was a man of capital and enterprise, and it throve so in his hands that. he was lately offered £75,000 for the property. We may see from Mr. Brodrick's paper how impossible it is for eldest sons, having the portions of their brothers and sisters charged on the estate, having nothing more than a life interest, and having to keep up a position commensurate with the dignity;of the estate rather than the income from it, to devote the necessary sums to its improvement.. Of course this is not the main objection to the system of primo- geniture. We think Mr. Brodrick is guilty of a fallacy whenn, he says that it involves no real hardship on younger sons, that their " supposed grievance is in no respect more real than the grievance of those who are born to no fortune at all, and look wistfully at the inherited wealth of the richer classes." Except on principles of communism, which would destroy all private property, it. cannot be maintained that all men are born with equal rights,. whatever may have been done by their parents, or that a man who. acquires wealth by ability or industry may only enjoy it for his. own life without transmitting any of it to his descendants. On the other hand, a younger son may well feel it hard that his brother, born in the same condition and of the same parents, should be placed immeasurably above him in worldly fortune on account of a year's difference in age. We mention this, because in all other- parts of his paper Mr. Brodrick has our full concurrence, and his. statement of the evils which result from the system of primogeni- ture is not only just but moderate.