The Russian Naval Menace
By ADMIRAL SIR WILLIAM JAMES
EFORE the submarine and the aeroplane were developed into major weapons for maritime war the balance of sea- power could be seen at a glance from the number of battleships built and building by the Powers. The human factor, which in our case so often restored the balance when our fleet was heavily outnumbered by the combined fleets of France. Spain and Holland, could not be weighed until after the first encounters ; that it was still a principal factor after steel and steam displaced wood and canvas was evident when the Russian fleet was annihilated in the Tsushima Straits by a Japanese Fleet, whose battle-power on paper was the same. But when in the First War Germany made a bid for quick victory by issuing orders to her submarines to sink merchant ships without warning, she not only debased the standard of conduct that had been observed for centuries and promoted the submarine to a major attack-weapon, but introduced new and unknown factors in the balance of sea-power.
It was only after long experience of fighting submarines that we were able to estimate the forces and weapons required to defeat a sustained, unrestricted submarine offensive. By a great effort our scientists, shipbuilders and seamen succeeded in first checking the sinkings and then slowly but surely gaining com- plete ascendancy over the submarines. During 1916 only twenty- five submarines were destroyed ; by November, 1917, 2,800 anti-submarine vessels were in action, and from May, 1918, to the end of the war between eight and ten submarines were sunk each month. The weapon that could only proceed slowly under- water without an eye and whose fighting power on the surface was small was overcome by weapons moving faster on the surface, with an eye, and the means to destroy a submarine when it was located. Two factors that helped to restore the balance were, firstly, that after the cream of the submarine commanders had been killed the offensive was prosecuted with less skill and vigour, and, in the later stages, the Germans experienced difficulty in equipping their large output of submarines with 100 per cent. efficient crews, and, secondly, the minefields we were able to lay in the submarine exit-channels from their bases because we held the whip-hand in the North Sea. We now knew how to defeat a submarine offensive, but during the next twenty years the money allocated to the Navy was insufficient to build, maintain and train the armada of anti- submarine vessels that would be needed if our sea-borne trade was again under heavy attack ; we were only just able to keep the balance in surface ships slightly in our favour. So the pattern of the last war was similar to the pattern of the 1914-18 war. It was not until_the spring of 1943 that we began to check the submarine offensive, and only just in time, as during the first twenty days of March our losses reached the appalling figure of 500,000 tons. In the British Empire alone 220 destroyers, 301 corvettes, 244 frigates and 1,260 coastal craft were built for the campaign ; but it was the aeroplane that turned the tide of battle definitely in our favour. As soon as long-range planes were suitably based to cover the waters through which the convoys passed our losses began to fall steeply ; in May, 1943, no ship was sunk within 600 miles of the bases of the shorter-range Coastal Command planes. When profiting by the submarine's increased radius of action and the acquisition of the French Atlantic bases, Admiral Donetz severely strained our resources by moving large concentrations of submarines from one part of the Atlantic to another, this was met by a corresponding rise in the efficiency of the hunting vessels. Today Russia is a potential enemy, and her building pro- gramme is veiled in secrecy. Between 350 and 370 submarines are believed to be in service ; about 60 are former German U boats and about 100 are a small, coastal type with a very limited radius of action. Some 120 submarines are believed to be under construction in Russian dockyards, whose building capacity is reported to be twice that of ten years ago. A proportion of these new boats are mine-layers. It has also been reported that Russia has begun a long-term programme to raise her submarine fleet to 1,000, but that will not be completed for many years, and Russia, unlike other Powers, does not scrap obsolete ships.
Whether or not Russia is capable of building and manning such an enormous fleet in the distant future, she can today despatch a large number of submarines to our trade routes before or on the outbreak of war, and that is the all-important difference between a war with Russia and our two wars with Germany. In those two wars the Germans began with few submarines, and, though we were at a grave disadvantage in the 1914-18 war because we had not anticipated unrestricted war- fare, we were able to introduce the convoy system on the out- break of the last war and before the Germans had brought into service the large number of submarines that operated a year later. There will be no breathing-space to institute the com- plicated convoy and routing systems after Russia declares war, and so the Atlantic Powers must be ready with all the measures necessary to combat a powerful attack on their sea-borne trade.
There is no reason to suppose that the inherent disadvantages of a submarine when in battle with a surface ship or aeroplane have been dispelled by some new invention. The breathing-tube, invented by the Germans, removed the disadvantage of having to surface to charge batteries, but both ship and planes can pick up this tube by radar. An increase in speed of the submarine can be matched by increasing the speed of the hunting vessels. Moreover, Russia is geographically at a disadvantage for con- ducting war in the Atlantic. Not only would her submarines have very long passages to the trade routes and back, but those based in the Black Sea and Baltic would have to pass through long narrows whose shores will be in the hands of their enemy. No great effort would be needed to deny these passages to sub- marines, and if an early objective of the Russian Army is to reach these shores, and it proves successful, the passage of submarines can still be made hazardous by mines laid by aero- planes; the Germans brought our Channel and Thames Estuary shipping to a standstill by that method. Submarines sailing from the Northern bases are at first only restricted by the ice-line, but to reach the trade routes they must pass through the Denmark Strait or between Iceland and the Faroes or between the Faroes and the Shetland Islands, and none of these narrows is too wide for effective patrol.
Furthermore, it is not wishful thinking to assume that the Russian commanders and crews will be no more skilful or better trained than the Germans were, or than our own commanders, whose exploits in the Mediterranean were famous before they. too, lost their lives. The efficiency of the Russian sailor has hitherto been low. The Russian ships were hopelessly out- classed by their opponents in the Russo-Japanese War ; the Russian Baltic Fleet performed no useful service in the 1914-18 war ; in the last war the protection of the Arctic convoys was undertaken entirely by us, and we never heard of the Russian Black Sea Fleet when the Germans advanced to Stalingrad. It is unwise to underrate an enemy, but it is absurd to assume that the Russian sailor has overnight become a super seaman. strategist, tactician and technician. We are prone to think that the balance of sea-power is tipped against the Atlantic Powers when we hear, from time to time. that Russia intends to build an immense submarine fleet: but ten years of experience of fighting submarines has proved that the submarine is no match for surface and air forces. That the Atlantic Powers realise that next time two years to build up an anti-submarine front will be two years too long is evident from the trend of their building programmes. Aircraft-carriers are being reconstructed and improved to operate more effective aircraft for anti-submarine warfare ; large destroyers are being adapted as submarine-killers ; smaller destroyers are being con- verted into anti-submarine frigates ; the policy is reflected in the names given to new U.S.A. construction—" Hunter-killer cruisers.' "Hunter-killer destroyers " ; minesweepers are riow given high priority. Today we can contribute 12 carriers, 106 destroyers. 162 frigates and 60 minesweepers, which can also function as escorts, and we are building six carriers, eight destroyers and a number of sweepers ; the U.S.A. can contribute 103 carriers, 595 destroyers and escorts. 176 patrol vessels and a large number of submarings converted or designed as sub- marine-killers, and have under construction 112 vessels ; the Dominions and all the other Atlantic Treaty countries are con- verting existing ships and building new ships for anti-submarine warfare.
The Atlantic Powers may not yet be able to deploy sufficient strength to shatter a submarine offensive, but there is not a shadow of doubt that it is well within their power to do so. Russia's geographical disadvantages also apply to any offensive operations she may attempt with her surface fleet. The ' Bismarck ' based on Norway, skilfully commanded and manned by a crew, who were competent to manipulate the maze of machines and instruments could not reach the trade-routes ; the ' Tirpitz ' never fired a shot ; the only successful forays by German surface ships were by those based at Brest, close to the trade-routes, and these forays were soon stopped by our bombers. Russia is reported to be building three battleships, twenty cruisers and 120 destroyers, but even when these are added to existing ships her surface-ship strength will be no match for the surface- ship strength of the Atlantic Powers.
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