THE TROUBLES OF ITALY. A LL British lovers of Italy, which
is another way of saying the whole British nation, have read with great pleasure the accounts of the enthusiastic reception given to the King of Italy I oth in the Italian Parliament and in the streets of Rome. If we had been guided solely by the depressing messages which we often read in the pispers about Italian affairs, we might have come to the conclusion that Italy was on the verge of revolution. The vast majority of Italians, we are sure, would be greatly astonished if they were told what is sometimes believed abroad about the state of their country. Unity has been the rock to which all good Italians have clung ever since the early days of the Risorgimento ; unity was the motto of the revolutionary leaders of those great days ; and the Italians are few and far between who wish now to let go of a principle which has served them so well. The exodus from the Chamber of the Italian Socialists and Republicans served only to mark the enthusiasm of the vast majority of Deputies who remained to cheer for the King and for Italy.
But though the dangers which beset Italy are too commonly magnified, it cannot be denied that there are dangers, various and real, and all the courage and the high sense of responsibility of the Italian people will be needed to avoid them. Although Italy comes out of the war victorious, she has suffered terribly ; she has gone short of raw materials for almost every industry, and she has gone very short of food. Now she is passing through a phase of widespread strikes and riots. People who have suffered as the Italians have, and are suffering, are naturally in a weary, excited, and rather nervous condition. But when it comes to choosing between the path of safety and the path of wild and speculative action, it is the Italian sense of responsibility to the rest of the world which will bring the country safely through. Among people who have been very sorely tried, sobriety of judgment is not always to be reckoned upon, and it would not be surprising if people who have become rather feverish in meditating upon their troubles turned their thoughts to desperate remedies. It is a case, therefore, for thankfulness that the Italian3 as a whole show no sign at all of taking leave of their moderation. They know perfectly well that Europe could not afford the collapse of Italy. The problems of settling Europe are numerous and bewildering enough without a disaster which would certainly bring about others, and which would merely be the beginning of one knows not how long a series of catastrophes. If there were not in Italy the real sense of responsibility which we know there is, Italy would still be saved from an extreme or adventurous policy by the exhaustion of the people. She does not want a fresh war any more than other reason- able nations want one. Although the Italian Government could afford to ignore the protests and more or less ill- mannered ejaculations of the Socialists and Republicans, they could not afford to ignore, even if they wanted to do so, the solid opposition to an aggressive policy which the parties of the Left (one-third of the Chamber) represent.
On the whole, one can look with confidence to the passing away of the bad dream which has been imposed upon his countrymen by Signor d'Annunzio. Of course there is always the danger, which must not be forgotten, that Signor d'Annunzio, with what he may regard as an heroic gesture, will issue a pronunciamiento in the true Latin fashion and challenge the Government to adopt his policy or leave the field clear for others. But every day which passes without an act of madness is a day gained. At present the situation is remarkable enough. Signor d'Annunzio has managed to maintain himself at Fiume in defiance"of the orders of his own Government and of the Supreme Council of the Allies, and he has done so with the support of many elements of the Regular forces. More than that, he has now occupied Zara, and it is 'Possible that his adven- turous impulse will not expend itself before he has occupied Spalato or some other place or places. The officers of the Italian ships which are nominally blockading him at Fiume are evidently showing him a good deal of indulgence and sympathy. But though their blockade as such may be ineffective, it serves a useful purpose, inasmuch as it keeps the ring. If the blockade were not nominally in existence, the South Slays might be tempted to have a fling at the invader, and goodness knows what would happen then. Probably the Italian spirit would not be proof against such an attack ; the cry would be raised that Italy was not, after all, the aggressor but the victim, and all history informs us that for such a plea a high-spirited nation will rush to arms without reflecting that its original cause was a bad one. Even though no excuse can be found by foreigners for Signor d'Annunzio's mad escapade, it would help people to understand how readily excuses are made in Italy if they reflected upon what unfair things have been said about Italy in connexion with the Secret Treaty of London. Ever since the text—though possibly not the full text or the perfectly accurate text—of that Treaty was published by the Russian Bolsheviks, a kind of odium has attached to it, as though it were something dishonest. Yet there is no dishonesty whatever about it. It was a perfectly straightforward and natural agreement such as the Italians were bound to make in their own interests if they were to enter the war. The very word " secret " has been used as a term of abuse. How absurd is this abuse is shown by the simple fact that the Treaty contained a good deal which was of a purely military character, and which could not possibly be published to the world without giving valuable information to our enemies. For example, if the Treaty had been made public, the Austrians would have known the exact date on which Italy proposed to mobilize her forces ! In criticism of the Treaty it is also said, quite unfairly, that the Yugo-Slays had nothing to do with drafting it though their interests were primarily affected, and that the Treaty does not give them any outlet to the sea. The facts, of course, are that in April, 1915, when the Treaty was made, the Yugo-Slays had no constituted Government which could be consulted. For all that, they were not ignored. The Treaty of London leaves considerably over a hundred miles of sea coast south of Fiume which is at the disposal of the Yugo-Slays. On this piece of coast there are such harbours as Buccari and Porto Re. These are excellent harbours, and there are several smaller ports further south. South of Sebenico the Yugo-Slays have Spalato, Metcovich, Ragusa, and Cattaro. All these Paces and their great hinterland might belong to the Yugo-Slays, under the Treaty of London itself, and of course the provisional arrangement under the Armistice and the proposals which were subse- quently made in Paris go further in favour of the South Slays. Yet to hear some persons talk one might suppose that Italy was consumed by an Imperialistic passion which would not allow her to be satisfied short of the possession of all Dalmatia. We have no doubt ourselves that the Italian Government understand perfectly well that it is essential for their national safety that they should have not merely a good frontier but neighbours beyond it who are not nursing grievances. It should be remembered that even the more or less unofficial Pact of Rome, which is so often quoted by the critics of Italy, laid it down that the agreement between Italy and the Yugo-Slays must be of a kind "not to injure the vital interests of the two nations such as shall be defined at the moment of peace." We are not very much afraid that statesmanship and good- will will fail in this matter. What we are rather more afraid of is that Signor d'Annunzio's martial folly may take the settlement out of the hands of reasonable men and place it at the mercy of passion. One word in conclusion. President Wilson's rebuke during the Peace Conference to the Italian Government has left a certain tension between Italy and the United States which has hardly been relaxed. For this reason it„is conceivable that Americans might be in a mind to misunderstand any word from Italy which seemed to be in the least provocative. Probably there is no such risk, though it is just possible that the King of Italy's very natural declaration in his Speech of the intention of Italy to maintain a close association between the home country and those Italians who have settled in Latin America might be regarded as a kind of challenge to the Monroe Doctrine. We are perfectly sure of course that nothing of the kind was intended, for every civilized European country recognizes not only the validity but the extreme usefulness of the Monroe Doctrine, and desires to co- operate with the United States in maintaining respect for it. Even if the King of Italy—an absurd supposition— were not sound upon that point, he of course knows quite well that Italy has nothing to gain and everything to lose by failing to be the best of friends with America. After all, the Americans understand better than any other people in the world how natural it is for men living on the continent of America, North or South, to retain a sentimental affec- tion for the countries of their origin, though acknowledging citizenship of their adopted land. It is by virtue of that understanding that American; have so long regarded it as excusable for the Irish in their midst to behave as they do.
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