INDONESIA
PRESENT events in Indonesia must be set against their background, if they are to be understood. The basic cause of the anarchy reigning in Djarkata must be sought in the geo- graphical dispersion and, at the same time, the disproportion of Indonesian territory. The Dutch East Indies united some three thousand islands, big, small and minute, all of which—with the exception of Dutch New Guinea (West Irian)— now form the Indonesian republic. They contain eighty million inhabitants, of which fifty million live in Java, although most of the national wealth in fact comes from other islands—from Sumatra, Borneo or the Celebes. Geography has, therefore, created both a natural tendency to particularism on the part of the different islands and a clash of interests between the Javanese and the more outlying territories, both of which have been reflected in sporadic military revolts and refusals to obey the central Government. At present, after the setting-up of an autonomous regime in Sumatra in 1956, the writ of Djar- kata, as far as the collection of taxes and the other functions of government go, runs only in Java, though some lip-service to the cause of Indonesian unity has been paid and continues to be paid by the local military commanders who head what are, in effect, small sultanates on the traditional model.
The reason why local nationalism and discon- tented colonels have been able to get away with it so far—and also why there has been so much dissatisfaction with the central government in the first place—is the almost complete lack of Indonesian administrative cadres—the result of the Dutch policy of only training Indonesians for the lowest levels in their colonial services.
This has produced both political incompetence in the higher levels of political life and corrup- tion throughout the whole administration.
Economically, the country is on the verge of ruin without any apparent cause—since there is no pressing balance of payments problem—and the conditions prevailing there are such as to effec- tively discourage foreign investment. The cor- ruption and extortion among the Djarkata politicians have been a main cause in deciding the peripheral islands not to pay any further taxes to the central government and also in pro- yoking army interference in politics which cul- minated in an attempt to arrest the Foreign Minister, Mr. Roslan Abdulgani, on charges of corruption as he was about to leave for the Suez conference.
Some of these facts are certainly due to the past policies of Dutch colonialism, but a con- siderable responsibility is also borne by the politicians of Djarkata. The main Indonesian political parties are four in number. The Nah- datul Ulama is an orthodox Moslem party with strong agrarian ties. The Masjumi is another Moslem party rather less orthodox, rather more socially conservative and stronger in the peri- pheral islands than in Java. The Nationalist party boasts among its supporters President Sukarno and, comprising, as it does, much of the original revolutionary intelligentsia who fought for Indonesian independence, has headed most of the governments for some years past. The Communists have now quite recovered from by Communist-inspired workers to seize the premises of,. Dutch businesses there. Immed- iately, however, the effect of the New Guinea claim will be to bring Indonesia nearer to the Eastern bloc and to embarrass politicians, such as Dr. Hatta, who oppose this evolution and wish to maintain ties with the West.
All this forms a gloomy enough picture, and it is hard to see how any order can be brought into it. If Dr. Sukarno succeeds in setting up his 'guided democracy,' he is likely to be faced by continued opposition from the army, which fears any move towards Communism. In that case will he be able to bring the outlying parts of the country under central control? Or will Dr. Hatta, whom the provinces have repeatedly asked for as Prime Minister, be able to save the situ- ation? His spectacular reconciliation with the President last September does not appear to have been followed by any very tangible results, but he may be having more influence on policy than appears. What is certain is that for any improvement to take place more efficient and less corrupt politicians and officials are required together with a determined attempt to end army interference in politics and pronunciamientos by local commanders. This will be a long job, and at present there are few signs that the work is under way. their attempted coup d'itat in 1948 when most of their high command was shot; they received six million votes in the 1955 elections.
The main issue in Indonesian politics has been whether or not the Communists should partici- pate in governmental coalitions. It has been President Sukarno's I view that they should: whether out of genuine conviction, or whether simply to avoid delivering himself into the hands of the Moslem parties and, therefore, of his rival, the ex-Vice-President Dr. Hatta, remains obscure., On the collapse of the coalition led by Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, a politician of the Nationalist party, President Sukarno first tried to form a government with Communist partici- pation and then fell back on a presidential cabinet of experts headed by Dr. Djuanda. This solution was part of the famous plan for 'guided democracy' announced by the President last February. Its proposals envisaged a kind of popular-front cabinet including all the main political parties and a national advisory council without parliamentary powers. Fears have been expressed that these changes would mean a transition towards the form of government favoured in the peoples' democracies, and the welcome given by the Communists to Dr. Sukarno's new plan has confirmed• these sus- picions. The efforts made by the President to avoid calling upon Dr. Hatta—widely thought to be the only Indonesian politician capable of coping with the present situation—also suggest that personal ambition is adding further com- plications to the already inextricable maze of Djarkata politics.
In these conditions the creation of an 'Indo- nesia irredenta' in Dutch New Guinea has the advantage of diverting public attention from the internal situation of the country. Perhaps owing to the oppressive nature of Dutch colonial rule, peculiar importance is attached by Indonesians to expelling them from South-East Asia for good and all. On the other hand, not only is there no good case for Indonesia's having any part of New Guinea—its inhabitants are not Indonesians and would probably dislike being governed by them —but agitation against the Dutch on this issue may bring about the final collapse of the country's economy by scaring away • Dutch capital and technicians, both of which are vitally needed. Unfortunately, with President Sukarno setting the pace, the struggle against the Dutch is an issue on which no Indonesian politician can afford to appear moderate, and it is not surpris- ing that the Indonesian failure to obtain UN action on their claim to West Irian has been followed by a series of measures including refusal of permission for Dutch air liners to land in Java and a ban on the entry of Dutch citizens into the country. Slightly more encouraging is the news that action has been taken by the Djarkata garrison commander against moves
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