THE NEW DEFENSIVE PREPARATIONS.
WE hold, and we believe all competent politicians of both parties hold, that there is real danger lest within the next few years Great Britain should be attacked by a coalition of at least three Continental Powers. We are considered to have taken more of the world than is our fair share, which, if "fairness" is to be the principle of distribution instead of the good of the world, is quite true ; we are believed to be always fomenting war in Europe in order to relieve ourselves alike of pressure and of commercial rivals, which is quite false ; and we are at once hated, despised, and envied because we, " a mere nation of shopkeepers," as the German papers call us, without a conscription and without a, military caste, hold so lofty, or, as our rivals phrase it, so " intolerably arro- gant," a position. We have, too, at least one deadly enemy among the Monarchs, and many among the states- men, who cannot bear to see that their " combinations " to be effective must first of all be submitted to British judgment,—that is, to the judgment of a democracy " out- side" the system of Europe. The coalition against us is, therefore, possible, and if it occurs we hold—though we admit that on this point the opinion of statesmen is not equally unanimous—that, as all Germans threaten about once a week, an invasion of Great Britain will be tried. Those who invade will not hope to conquer the island, which would overtask two hundred thousand men, but to create by a, successful descent with two corps d'armee of thirty thousand men each so wild a panic among the civilian population as to disorganise the Administration, arrest industry for months, and turn London, which would be, as Lord Overstone once showed. without means of pay- ing wages, into what soldiers would describe as a hell upon earth. This calamity would be so horrible that it ought to be prevented at any cost, and we would, if we could hope to convince the people, advocate the raising of a loan of fifty millions, with instructions to the Committee of Defence to expend as much of it both on the Army and the Navy as was necessary to make Great Britain itself, in the opinion of qualified experts, impregnable. With the citadel safe no temporary disaster at an exposed point could involve any- thing like ruin, but with the citadel lost or thrown into anarchy, actual ruin at least for two generations might arrive. If that course, however, is too bold for the people, or rather—for the people are only uninstructed— for those who guide them, then the next best course is slowly but steadily to make all preparations for defence as perfect as possible. The Navy should be set free from purely defensive work by fortifications ; the really large body of half-instructed soldiery should be enabled to do their best by the construction of defensive works between the capital and the coast ; and the small regular army within the islands should be made as highly equipped with scientific weapons, as mobile, and as formidable by skill in arms, as our resources will allow.
It is this policy which, according to Mr. Brodrick, the Under-Secretary for War, in his speech of Friday week, the Government is intent on steadily pursuing. It pro- poses to fortify in a cheap but efficient way four more harbours—Falmouth, Berehaven, Scilly, and Lough Swilly —which are inadequately protected, and which, if fortified, would enable the Fleet to coal easily, and there- fore set it more free for actual fighting within our own waters. It proposes to improve and fortify the defensive positions between the capital and the coast, long since selected, by which London can best be defended, and some new arsenals best protected, and which will be garrisoned byMilitia and Volunteers while the Regulars are fighting the enemy between those positions and the shore. And it proposes to establish numerous rifle-ranges for the thorough education of the men throughout the country, and to purchase forty thousand acres of Salisbury Plain for the thorough education of the higher officers, who at present have never any experience in handling more than ten thousand men, and very little in manceuvring more than five thousand. This plain seems made by Nature for the purpose, covers sixty square miles, and is not worth for cultivation £8 an acre freehold. The total sum asked for all these purposes is £5,500,000, and it is asked for by way of loan, because only in that way can a consistent plan be either drawn out or pursued. Annual estimates will not do, because the uncertainty of that mode of raising money breaks the hearts of the great officers who draw the plans, and constantly causes the most serious delays in their execution. Sometimes, even, there is too much money for the year, and then the surplus must be paid back to the Commissioners of the National Debt, and the whole business of voting and raising it be gone over again. We cannot believe that schemes so moderate, so reasonable, and so well explained can be rejected or mutilated by Parliament, even if it feels, as we feel, and as all who have ever studied the subject feel, that in mili- tary affairs we Englishmen do not get quite enough for our money. Grant that we do not—and it must not be for- gotten that we have always to keep up a peace establish- ment in such a way that it can be doubled in war-time, and that elasticity in a Department is the most ex- pensive of qualities—we still cannot afford on that ground to leave necessary preparations unmade. We might as well refuse to insure against fire until all the insurance offices dropped their rates by 10 per cent. We must first insure and then quarrel about rates, which we can do quite as well without leaving our- selves exposed to what might be a ruinous chance of fire. Our own belief is that a " miserly army " such as that of Prussia was is often a good army, but to stint the supplies of any army whatever, whether in munitions, in food, in healthy accommodation, or in means of instruction, is unbusinesalike. You might as well bring up children on half-rations, and keep them at home. because school- fees are heavy, and then expect them to grow up both educated and burly. The purchase of Salisbury Plain sounds a big thing, but the cost is less than the petty State of Wurtemburg expended on manceuvring ground for its cavalry, and little more than half that of an ironclad, while the Plain may make all the difference between competent and incompetent tacticians in command of the fighting corps. If England were invaded, what would England give to be certain that the General intrusted with her defence was an admirably competent tactician ? Would fifty millions be at all an excessive price ? It would be paid.
We hope the Government is going yet a step further, and will put the country in a yet better position of defence. The number of the Regulars and Reserves within the islands actually available as a fighting army at twelve hours' notice is never sufficient to fight a second battle if the first is lost, and that is what, in view of the awful consequences of defeat, ought to be secured. We understand well the objections, chiefly Parliamentary, to increasing the Line, but we might surely, at a moderate outlay, bring up the whole body of the Militia nearly to a level with the soldiers in barracks. That has been done with some Militia regiments, and if it were done with the whole force, and if the Militia were equipped as well as the Line both as to officers and as to munitions, we should have a really sufficient army for defence. As it is, we, as we believe, are never adequately supplied with material, the authorities relying on contractors, who might be paralysed by bank failures, and we rely perhaps too much on the Volunteers, who are better material even than the soldiers, but who have not been through that annealing machine, and who, above all, have never been tried in actual war, and have therefore no tradition to inspire them. Tommy Atkins has no notion of his regiment being sneered at. The Volunteers may fight as well, probably will fight as well, as General Grant's battalions, who also were Volunteers ; but then they may on some- unlucky day give us a Bull Run first. This island is far too small, and this London far too big,-for a scene of that kind to be survived, as that scene was survived in America, without injury to the national character or the national life. We must win if we fight on our own soil, or we must go under, without a day to spare either for recuperation, or for shame.
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