I T is a fortunate coincidence that simultaneously with the issue
of . the Report of the Army Reform; Committee the kindred question of Imperial defence should be brought before the country. Mr. Asquith's- admirable address to the British Empire League on Monday was inspired by that sane Imperialism which is- at once long-sighted and practical. In, remodelling our Army mechanism we must remember that we are framing a scheme not for an island but for an Empire. We- must endeavour to make use of that loyal and fighting spirit which permeates our Colonies, by encouraging and directing it on similar lines to our own. It will be a poor Army reform which provides an effective war organisation for the British Islands and India, and leaves' the Colonies without the benefit of our advice and: co-operation. " Vous faites la guerre cornme ml satrape,": wrote the indignant Napoleon to his brother Joseph; and it is a warning we may well apply to ourselves. To, neglect the Army in peace and call out ill-organised levies in war, to accept Colonial aid at a crisis and thereafter to make no effort to render such assistance pennanent and' fully effective, is the true policy of the satrap, which we trust we have done with for ever. The first step in the right direction has already been taken in the admission of Sir Frederick Borden, the Canadian Minister of Militia, to the councils of the Committee of Defence. This could' only mean that the Government were alive to the portance of advice from the Colonies on the defence of, that Empire of which they form a part, and that they oleo wished to ensure that in the organisation of their local forces the Colonies should be assisted by the test expert knowledge which Britain can command. Mr. Asquith in his speech stated very clearly the two grounds which make collaboration a necessity. You cannot divide the Empire into water-tight compartments, and declare that the problems of each department end with its own boundaries. Canadian defence involves the question of the defensive policy of the whole Empire, and equally any change in the disposition of the British land or sea forces has a direct bearing upon the security of each Colony. " You must get first-hand knowledge from all these out- lying parts as to what are their own special necessities,, and what is the particular part they are prepared to play in this great composite work." In the second place, it is desirable that the local forces of each Colony should be organised efficiently, and as far as possible on similar lines,: so that in case of war they may be easily subsumed under one military system. "Each of our separate Colonies has, its own local requirements, which it has to meet more or less upon the spot out of its own resources and for itself;' and in determining. what is the best way of organising local forces for local requirements it is of the highest importance that they should be able to take counsel with the Imperial authorities here." In the great problem of defence Britain and her Colonies must give and take advice from each other with all freedom, since both sides are vitally concerned in the solution.
The pivot of the scheme is the Defence Committee iu new form. It has attached to it a permanent Department, which its advocates believe—and in spite of an apparent difficulty we are inclined to agree with them—will form the mind of the Army and Navy, systematising and studying the data which the eyes and brains of Intelli- gence Officers provide for_ it. It will be the bureau to which will come Colonial Reports and statistics, and the whole raw material for a policy of Imperial defence. This bureau in turn will be the servant of the Defence Com- mittee, providing it with the latest information, digested and clarified, so that the Committee will be able to ascertain easily at any time what is the effective strength of the Empire, and also to find the skeleton of a policy for any situation it may have to face: The bureau will be the memory and the analytic faculty of the Forces, the Committee itself their shaping and directing intelligence. But this central brain musb-be areal intelligence, and to be real it must be complete. , Since it will have to decide•the gravest Imperial questions, it should be an Imperial Council. A Council of Englishmen presided over by the Prime Minister of the day may be a very efficient consulta- tive body on most questions ; but there will certainly be matters which it will not be able to determine correctly, however fully it may be fed with facts by the permanent bureau. If representatives of the great Colonies were admitted, not merely as assessors but as actual members, there would be no joints in its armour. A Colonial Minister for Defence might sit on it during his term of office ; or if this plan were found to be unworkable, a dis- tinguished ex-Minister, or even an unofficial expert, might have a seat. No supply of documents, however ample, is complete without an interpreter. We should not think of creating a. Committee of Defence consisting only of civilians, leaving it to their natural acumen to interpret and use the informa,tion supplied to them. , In the same way, however perfect our intelligence system, its results will never be adequately used unless we have also the evidence of local representatives to supplement them. The Colonial members would be another permanent nucleus to add to the In- formation Bureau. They need not change either with the British Ministry which appointed them or the Colonial Ministry which they represented, any more than the extra members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council vary. The one great danger in British policy is that one Government may undo what another Government has done; and though we should strongly object to the creation of an Aulic Council outside of parties, yet it is wise to make a body entrusted with such grave duties as stable as is reasonably possible.
Of the many modes of Imperial union which are cried in-the market-place, a Defence Committee seems to us the best, because the simplest and the most necessary. It involves no rude change in our Constitution. At present, when all our war machinery is being taken to pieces, there can be little objection to a further change in the recon- struction when this change is amply justifid on its merits. It- is only carrying one step further a scheme which has already approved itself in practice. If the late war taught one lesson above others, it was the necessity for a new relationship between British and Colonial forces in order to make the most of the splendid fighting stuff which our Colonies offered us. They have a natural aptitude for soldiering, and a keen interest in all the details of military organisation. But until some kind of collaboration is arrived at this keenness will be wasted, and when we next call for Colonial aid we Shall have the same casual units instead of regiments' so 'drilled and organ- ised that they can be readily subsumed under our own system. There are countless details in regard to which a Common Council for Defence could effect a real reform. Looking at the defence of the Empire as a single great problem, it could prevent the unnecessary dissipation of energy in one quarter, and stir up activity in another. It could provide some means for the transfer of Colonial officers to Imperial regiments, and of British officers to Colonial forces, a reform which would be a great magnet in, Colonial recruiting. Especially it could insist upon some uniformity of training and management for all the forces of the Crown, which would treble their efficiency when the occasion arose for them to act together. It would please the Colonies to feel that they had a "share in the military policy of the whole Empire, and increase the sense of solidarity and Cohesion among them. Such are a few of the practical advantages. But the main argument is that it would increase the efficiency of the Defence Com- mittee itself. . Its primary function is to harmonise naval and military requirements in one great policy of defence ; but since the defence is not insular, but Imperial, its constitution, if it is constituted at all, should correspond to its aims.
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