Failed Apocalypse
The Fall of Crete. By Alan Clark. (Blond, 25s.)
THE paratroops whom Hitler used to seize Crete and whom Goering hoped would be able to leapfrog into Cyprus, Suez and points east were the Rihrer's favourite soldiers. 'That is how the wars of the future will be fought,' he once told Rauschning, 'the sky black with bombers, and from them, leaping into the smoke, the parachuting storm-troopers, each one grasp- ing a sub-machine-gun.' It is only fitting, there- fore, that in describing the apocalyptic battle for Crete in May, 1941, Mr. Clark should take us back to the genesis of the rival British and German grand strategies the winter before.
Churchill's Greek decision was, of course, a political one and from it sprang the defence of Crete. The supreme consideration was that we must not let down our Greek allies; moreover, Eden saw himself as the architect of an anti- Nazi Balkan coalition which could come about as a result of a successful expedition to Greece. Wavell and the Chiefs of Staff for their part thought the expedition might succeed, and at least this tepid enthusiasm on the part of the military was quite consistent with our oppor- tunist maritime strategy of exploiting peripheral weak spots on the flank of occupied Europe.
As far as Hitler was concerned, his main preoccupation ever since autumn, 1940, had been Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the USSR, but he was persuaded by Goering that a landing on Crete would lead to control of the Eastern Mediterranean. In the confusion of the Greek campaign all on the British side except Churchill failed to see that the real strategic prize was Crete with its vital airfields. But how far could its garrison, evacuated there
after the shambles of the Greek campaign, be expected to hold?
This question was put to the test when oe May 20, 1941, hundreds of Junkers 52 dumped thousands of the parachuting storm-troopers en Maleme, Canea, Retimo and Heraklion. 'There Was just a possibility,' writes Mr. Clark, 'that the large body of troops on the island, intelli- gently directed, might administer to the Wehr- macht its first clear-cut defeat since the Battle of the Marne.' But already Wavell in Cairo Was 'privately convinced' that Crete was untenable, and Freyburg's command on the island was com- partmented into four separate forces.
Mr. Clark describes brilliantly how for the want of a nail the kingdom was lost, when the vital Hill 107 which overlooked Maleme airfield was evacuated by the unfortunate Colonel Andrew on the very first day of the battle. Seldom in modern war can such a small action have had such decisive results. Thereafter the paratroop commander, Student, ruthlessly rein- forced success and by May 25 Freyburg was `anxious to secure authority to evacuate the islands as soon as possible,' despite appalling casualties inflicted on the invaders. There followed inevitably the ghastly retreat to Sphakia, the rendezvous with the Navy, and by the end of the month the only British troops uncapturect were harried bands in the mountains of Ida.
Yet nothing in war is certain. Furious at the destruction of his only paratroop division, Hitler refused to authorise any more sea-air operations in the Mediterranean when Syria and Cyprus lay open. Thus Churchill's Greek decision paid off—although not for the reasons which justified it when it was made. But Mr. Clark exaggerates needlessly the cost to the Germans of their Pyrrhic victory when he writes that on the first day 'casualties suffered by the Seventh Parachute Division were greater than the total Wehrmacht killed in the war to date,' which were over 38,000. The UK official history gives a total of over 6,000 German casualties in Crete, Churchill a grand total of 15,000. This is a small point, however. Mr. Clark has written the best book to date on this crucial battle, although be has been disgracefully served by his publishers* who fail to include.maps of the various actions. •
DAVID RFES
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