6 NOVEMBER 1880, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

FALLACIES ABOUT THE EASTERN QUESTION. THE friends of the Turks throughout the world—that is, the Magyars, Jews, English Jingoes, and speculators in Turkish bonds—are wise, though unscrupulous, in the line they are taking up about Greece. They know quite well that in all the Eastern Question no case is so perfect as that of Greece ; that if Greece is abandoned, the English Liberal policy in Eastern Europe must be abandoned too, and they acutely desire that result. Had the Greek Government in 1878 distrusted the West, invaded Macedonia with even ten thousand men, and called the Greeks of that great province and of Roumelia, of Thessaly and Epirus, and of the Islands to arms, Turkish authority must have ceased throughout the Sultan's European dominion. The Albanians, though powerful for defence, are not mobile ; their Christian clans would have obeyed an old tendency to side with Montenegro ; the Greek provinces, almost denuded of Turkish troops, would have been occupied ; and Europe at Berlin would, as usual, have recognised accomplished facts. The Greeks —fortunately or unfortunately for themselves, as the event may prove—accepted the promises of the West, and abstained from action, in the full confidence that in any settlement Europe might make, their claims would be, at least in part, acknowledged. They were not entirely deluded, for at the Congress of Berlin a sort of settlement was accordingly made. Greece did not receive her rights at once, as she would have done had she been in military occupation of Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete, but she received a promise of territory, to be subsequently defined. It was subsequently defined at a special conference of Europe, which gave her the territory between the Adriatic and the 2Egean south of the fortieth parallel. Greece, therefore, claims those districts under that award, which is not perfect, inasmuch as no plebiscite has been taken, but which is merciful towards Turkey, as but for the interference of the Powers on these and other conditions Turkey would have been driven from Europe ; and as " legal " as any award of the Congress of Vienna, say that which gave Belgium to Holland, or that which assigned half Saxony to Prussia, or that which united Norway to Sweden, or that which gave Venice for half a century to Austria. The title of Greece is, therefore, according to European precedent, complete, and her army is ready to occupy the provinces, which, again, if they were free, would give her a plebiscite to-morrow. If, under such cir- cumstances, the Powers hesitate to carry out their decision, they break faith with Greece, and they declare that they had no moral right to take territory from Turkey,—that, in fact, Bulgaria ought to be re-enslaved, and Bosnia handed back to the Sultan, with an apology and a cheque for all revenues -collected by Austrian agents. The settlement of Berlin would be given up, Europe, which has been acting in concert, would be discredited, the Turks would be morally rehabilitated, as rulers deserving no sentence from civilisation in general, and the British Government would be made distinctly ridiculous. The special compromise which its representatives had favoured as one calculated to do justice, and yet avoid the liquidation of Turkey, and the wars which might follow that event, would have been brought to the test of action, and have been pronounced impossible. Europe, in fact, would have received warning not to interfere with Turkey.

The enemies of the settlement—that is, those who, like the Jews, prefer the East to the West ; or, like the Magyars, imagine their own position dependent on the depression of the South Slays and Greeks ; or, like the English Jingoes, admire the Turks as brave barbarians, who know nothing, but love fighting and ascendancy ; or, like the Bondholders, think that if Turkey is saved they will rule her as the Egyptian Bondholders rule Egypt—see this perfectly, are afraid that statesmen, seeing it also, will insist on carrying out the award, and hail with delight any evidence of possible or immediate failure in the European plan. They declare that M. Gladstone is foolishly in advance of English opinion, which requires the Greeks to wait, a hint gained from a speech of Lord Beaconsfield ; they assert that "the Con- servative Powers," Germany and Austria—one of which has upset a dozen ancient dynasties, and the other has just absorbed a great Turkish province without earning it—are convinced that Turkey is in the right ; they are certain that the French Chamber, which has not yet met, is opposed to all action, and they pour out scorn upon Greece for being so small, for agitating the world, and for relying on foreign aid,—all true charges, as true, every one of them, as they ever were of Piedmont. They profess to think that Turkey is not bound by the award of Europe, that Europe is not bound by its own decision, and that the Sultan, though., of course, he was right in surrendering Bosnia without a struggle and Cyprus without a .battle, would humiliate him- self if he surrendered anything to. Greece until defeated in the field. Above all, they are opposed to the use of force, unless, indeed—for we must admit the exception carefully recorded in the Daily Telegraph—force is em- ployed to appoint an International Financial Commis- sion at Constantinople. That would be right, for Turkish Bonds would spring to £50, and could there be so noble a result as that ? but for any other object force is hateful to them. Coercion is always wrong, except in Ireland ; but the coercion of Turks for the sake of Greeks is hideous iniquity.. Why, the Greeks are not pure-blooded Hellenes, and Greek brigands killed Mr. Herbert, and Greek dealers in London make unconscionable profits and are as sharp in Mincing Lane as the Jews upon the Stock Exchange 1 Britons must protest in a voice of thunder against coercion to an ancient ally on behalf of such a people, and Mr. Gladstone must retreat, for if ho does not, England will be "isolated ;" and she ought not to be isolated, but to be part of the great concert of Europe, which, nevertheless, say the same authorities, in the same breath, is a "fad" of Mr. Gladstone's, wholly useless for any result what- ever. One of their Continental allies, indeed, goes a step farther, and, with the European Fleet still swinging at Cattaro, declares that if Mr. Gladstone does not repudiate Mr. Cham- berlain for hinting that Austria would like Salonica, England must be subjected to a " political Continental blockade." The European Concert, it appears, can produce that result, what- ever it may be, though it cannot transfer a petty fishing- village to the Montenegrins.

There is a good deal of amusing reading in all that, in a, dull time, and something of intellectual interest in watching London journalists who think that Hungarian menaces and Turkish offers to borrow more money will secure English votes ; but we fail to perceive any statesmanship in it, or any accurate appreciation of affairs. We should have thought that politicians of experience would have recognised a few facts which are sufficiently patent, and which must have some influence, however limited in extent, upon the coming settle- ment. One is, that Mr. Gladstone rules England, with a majority unimpaired in the country, and likely, owing to cer- tain hints given by the electors to Whig county Members, to be much more unbroken in the House of Commons. The adhesion of the Land-leaguers to the Tories, if they do adhere, will cost the latter at least as many votes as they bring. With Mr. Gladstone in power, it is quite certain that the Greek claims will neither be derided nor forgotten, nor put aside with gentle words about the conceivable grandeur of the Greek future. Mr. Gladstone does not believe in breaches of national faith as bases of national prestige, and besides understanding the Greeks rather better than his opponents, was a supporter of Lord Palmerston, who gave them the Septinsular Republic. He is pledged to his lips to the Greek cause, and one, at least, of the many reasons for which he is hated by Society is that he keeps his pledges. It may be taken, therefore, to be as certain as anything in politics that the Greek claim will be steadily and strongly pressed upon Europe and upon Turkey ; and apart from newspaper articles, what is the evidence for supposing that either will resist ? The Sultan will never give way Certainly not, till he sees reason,—he never does ; but the arrival of the European Fleet before Salonica or Smyrna will be a reason as convincing as the reason which in- duced him to surrender Bosnia, the one province in Europe where his authority was undisputed during the war, and where half the population was nominally Mahommedan. Torpedoes are being laid, we are told, before Smyrna, but we do not sup- pose those who say so, seriously believe that the Sultan will blow up a European Fleet. That, indeed, would be a short and final ending for the " Eastern Question," so far as it includes the reorganisation of Turkey. But the European Fleet will not sail. Why not ? What has occurred within the past few weeks to destroy the resolution, recorded by the Ambassadors at Constantinople in a formal and public Note, to apply pressure till the Montenegrin and Greek questions were settled, and not to make out of them excuses for the individual advantage of any State The Conservative Powers, it is said, have repented, and are anxious to withdraw their ships ; but there is no proof of that, except newspaper statements, the only official &okra-

tion being that Austria will, if coercion commences, give only moral support, which is all that is required. The British Fleet requires no aid in any operation. Do these writers believe that the Conservative Powers are going to fight for Turkey, or drive England and France into close alliance, or allow a war in the Balkan peninsula which they can, by keeping up the Euro- pean accord, prevent? That they are annoyed and disappointed at the failure of schemes which might drive Austria south- ward is quite possible ; but statesmen baffled in a project are accustomed to consider the next best, not to lose advantages through sulkiness. It is not to the advantage of Austria or Germany that the non-Conservative Powers should go forward alone, or that the peninsula should rise in insurrection, and those considerations will weigh with them much more than any pique. But France, it is said, is about to engage in some occult intrigue, under which she would become the third partner in the Conservative alliance, which would then be absolute by land. Is Prince Bismarck, then, perchance, going to give up Alsace- Lorraine for the sake Of Turkish claims to Thessaly and Epirus, which he sacrificed at the Supplementary Conference with a certain acerbity of decision ? If he is not, what chance is there of such a Triple Alliance, or any alliance, ex- cept the one which exists already, and enables Austria to seek her own advantage in the Balkan peninsula ? We are quite ready to believe in intrigues, even in unsuspected quarters, for we have read Lord Salisbury's Secret Agreement, and his instructions to his plenipotentiary to fight for the surrendered points ; but an intrigue in which France becomes the ally of Germany, in order that Turkey may keep Thessaly, makes a strong demand upon our faith. We do not, however, declare that to be impossible, however much we may think it so. We only plead that Mr. Gladstone will not betray the Greeks ; that the Greek Government, with 60,000 militiamen to keep, cannot wait long ; that the French Chamber has not met ; and that the concert of Europe, which avowedly covered Greece as well as Montenegro, is as yet intact. It seems to us that there are grounds in those circumstances for believing it to be quite possible that in a few months the Greek flag may be peacefully flying in Jannina, and for interpreting the present delay as a pause in expectation of the meeting of the French Chamber.