THE MAGAZINES.
THE crisis in the Balkans is treated from wholly different points of view in two articles in the new Nineteenth Century. Dr. Niko ?2upani6, writing on the strategical significance of Serbia, traces the Balkan policy of Austria to the instigation of Berlin, and the policy of Berlin in turn to the German desire to create a Greater Germany in Asia Minor. In a word, Serbia is the high-road to the East, and the present war may conceivably make the hopes and dreams of the Pan- Germans come true. He does not think that Germany's present aim is so much to conquer all Serbia as to control that length of the Belgrade-Constantinople railway which runs through Serbia, and so create a connexion between Berlin and Baghdad, and enable the two Central Empires to reinforce the Turks with men, officers, and munitions for use in the Dardanelles, Egypt, and even India. The defeat of Serbia, be maintains, would gravely disturb the man-power to the disadvantage of the Entente Powers. "If Serbia should be crushed, they would lose the support of 400,000 proved soldiers, while the German group would gain 400,000 Bulgarians, not reckoning the Turks." In other words, it would alter the balance of man-power by nearly 1,000,000 men in Germany's favour, even if Turkey should not send a single soldier to Germany. Holding, as he does, that the Suez Canal and the British forces in Gallipoli are defended in Serbia, Dr. t up:a:id believes that the preservation of Serbia's integrity is not merely a Serbian, a Balkan, or a European interest, but an interest of civilization as a whole. "The com- bination of German organization, German intelligence, and German industrial fanaticism might endanger civilization." He bitterly laments the irreparable loss of time by the Allies, but still hopes that Serbia, if she can hold out till adequate reinforcements arrive, may avert a second battle of Kossovo. If she falls, her fall may determine the issue of the war, and with it the future of civilization.—On the other hand, Mr. James Ozanne, while admitting that the Central Powers may have secured important advantages at the outset of their Balkan expedition, is inclined to think it may prove a blessing in disguise by weakening their offensive elsewhere, and adding one more to the immense field of operations at a moment when they are showing symptoms of exhaustion. Mr. Ozanne acquits our Foreign Office of blame for the failure of the recent negotiations. His only complaint is that the Entente Powers were not firmer in overcoming Serbia's uncompro- mising attitude towards Bulgaria :- "At the outset of this groat War the Quadruple Entente did its utmost to induce Serbia to consent to concessions to Bulgaria which might have brought Tsar Ferdinand to its side, and it is impossible to refrain from the melancholy reflection that if Serbia had at the outset paid hoed to the counsels of Russia, which, as its champion and protector, had every right to insist, the situation in the Balkans and in this terrible War might have been very different. As it was, the Belgrade Government could not, until it was too late, be brought to understand that, with the cession of the territory in Macedonia claimed by Bulgaria, it would be more than compensated, as the result of a fortunate war, by the addition of provinces wrested from Austria-Hungary and an outlet on the Adriatic. Tsar Ferdinand, who, despite his Hungarian proclivities, has a fine eye to the main chance, might have been expected to knock himself down to the highest bidder. Thus was a splendid opportunity lost. Unhappily, Serbia is now beset with foes and in the throes of a desperate and unequal struggle, which might have been averted if its Government had only displayed ordinary foresight and prudence with the admixture of a little gratitude to the Power which, at great risk and, as we now see, stupendous sacrifice, cried 'Hands off when Austria-Hungary had decided on a 'punitive expedition.' The solo explanation of this culpable folly must be the magnetic attraction which Macedonia possesses for these Balkan States."
The optimism of Mr. Ozanne is not altogether convincing when he speaks of "several hundred thousands of the soldiers of the Quadruple Entente taking the field with Salonika as a secure base," and reckons on the speedy intervention of Roumania and Greece.—Sir Alfred Sharpe, in a postscript to his article in the September issue, in which he predicted the invasion of Serbia by an Austro-German army, con- 41emns the dilatory action of our Foreign Office, and expresses lithe view that the policy of Roumania and Greece will depend -on the success of our action in the Balkans. The most interesting passage in this postscript is a communication from M. Venezelos correcting a statement in the previous n,rtiele, M. Yonezelee states that in his famous Memorandum to the Bing of Greece he never advised the cession of Serres as well as Karelia, and Drama, and as regards Kavalla and Drama, stipulated for the cession to Greece as a quid pro quo of the Ghevgeli-Doh.an triangle, a point of great importance for the defence of Salonika. Sir Alfred Sharpe adds that M. Venezelos has told him also "that the last elections in Greece were not fought on the question of the cession of Kavalla—as, when his memorandum was published (towards the end of March), he expressly declared that since the drafting of this document (January) circumstances had altered in such a way that the memorandum belonged to the past; and that during the negotiations which preceded his retire- ment from office no allusion was made, so far as the Entente Powers were concerned, to a settlement on the lines of his memorandum. In fact, that during the elections no one belong- ing to the Venezelos party or Press alluded to the possibility of turning back to the policy summed up in the memorandum, as every one in Athens was convinced, after the German loan, that Bulgaria was absolutely committed to Germany, a view which was further confirmed by the smuggling of ammunition, money, and officers to Turkey through Bulgaria.'
M. Henry D. Davray has an admirable paper on " A. French View of Anglo-French Relations," at once courteous, appreciative, and candid. He recognizes that difficulties beset the Government of England of which the French Government have no knowledge; he cordially acknowledges the excellent opinion of France which now prevails in England; and when he ventures on criticism be does so in no carping spirit, but with a sincere desire to promote our common ends. In conclusion, he points to the fact that the English newspapers most read abroad are those which have taken up the most acrimonious attitude in current controver- sies. It is not a question here, he observes, of establishing whether their criticisms and attacks on the British Govern- ment were justified or not; it is enough to state that they occurred at an admirable moment for corroborating alarmist rumours, and undoubtedly fostered and increased the uneasi- ness of French public opinion. Fortunately, the most influential French organs devoted themselves to the task of instructing the public as to what was actually happening in England, and the invitation of the Admiralty to leading French journalists and publicists to visit the Fleet had an excellent effect in abating this uneasiness.--Mr. Carson Roberts, writing on " True National Service," emphasizes the need, not merely of winning and holding the respect of our allies, but of retaining the love and good opinion of our children overseas. Hence his contention that the nation would gain far more than it could lose from a bold pronouncement that the time has come when the help of all must be claimed, and that the State can no longer admit the right to bargain in the nation's service.—We discuss Lord Cromer's article on "The Teaching. of Patriotism" elsewhere. Other articles of interest are the Postmaster-general's account of "Government Measures on War Distress "; the Countess Zanardi Landi's outspoken study of "The Real Austria—and her Relations with Germany" ; Mr. Roderick Jones's personal impressions of General Smuts, whom he regards as the Alexander Hamilton of the South African Commonwealth ; and Mr. J. 0. P. Bland's critical survey of Japanese policy in China, Dr. Seton-Watson's article on "Serbia's Need and Britain's Danger" in the Contemporary follows closely on the lines of Dr. tupanid's noticed above. As regards the question of Serbia's concessions to Bulgaria, be asserts that— "Last September Serbia, under pressure from the Allies, con- sented to sacrifice to Bulgaria the whole of Serbian Macedonia between Egri Palanka, and the Lake of Prespa, including not merely Istip and Voles, but Monastir itself; in other words, all that is valuable in the so-called uncontested zone. Oehrida, alone was to be retained, in order to preserve a. land connection between Serbia and Greece. That Bulgaria should not merely have regarded this offer as inadequate, but should almost imme- diately afterwards have plunged into war against the Entente, proves beyond dispute that her King and statesmen aim at some- thing far bigger than the recovery of Macedonia. Not even the wildest fanatic would declare war merely in order to add Ochrida to Monastir. King Ferdinand has a treble aim, and from his own standpoint it is perfectly logical, He has always hated Russia and the Tsar, and he wishes to prevent Constantinople from ever becoming Russian. Ho fears Serbia, and is deter- mined to prevent the achievement of Jugoslav unity under any save Bulgarian auspices. He sympathises with the present regime in Hungary both because he desires to preserve his vast Hungarian estates and also because Magyar racial tyranny and his own selfish dynastic interests entirely coincide. In a word, his aim is to keep Russia from the .lgean, and to supersede the dream of Jugoslavia under Alexander Karageorgeviteh by On reality of a big Bulgaria, touching the three setts of Bulgarian political phantasy (Black, 2Egeitn, And Adriatic), under Boris of Coburg. Serbia's solemn warning of the approaching Bulgarian mobilisation was disregarded by the Allies ; her desperate but wholly justifiable and feasible plan of answering that mobilisation by the occupation of Sofia before adequate resistance could be made, was met by a stern veto which was meaningless save on the assumption that prompt military aid would he pushed up from the South if Serbia's misgivings should prove correct. The Serhe wore even assured on high authority, almost on t ho eve of invasion, that they need not fear any serious attack. If Serbia tc-day is in danger of extinction, then it is, above all, the fault of inertia and want of foresight on the part of the Entente."
in conclusion. Dr. Seton-Watson maintains that there can be no settled peace in Europe till we have laid its foundations anew, and given free play to the national aspirations which to.
day are unsatisfied and suppressed. " Inaction or hesitation at this crisis of the war would shake the very foundations of our alliance with France and Russia, and force us to choose between the ignominious peace of which some men are already dreaming, and the attempt to retrieve, under infinitely less favourable circumstances, a situation which can still be saved by a last determined effort."—Dr. Dillon asserts that it was within hie knowledge that "when the Balkan War broke out, Germany's syndicate of three Balkan Kings was bound by express stipulations to the Central Empires; that Bulgaria had further supplemented that agreement by a convention with Turkey; that Radoslavotre negotiations with the Entente were meant to throw dust in the eyes of the Allies and gain time for their enemies to organize an expedi- tion against Serbia"; but that the prohibition of the Censor- ship compelled him to keep idleness. Now, though partially unmuzzled, Dr. Dillon can only deal with what he calls "the fringe," but speaks freely about King Constantine and King Ferdinand. As for the former, he observes that " Venezelos'a
binding treaty is Constantine's scrap of paper "; while King Ferdinand's policy has always been to keep in with the victor, and in backing the Central Empires he is, in Dr. Dillon's view, neither foolish nor short-sighted. if he is right, he wins a
great stake; if wrong, be can always put on sackcloth and ashes and appeal for mercy to Russia. In conclusion, Dr. Dillon refuses to dissociate the Bulgarians from their King:- " To my thinking, the truth is that the Bulgars are the Prussians of the Balkans. They have the social sense highly developed, the vaulting ambition, the self-containment, and the capacity for organisation which have won for Prussia the place she now occupies in the world. Only a very powerful Serbia, in possession of an assimilated Macedonia, could keep Bulgaria permanently quiet and pacific. We have wasted too much sympathy on the Bulgars, who after the Prussians are the most dangerous enemies to the peace of Europe. Ferdinand on the throne at Sofia is their right leader. King and people suit each other. That was my conviction long before the present war; and since then events have strengthened it. As for Ferdinand, he behaved congruously with his character and his lights, which wore wrongly gauged by the simple-minded generous diplomatists of the Alliance."
—.Signor Romolo Mnrri contributes an interesting paper on Italy and England. The union with Austria was only a "Preventive expedient," and the Triple Alliance was for Italy "a eonstitutional disease," sapping her spiritual unity, detaching her from her true friends, and opening a wide breach for German penetration. Now that she is emancipated from the Parliamentary opportunism of Giolitti, Italy has regained her soul. She is not, he declares, waging a little war of her own within the great war, as the Giolittians would wish. " That is a past which is not to return. We are against Austria, against Turkey, but, above all, against German Imperialism. We are making ours the aims of England in the present conflict. And we know that it is not merely a
question of our conquering the enemy opposed to us, but that we may give England time to win."—tdr. Sydney Moseley writes "Some Truths about the Dardanelles" which differ widely from the accounts contributed by most war correspondents, Our worst enemies, in his view, are not the Turks or the Germans, but the idle gossipers in mess tents and wayside taverns. He coudemns the laxity of the Censor- ship, and admits the enervating effects of monotony, and, above all, the faulty methods of execution, which robbed us of the fruits of splendidly conceived plans. But ho finds no justifi- cation for pessimism. On the contrary, he declares that we have the situation well in hand, that the moral of our men is first-rate while that of the Turks has steadily deteriorated, and predicts
that we shall get through to Constantinople by Christmas at the very latest.—Mr. Aneurin Williams writes of Armenia, and bids us remember that, although the campaign of extermination has been carried out with appalling thorough- ness in Turkey. there are about 1,800,00G Armenians in Russia, 100,000 of whom are serving in the Army, and 200,000 iu Persia, The existence of the non-Turkish Armenians assures the continuance of the race; as for the refugees in the Caucasus and elsewhere, we can still help to save them from perishing of want and disease through the agencies at work in Euglatid. Incidentally he pays a tribute to the efforts of the United States and her Ambassador at Constantinople, who throughout these horrors has laboured gtltautly to stay the hand of the assassin.—M. Mjelde, a Norwegian journalist, writes of Norway's relations with Germany, England, and France, and asserts that while Germanism has always dragged her into an eddy, Gallicism and Anglicism have brought her the refreshing and fertilizing currents of civilization. Norway, he declares, is once more the barrier against Germanism in the North.—Other interesting papers are those of Mr. A. W. G. Randall on " Pan-Germanic Education and French ' Decadence ' "; and of Mr. K. C. Lim on the dangers of the monarchical movement in Chime
Though in form and arrangement the National Review has reverted somewhat to its ante-bellum . appearance, its spirit remains the same, and that may be summed up in a sentence from the " Episodes of the Mouth" " We have nothing to fear from the enemy, but everything from ourselves "—our- sel yes being the " Grand Dukes of Downing Street," panic- mongers, pessimists, and so on. The editor, we may note, declares energetically against the policy of "side-shows," advocates concentration as opposed to dispersion, and urges the immediate evacuation of Gallipoli. Incidentally we may mention that over hie own name he writes a chivalrous, and, as all his friends will at once recognize, thoroughly characteristic, letter in defence of Sir Eyre Crowe against a campaign which " if successful would deprive our Foreign Office of one of its best and most loyal and devoted brains at a time when we most need them."—Lord Cromer takes Pro. fessor Andler's "Lee Usages do la Guerre et la Doctrine de I'Lat-Major Allemend " as the text for a striking study of German military ethics. He points out that the German mind, even in its manifestations of the most extreme savagery, always gravitates towards idealism, and is at pains to discover sonic veil of abstract philosophy to throw over criminal purposes. For the rest, "the Germans," he observes, " recognize that the exercise of mere brutality for its own sake is unjustifiable, not so much on account of the moral condemnation which it entails, as because it is useless. On the other hand, they hold that there is no limit to the brutality which may properly be employed during a war, provided it oontributcs towards the achievement of its end." This, he maiutains, is the base of Clauetiwitz's theory of "absolute" war—" in other won's, war whose ruthlessness was not to be tempered by any considerations based on humanity, public morality, or compassion for the vanquished." He notes that from the days of Clausewitz onwards an ever-ascending scale of brutality has marked the utterances of responsible German authorities in their declarations as to the manner in which war should be conducted, and concludes that the only satisfactory method of dealing with a people who act vn such principles is so to cripple their strength as to prevent them from again making war for at least another generation.--Miss Bates, under the beading "So He Taught Them," describes the influence exerted on Ulstermen by Sir Edward Carson, and contrasts the self-sacrificing patriotism displayed by the Ulster working men with the bargaining spirit displayed in other parts of the United Kingdom.—Mr. Coulson Kernel tan contributes some interesting recollections of Lord Roberts, illustrating the geniality, the courtesy, the self-sacrificing. patriotism, and the stoicism of that great soldier and Christian gentleman. Mr. Maurice Low's " American Affairs " is in the main a eulogy of President Wilson's policy. He notes, however, one important change. The lesson taught America by Germany has put an end to the policy of unpreparedness :— " Germany has yielded, but has she yielded only to wait a more favourable time for the reckoning? A great many Americans ask that question, a groat many Ameeieens believe they know the answer—unless they aro able to convince Germany it will be wiser for her to abandon the thought of revenge. At any rate this fear of Germany has given an impetus to military preparations, and while it is too early to say whether Congress will sanction the plans which have the approval of the President, the demand of the country is so imperative that we may feol certain both the Army and the Navy will be largely increased. Nothing is more significant than the President's conversion. Heretofore ho has been on the side of the pacifists and the little navy mon ; now he frankly admits that the country needs to be prepared to defend itself."
—M. van Ledo contributes an eyewitness's impressions of the fall of Antwerp, in regard to which he maintains that the British expedition, owing to its lack of organization, failed in its object, and in many respects did more harm, than good.— The number also contains a detailed map of Champagne, and the complete series of letters published by the Foreign Office relating to the murder of Miss Edith Cavell.
[Owing to a failure of delivery on the part of the Post Office, we are obliged to hold over until next week our usual notices of Blackwood and the Fortnightly.—En. Spectator.]
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