Overlord or Not
Triumph in the West 1943-1946. Based on the Diaries of Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke. By Arthur Bryant. (Collins, 30s.) LIKE the first, this second volume of the Alan- brooke War Diaries is a profound study of Allied command in war, which is bound to involve a clash of personalities and of the means to be employed to gain the aim of the war. What was the aim? According to these diaries, and according to every other important book published in this country and in the United States, it was the defeats, of Germany, or, as Sir Winston Churchill puts it `Victory—victory at all costs,' and this has becOmft the accepted view.
Is it the correct one? It certainly is not, because the defeat of an enemy is no more than the means toward the end, which is to establish a profitable peace: The sole leading statesman of the anti• Hitler alliance who appreciated this fundamental truth was Stalin. Hence he won the war politically while his allies did no more than assist bill' militarily to achieve his aim—the expansion of the Soviet regime. Hence the world of today.
Although, as Chairman of the Chiefs of Stall' Committee, Lord Alanbrooke was not responsible for policy, readers of his diaries are advised to bear the above remarks in mind, because out of thi confusion of means with end are to be traced the many clashes between him and Sir 'Winstoi Churchill and the American Joint Chiefs of Stall The most violent of them centred in whether thi invasion of Italy, with which the present volunv opens, should be pushed to the full, or whether it should be regarded as a secondary operation to the then projected cross-Channel invasion of France, code-named 'Overlord.'
Until Hitler's decisive defeat at Stalingrad, seven months before the invasion of Italy, them can be no doubt that the 'Overlord' project alone was the correct one. But after Stalingrad, when it was obvious that Hitler could no longer win the war, strategical conditions were completcl) changed. Unless the two Western Allies could defeat Germany before their Eastern Ally did so all they would accomplish would be the replace,' ment of Hitler by Stalin. Then, in September, 1943, came the invasion of Italy and with it a confusion of strategical aitiri Stalin pressed for 'Overlord,' so as to keep allies out of eastern Europe; the American' backed him, because they believed him to be 3 staunch democrat; Churchill pressed for opera' tions in the Balkans to assist Russia, although one suspects he had another idea at the back of hit head; and Alanbrooke championed the campaign in Italy in order to weaken the Germans on the Russian front. Late in the campaign, Sir HarolJ Alexander, Commander-in-Chief Italy, and Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Supreme Commander it the Mediterranean, pressed for an advance through northern Italy toward Vienna, which, according to Wilson, was 'the strategy best calciv lated to aid the assault on Northern France . a blow which would force the enemy to divert divisions from France and, at the same time, con' front him with the prospect of defeat in 1944..
After 'Overlord' was launched and Alexander in Italy had been 'deprived of ten divisions provide troops for the ItArcical invasion of southern France, Alanbrookok, in a discussion will' the Secretary of State for War, saw the Wester' Allies' dominant political problem in its foil significance. 'Should Germsoy be dismembered or gradually converted to an arty to meet the Russi:n threat'?' was the argument, and his answer was :.I suggested the latter and falai certain that we matt from now onwards regard Germany in a very different light. Germany is qua longer the dominat" ing power in Europe—Russla is.'
The lesson of these fascinating diaries—and is the first of all in the conduct of war—is t1' policy and strategy are indivisible, as Clausewit; pointed out 130 years ago. Had the Chiefs of Stall been consulted in policy making, and not solely' relegated to strategy making, the probability that these diaries would be as amicable as they` now are cantankerous. More important, that the Western Allies would not only have defeated Cie many but also have won a profitable peace. J. F. C. FULLO
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