THE SUKHOMLINOFF TRIAL.
WHEN one reads the distressing revelations made at the trial of General Sukhomlinoff, formerly Russian Minister of War, one is astonished, not that the complete break- down of the Russian military system should have come about, but that it should not have come sooner. The trial is over ; General Sukhomlinoff was condemned to hard labour for life, and his wife, who was charged with having joined in his acts .of corruption, was acquitted. From 1909 to 1915 General Sukhoralinoff in his capacity as Minister of War controlled the whole Russian Army, and acquired for himself power over and above that usually exercised by Ministers of War. He was popularly supposed to have regenerated the Army after the calamities of the war with Japan. He remained Minister during the present war till after the Russian disasters in the summer of 1915. Apparently he had taken no more care to supply the Army with munitions than would just save him from ignominious exposure. At the beginning of the war the Russian guns were allowed to fire only one shell a day each while the Germans were firing hundreds of rounds. One harrowing fact brought out in the evidence was that the Russian Generals begged General Sukhomlinoff to send them blank cartridges if he could send nothing else, since even an empty noise might serve to keep up the spirits of the soldiers. In August, 1914, troops went to the front with only one rifle for every two men, and as the Army grew battalions were sent without arms at all. The whole of the disastrous retreat in 1915 in face of the extravagantly praised German phalanx was due to want of rifles, shells, and cartridges.
Though the exposure of General Sukhomlinoff was the main fact of the trial, by a curious chance a great deal more atten- tion has been paid both in Great Britain and Germany to what was a mere stray point of evidence. This side-issue concerned the question whether in July, 1914, General Sukhomlinoff and his Chief of Staff, General Janushkeviteh, had hidden from the Tsar the fact that the Imperial order for modifying general mobilization into partial mobilization had been disobeyed. The evidence was contradictory and obscure in many respects, but there seems to be no doubt that in the critical days at the end of July, 1914, the Tsar did UMW an order for this modification, and that his military officers dis- obeyed him and deceived him. That is to say, for some days the Tsar was under the impression that there was a Russian mobilization only against Austria, whereas his Military Executive was proceeding with a general mobilization, which of course would be employed in the event of war against Germany. Germany has always declared that she was driven into the war by the aggression of Russia, and she now professes to have in the Sukhomlinoff trial new proofs of this assertion. In characteristic fashion, she is making the utmost use she can of the evidence to prove that she is morally a blameless country, victimized by ambitious and intriguing enemies. In Great Britain this stray point of evidence at the Russian trial has been put by a few persons to a somewhat similar use. Nobody, of course goes so far as the Germans, but a good deal of attention has been drawn to an article by Mr. H. N. Broils- ford in the Nation of September 15th in which he says in effect that important new light has been thrown on the origins of the war, and that it is no longer possible to regard the Central Powers as the sole plotters of the world-wide disaster. There were two war parties, he says, determined to plunge the world into the tragedy of war, one in Germany and one in Russia.
Several correspondents have written to us about this
article. A few of them no doubt are genuine inquirers who wish to be informed whether it is really necessary to change their opinions about the origin of the war. Others, we have as little doubt, are indulging a sly malice in putting their questions, accompanied as they are by expressions of wonder that the Spectator has not thought fit before to deal with this urgent matter. We have not dealt with it because in truth it seemed to us to be of no importance at all. The evidence is intensely interesting, we freely admit, but the historical light it throws on the pre-war negotiations adds nothing to the previous illumination. Having read all the evidence we have been able to procure, we have come to the conclusion that Mr. Brailsford has discovered a mare's-nest. The case as summarized by him is as follows. On July. 29th, 1914, the Tsar signed a decree for a general mobilization. In the afternoon, at 3 o'clock, General Janushkevitch, at the sug- gestion of H. Sazonoff, sent for the German Military Attaché and assured him on his word of honour as a soldier that the position was unchanged, that no mobilization had taken place, and that on the fronts directed towards Germany the Tsar desired no mobilization. The German Attaché did not believe him. As a matter of fact, General Janushkevitch, as he admitted during the trial, had the Tsar's mobilization order in his pocket when he spoke. That same evening the Tsar received the Kaiser's second telegram, which, according to Prince Troubetskoi, made "a deep impression" upon him. This telegram accepted the refe of mediator, but urged the Tear not to go on mobilizing against Austria. The Kaiser, according to Mr. Brailsford, was aware at this time only of the Russian mobilization against Austria. The Tsar, however, knew that the case was worse than that. He therefore tele- phoned late on this same night to the two Generals. He asked General Janushkevitch to proceed only with preparations against Austria, but in a more peremptory message to General eukkomlinoff he demanded the oessation of all mobilization. The two Generals, however, by agreement with one another, went on with the general mobilization. After a great deal of examining of other evidence, into which we need not enter, Mr. Brailsford concludes as follows :— "31.Sazonoff and his military colleagues lied to the Tsar and to Germany. These were the least of their lies. They are scattered throughout these official papers (see 55, 203, 207, 297). Their central lie, their really prosperous lie, was told to their
From the 29th onwards they represented themeolves as the patterns of pacific moderation, and, thanks to this, they dragged France into their war, and we followed Franco. This IM with many shapes stambi in all its perfection in this despatch to his Government from the French Ambassador (211), dated July 30th, while the general mobilization was actually in full swing
kf. Sazonoff, to whom I communicated your desire that every military measure that could offer Germany the pretext for general mobilization should be avoided, answered that in the course of last night the General Staff had suspended all moaaures of military precaution, so that there should be no iniaunderstanding. Yester- day the Chief of the Russian General Staff sent for the Military Attaché of the German Embassy and gave hini his word of honour that the mobilization ordered this morning W11.5 exclusively directed against Austria.'
If the French had known the truth, if Jaures had known it, and had lived to use it, the West of Europe would have been awed tide war. It seas made by a lie, and to this day the millions in France and England are persuaded that, whatever he the guilt on the head of Tsardom, it is innocent of this war. I will draw no sharp oonalusions from this ghastly chapter of history. In 1914 there were two war-parties in Europe, and between them thoy made the war. On the 29th moderation had prevailed in Berlin, while the war-makers triumphed in Petrograd. Chance, a time- table that kept no parallelism, bluffing, gambling, ignorance, and lies, all the notorious dangers of secret diplomacy, those were the things that made our war. Our current popular view, Mr. Wilson's view, that one evil will, the will of the rulers of Germany, deliberately made the world-war, planned it, dated it, and marched into it with conscious dotermination—that he a misreading of /Maury which is driving civilization through darkness to suicide."
It is difficult to restrain one's indignation at such a conclu- sion. We are sure that Mr. Brailsford is quite honest, but no one who is less honest than he is known to be could possibly be excused for asking his countrymen to believe that the manner in which Russia entered the war was comparable with the long and calculated intrigues of Germany. Mr. Brailsford suffers from an obsession and reads everything in its light. Although he has been long and honourably interested in the Balkan peoples, lie now, in order to satisfy his Piteificist preconceptions, deliberately shuts his eyes to the obvious fact that what Germany and Austria throughout wanted to do was to deny the right of Russia to express any interest whatever in the South Slays, their Balkan kinsmen. That is bad enough at the moment. It would be worse later if Russia should become a strong Republic with a well-estab- lished popular Government, and Germany should continue on her own lines as the arbitrary oppressor of small nationalities. Austria knew perfectly well what would happen if she attacked Serbia. She had known it for a great many years. Russia VW the professed champion of the Serbs, and could not possibly renounce her guardianship. Germany also knew this perfectly well. Russia had tried to reassert her interest in the Balkans in 1908, and it was then that the Kaiser appeared "in shining armour" and theatrically forced Russia to give way. It was made clear then that Russia could not make such a surrender a second time. In 1913, again, when Germany and Austria planned just such an attack upon Serbia as led to the present war, the Italian Government, who were asked to join in the enterprise, and saw what was intended, firmly refused to have anything to do with such a wicked scheme. When Austria, with the consent, and undoubtedly with more than the consent—at the insti- gation—of Germany, declared war upon Serbia on July 28th, 1914, she put the first match to the powder magazine of Europe. She did it with her eyes open, having been warned on those previous occasions when she was fumbling with the matchbox what would happen.
It seems to us, therefore, no exaggeration to say that Mr. Brailsford's hair-splittings as to whether the Russian mobilization was partial or general, and as to what extent Russian Generals perjured themselves on July 29th and 30th, 1914, are of the very slightest importance. No doubt from the Russian Generals' point of view they were only making good the military position, which threatened to collapse owing to what they saw to be the extreme weak-mindedness of the Tsar. What could Russia do ? She knew that her whole prestige and her declared interest in the Balkans were once more challenged, and she saw only too plainly the meaning of the joint German and Austrian action. Even if everything that Mr. Brailsford would charge against Russia were true, and a great deal more, it could make no difference to our opinion about the origin of the war. A blow was aimed at Russia, and she proceeded to defend herself. Every argument that Russia was to blame in these circumstances only repeats the sense of the famous, French saying : eet animal eel iris mechant ; quasi on l'attaque il se defend. It seems to us very probable, again, that when it became clear to the German Government that Great Britain would come into the war, the war party at Berlin became frightened, and there were actually moments when the Kaiser and the Chancellor seriously contemplated making use of the temporarily increased power of the peace party, and ridding themselves of the risks of a tremendous conflagration. But that does not affect the general question. The truth is that Russia had in any case to meet the gross and gratuitous challenge of Austria, and her mobilization in answer to the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia was made the pretext of Germany's decision also to make war. Mr. Brailsford writes as though Germany merely informed Russia that she would come into the war if there were a general Russian mobilization. As we read the evidence, and as has been pointed out in a series of admirable articles by Mr. J. W. Headlam in the Westminster Gazette, partial mobili- zation, and not general mobilization, was enough for Germany. It is true that German Ministers and representatives said different things on different occasions, but the predominant sense of the German declarations, and the final German word on the whole subject, was that partial mobilization in Russia was to be accepted by Germany as the signal for plunging the world into war. It must not be forgotten, moreover, that the whole time that the German Government were threatening Russia with the dire penalties of defending herself, the German Army was being mobilized. The war could not have been started by Germany at the moment when it was if the German Army had not been mobilized throughout all those days of tension and negotiation. Those who want to follow the discussion in all its details will find Mr. Headlam's contri- butions in the Westminster Gazette of September 17th and 18th and October 22nd and 23rd, and in a long letter in the Nation of September 22nd.
Only one thing more need be said. What do those who absurdly believe that a new light has been thrown on the origins of the war and the withering intrigues of irresponsible militarists want us to do now ? Apparently their argument
is that the blame for the war should be impartially bestowed
on both sides, and that we should therefore negotiate peace with Germany as soon as possible. This object is a sufficient indication of the temper in which Pacificists examine the evidence of the Sukhomlinoff trial. The Kaiser with sickening ingenuity and unscrupulousness tried to exercise his usual hypnotic influence upon the feeble-minded Tsar and to bend him to his purpose. All the time he was resorting to the . familiar German practice of making the worse.appear the better
cause, of making Germany stand in a position of moral irreproachability. That was learned from Bismarck. The true German appears, not in his diplomatic arguments, though he does appear there to those who can read him, but in his acts. The question for us now is whether, knowing what German acts are, we intend to allow the persons who are guilty of them to retain any fragment of their power for evil in Europe. Whatever happens, Russian militarism seems to have disappeared for ever. Even if it were admitted (which of course we do not admit) that Russian militarism was in any primary degree responsible for this war, would that be an excuse for allowing the Kaiser and his advisers to continue in their old courses, to the utter undoing of the world ?
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