A DECISIVE MONTH
By STRATEGICUS S much is now known about the first exploit of the First Air- borne Army as is possible for some time to come. ' It was natant in its conception and heroic in its execution ; and if it is pt to go down to history as a glorious failure at least it is imperative .e should recognise its part in the complete design. It can, of se, be conceived apart from the advance of the Second British y, but only at the cost of a complete misunderstanding. The form one episode. It was the role of the airborne troops
o seize and hold the bridges of the Rhine ; but clearly they were ot expected to hold indefinitely. That is no part of their true unction. They held the bridge at Arnhem for the best part of ree days ; and that is a truly magnificent achievement. They did -es s, moreover, in spite of a deployment that, in effect, if not in !ns •esign, was very far from perfect. The mere fact that the second ler tion of the First Division arrived so late that it could not be
• serf until the morning of the third day proved of vital importance. a But, in the end, it is very difficult for anyone to find fault with the u borne troops' part in the action. The same applies to the advance h• the Second Army. It made very good time to the north, and )1d e within an ace of success. What decided against it was the
expectedly heavy resistance it encountered ; and the defection, in e again, of the most fickle and treacherous of our allies--the ew eather. The Tactical Air Force was unable to intervene before nd e seventh day of the fighting ; and that may well have been the les •ecisive factor. The Allies failed, only just failed, to gather into their ands perhaps the greatest single strategic opportunity of the war ; of they have secured a very considerable prize that should not be nderrated. They made a great leap forward against an enemy who
s to have been prepared for some such move ; and we can best ther some measure of the success by his repeated heavy attempts to wipe it out. He has been striking blow after blow to blunt the p of the salient, to bolt and bar the approaches to the door into estphalia. He has even tried, at some cost, to cut off the whole sition below Nijmegen.
So far he has failed ; and the Second Army is pressing out the em to the west and to the east. Here it has secured a grip on Mass; and in the west it has advanced to within a few miles of e important centre of s'Hertogenbosch. But we can be certain the German attacks will not cease. What better use can the ono sound troops in western Holland be put to than this? It ould be expecting too much of an army that has been even so ughly handled as this to imagine it would confine all its efforts escaping into Germany. The true line of escape from the threat the ztst Army Group is to destroy the salient while it still offers e chance to resolute attack. When it is thoroughly established will renew the northward advance, and then the Germans in estern Holland-will be like a cork swept away in the tide. Rund- tcdt correctly appreciates the situation and recognises that, if he ot decisively check the exploitation of the salient, these troops be of no value even if withdrawn into Germany. Their best hance, their one value, is success now.
e. But, before we dismiss the events that brought about the present tuation, it may be well to examine a little more carefully what laced the brake on the operations of the airborne troops and e Second Army. It was, as has been said, the weather. Several the correspondents have described how the Allies' transport, ks and tanks could gain no purchase on the rain-sodden roads. s is not a fact that will cause any astonishment ; but its plication to the situation that now confronts, the Allies deserves be noted. Ley and Goebbels have been congratulating the nation having escaped, as though by a miracle, from what seemed a flood threatened to engulf them ; and there is no doubt that the phase lightning advances has passed for the moment. This should have expected. Even if there were no Germans in Holland, the would still require their petrol. If there were any sort of sistance, the rifles and guns would clamour for their ammunition.
The troops would require food; but at Arnhem, as on various occa- sions during the war, it has been seen how much less the troops exact than the weapons and machines they use.
The time has come when it can be recognised how intimately the weather interferes with the factors which mainly constitute the Allies' superiority. Bad weather can ground the aircraft and put a brake on the tanks which play so great a part in making their attack irresistible and in giving their defensive such devastating strength. This is all the more & handicap from the very insight that has led the Allies to depend upon neither of them alone, but rather upon the complex of force to which they contribute. The armies have come more and more to rely upon the use of aircraft in tactical co-operation as well as on their strategic effect. They have developed the use of the tank not merely as part of a separate arm, but also as an integral part of armed force. The factor that checks the use of both, therefore, must have a very intimate effect upon the perfect operation of the whole army in its normal functioning.
It does even more. The great handicap which has so fat pre- vented the Allies from bringing their full pressure to bear against the enemy is the narrow funnel through which its supply has had to come. The very greatness of their resources in men and machines lays a proportionately increased strain on the mechanism of supply. Clearly this will ultimately be brought into adjustment with the needs of the armies ; but the question of the moment is, When?
Everything hangs on that ; and the Germans have no other hope of survival against the Allied attack in the- West than the possibility that they have now a respite front the full-scale effort that is designed. Even if the -Allies have contrived to get into working order other of the French ports that have been cleared since the capture of Cher- bourg, they must face the interference of winter storms ; and there is the difficulty of rolling-stock and long distances to travel. The use of road and air transport is subject to the same factor that affects the tanks and the other aircraft.
These considerations govern the chances of the Allies. The weather may be complacent during the present month. It is more likely to be capricious as it has been throughout the summer. But in November it can hardly be expected that it will favour operations in the air or by tanks. The Allies' chances of securing a decision this year have, therefore, narrowed. If the swift and overwhelming blows which their strength justifies are to be delivered before General Winter comes to the help of the enemy, they will probably have to take place within the present month. The development of slow- motion operations, even more of siege warfare, must be prevented during the next four weeks or so, if the enemy is not to secure the chance of a spring campaign. He has as little chance of a decision, militarily, as he had towards the end of last war ; but it can hardly be said that he has no chance of dragging out the present month.
It will be well to face such possibilities. There would scarcely have been any need to have emphasised them but for the strange spate of enthusiastic reports that cache from the Continent when the First American Army began to get its teeth in the Siegfried de- fences. Almost every day since then there has been some develop- ment in civil life here that suggests the approach of victory. The failure to secure complete success in the push to the Lek bridge has had the effect of a cold douche on this mood. But it would not have made any difference if exaggerated expectations had not become the most popular currency of the day. It is, of course, quite possible —one might perhaps say probable—that they will be justified in the event. We have every cause to trust the skill of our generals and the fighting ability of the troops. The Command see the trend of events better than any commentator ; and the First American Army's new advance through the Siegfried line may be the prelude of a full-scale attack. Nevertheless, on the facts as at present disclosed, it is certain that this has become a fateful month ; and the possi- bility of peace before Christmas depends upon the developments that take place in it.
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