FRANCE AND SYRIA.
GREAT BRITAIN seems fated to be misunderstood, even by her best friends. We have scarcely re- covered from the shock of being accused in America of having forced the League of Nations upon President Wilson, when we are charged in France with intriguing to deny the French a mandate for Syria. It may be as well to -say at the outset that no one here, so far as we know, has ever proposed a British protectorate over Syria ; it has always been assumed that, when the Turkish Empire ceased to be, Syria would fall to France. Since the Entente of 1904 the British public has put aside all thought of colonial rivalry with the French, recognizing that there was abundant scope for French activities in regions with which we did not concern ourselves. Among those regions Syria was unquestionably included. Nobody was, or should have been, surprised when the Bolsheviks, seeking like the Fat Boy to make our flesh creep, published in November, 1917, what purported to be a secret Agree- ment made in 1916 between Russia, France, and Great Britain, by which France was to obtain in Asiatic Turkey Syria, Adana, and the western part of Kurdistan. It was well understood by all intelligent observers that Franco attached great importance to the continuance of her civilizing work in Syria, and that the Syrian mandate, or protectorate, or sphere of influence would be hers, and hers alone. We may add that, so far from having any designs on Syria, Great Britain has not sought the very doubtful privilege of governing Palestine. The task may be thrust upon us, but it is by no means welcome, in view of our heavy responsibilities elsewhere. The alleged Agreement of 1916 assigned Haifa and Acre to us, in order, no doubt, that Palestine might have secure access to the only useful ports south of Beirut. But the Agreement went on to stipulate that Palestine itself " should be sub- jected to a special regime to be determined by agreement between Russia, France, and Great Britain." Of course the circumstances have changed since 1916 with the collapse of Russia, and we have now other Allies to consult in regard to the future of Asiatic Turkey. Yet in respect of Syria we can confidently assert that British policy remains the same. So far as this country is concerned, France still appears to be the predestined mandatory for the Syrian lands in which she has taken a deep interest for many centuries.
If, notwithstanding our clear intentions, the French Press—including reputable papers like the Ttnaps and the Journal des Debals, and even the Revue des Deux Morales—seems greatly perturbed about Syria, the fault lies mainly with the Peace Conference, which will not come to a decision about the fate of Turkey. The Allies concentrated their attention first of all upon the German Treaty ; having at last finished that part of their work, they are said to be awaiting America's reply to a proposal that she should assume a mandate for portions of the Turkish Empire, especially Armenia, and perhaps also Constantinople. As America was not at war with Turkey or Bulgaria, it might have been open to the European Allies to arrange terms with those enemies on their own account. But it was clearly wiser for the Allies to obtain, if possible, an American guarantee for the Near Eastern settlement even at the cost of some months of delay. On the other hand, delays are especially dangerous in Asiatic Turkey, where the Turkish system, worn out by the strain of war, collapsed before any new administration could be set up. Syria during the long interregnum has naturally become a hotbed of intrigue. When General Allenby, • after destroying the Turkish armies in Samaria and Galilee, occupied Damascus and Aleppo last autumn, he installed a military administration. The Syrian coast from Tyre to Alexandretta was entrusted to the care of Colonel de Piepape, the French officer commanding the mixed French division which had rendered excellent service in the Sept- ember battle. Colonel de Piepape with his troops entered Beirut on October 20th last, twelve days after the 7th (Meerut) Division had reached the town by the coast road and French warships had occupied the port. Eastern Syria, including the whole course of the Hedjaz Railway as far north as Aleppo and Muslimie, was placed under the charge of Ali Riza Pasha el Rikabi at Damascus. The French and Arab officers, with General Money, the adminis- trator for Palestine at Jerusalem, remained of course under the orders of General Allenby. It is this purely temporary and provisional administration which has, we fear, caused annoyance to the French. They frankly resent the presence of a Hedjaz Arab administrator in Syria. On military grounds it was not unnatural that the Hedjaz Arab forces, which had co-operated valiantly east of the Jordan with our armies and had reached Damascus on the same day as our cavalry, should have been entrusted with the care of the city. General' Allenby needed all his advanced troops in the regions further north, towards the Taurus and the Euphrates. But M. Robert de Caix in the New Europe of last week says that the Arab occupation of Damascus was prearranged by agreement between us and the King of the Hedjaz, and that France was not consulted as to the terms. The BritishGovertunent have not disclosed the nature of the bargain made with our Arab Allies during the campaign. But we must point out that when that bargain was con- cluded we had to-face very powerful German and Turkish armies in Palestine, and that we had no prospect of obtain- ing any substantial help from France or from any other quarter except the Hedjaz. No doubt the Arabs would have failed to secure their independence without our help, but we needed them just as they needed us, and we' were bound to offer them. substantial inducements to persevere in a campaign which was peculiarly arduous and costly. These facts meat not beignored now that the object of the campaignhae been achieved in the complete destruction of the Turkish- military power. If we had failed to make terms with the Arabs; the campaign might not have been so decisive.
The attitude of the Syrians themselves is by no means clear. We may take it for granted that they detested the Turks, who in' turn despised the Syrians. But they are probably far from being agreed as to the kind- of government which they would prefer. The population is a medley of races and religions. The Syrians of Arab stock, the Muses, and the Maronites, and many smaller peoples like the Aramaean remnant, live side by side without amalgamating in that fertile and troubled land. We can easily imagine how the setting up of two military authorities, French and Arab, under the supervision of a third authority in General Allenby has fomented and intensified the rival propaganda and intrigues for which Syria is noted. It is not surprising that " unfortunate incidents," such' as those of which the French Press com- plains, have occurred now that the temporary military administration has lasted for nearly a year. We do not know why one or two Syrians with French sympathies have been arrested, but we may conjecture that the military authorities, desiring as usual to be strictly impartial, have felt it necessary to cheek some unduly enthusiastic pro- pagandists who might be causing unrest. We are sorry to see it openly suggested in the French newspapers that the British authorities in Syria are deliberately repressing all manifestations of native friendliness to France, because nothing could be more foreign to the characterof the British representatives than such pettiness. Surely our actionshave made such criticism untenable. If we had wanted Syria, we should presumably have been most careful to keep the country under a purely British administration as soon as, we had occupied it by force of arms. As• it was, we took pains to appoint a French administrator at Beirut and an Arab at Damascus, reserving nothing but the general supervision for ourselves: It is hard to see how we could have demonstrated more completely our entire disinterested- ness, and our' sympathy with the French claims to a mandate for Syria; conditioned only by the political and moral necessity' of keeping faith with the Hedjaz. However, the future destiny of Syria, as of the rest of the Turkish Empire, is not being settled by Great Britain alone, The decision lies with the Peace Conference, in which France counts for as much as this country. The Allies; we under- stand, are hesitating partly because they desire a fuller knowledge' of the political aspirations of Syria, such as the American Commission which has' visited Syria may perhaps be able to supply. America is interested in the question because great numbers of Syrians emigrate to the United States and take a lively interest in the affairs of their native land. The Syrian Americans, or some of them, advocate an American protectorate of Syria, though it does not seem• likely that America would entertain the idea. Some- Syrian want independence, others favour an Arab Confederation in which Syria would be a State, others are said to deeire British guidance, and others again; especially the Maronites, would welcome a French protectorate. The final word lies with the Peace Con- ference, but, as' we have said, it must be clearly understood that Great Britain will not accept a mandate for Syria. That solution of the Syrian question is definitely excluded, for the simple reason that it would give pain to our friends and Allies. Every intelligent man knows that the peace of the world and the security of the British Empire depend upon the maintenance of our close friendship with America, France, and Italy, and that it would be a stupendous blunder to imperil this friendship for the sake of acquiring fi'esh territorial responsibilities in any part of the world when we have more than enough to do already. We can only hope' that the Peace Conference will come to a speedy decision about Syria, and thus relieve us from a task which was thrust upon us by the stern necessities of war, but which has become irksome and embarrassing in the transition from war to peace.
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