PROFESSOR FLINT'S "HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY." * [CONCLUDING
NOTICE.]
MANY just and thoughtful students of history have attributed the credit, or discredit, of the first French Revolution to the writings of Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau,—an opinion we deem altogether exaggerated and, to a great extent, erro- neous. The first of these eminent men, by his praises of the English Constitution, led the frivolous and impulsive nobility and gentry of France into that Anglomanie which rendered them so thoroughly ridiculous, when they fancied that, by dressing like English country squires, carrying large blud- geons, and being followed by boule-dogues, they were on the direct road to the acquisition of English liberty, tranquillity, and prosperity. His celebrated aphorism, so often quoted and so generally misunderstood, that under a Monarchy the motive- power is honour, under a despotism fear, and in a Republic 'virtue, led men to form the opinion that in a Republic virtue would be predominant, whereas the true meaning is that, for the peace and stability of a Republic, it is required that virtue should be predominant, not that any form of govern- ment can make it so. Indeed, there are at least two vices to which a Republican Constitution seems rather favourable,—viz., envy (if we may trust Longfellow, who ought to have known) and avarice, to judge from the state of Holland in the last century, and of the United States at present. But Montesqtrieu's views were deemed obsolete in France some years prior to the Revolution, and were termed by a popular orator, "senile dreams." Voltaire was an aristocrat in principles and habits, and flattered despots most probably from interested motives; and, though his sense of The History of the Philosophy of Historic. By Robert Flint, Professor in the University of Edinburgh. London and Edinburgh: Blackwood and Sons. justice and mercy seemed keen and strong, yet we find no trace in his writings of sympathy with the oppressed peasantry, the grievances of the middle class, or with the sufferings of women and priests. Few of his historical works have any pretensions to be deemed philosophical; but we agree with Professor Flint that, in his Essai sur lea Mews, he entered on the right path, i.e., that of tracing the growth of national manners, the progress of society, and the advance- ment of the human intellect from Charlemagne to Louis XIII. He also, as our author points out, saw clearly that the true aim of history proper is to refer the causes of events to those general laws which govern the opinions and feelings—we may add, the passions—of men, without rising beyond them to, as the Prof&sor terms it, the primary cause. Had he been alive in 1790, he would probably have rejoiced at the convening of the States-General, but would soon have been disgusted with their profitless declamations, have made them the butt of that sarcasm of which he was so skilled a master, and been one of the first to be "shaved by the national razor." It must be admitted, however, that the hostility to religion manifested in almost all his writings, and the 'gross indecency of some of them, did much to relax the bonds of morality and led to many atrocities, at least to the persecution of priests and nuns. Rousseau's Treatise on Equality, his Social Contract, and some opinions ex- pressed in his Emile, exercised a much wider and stronger practical influence than any of the writings of his two pre- decessors, at least, on the numerical majority ; and when Professor Flint very truly says that Voltaire was "the man of his age," he might, with equal accuracy, have added that Rousseau was the "the man of the people." The Professor also acutely notices that he saw and pointed out clearly the difference between liberty and equality, terms which many people nowadays confound; and we can discern what an unpractical mind he had, when we learn that he preferred the latter to the former, and asserted that the community might rightly inflict death on any one who violated equality. Liberty admits of degrees ; not so equality, which logically can admit of no increase or diminution ; every man must possess some portion of liberty, otherwise he would not be a man, while no two men can be said to be perfectly equal, save in voting at elections, and theoretically (but only theoretically), in litigation. Experience proves that many professors of equality neither believe, nor act upon, their principles, for if so, the heiress of a Cincinnati pork-butcher would not talk of" coming to England to buy a Duke." No Act of Parliament can enforce social equality; and success in life, which naturally leads to inequality, depends upon intellect, education, and industry, which it is impossible to equalise. Rousseau's declamations cannot justly be held responsible for the troubles (we suppose we must not say atrocities) of the French Revolution, but they led to much wild talk in the Legislature and to the adoption of many laws and regulations at once trivial, fussy, and yet stringent. A greater degree of practical influence was brought to bear on the mass of the people by ephemeral pamphlets, generally blasphemous and obscene, replete with attacks on private characters ; for which last we can show parallels in some of our society papers and in divers Anarchist journals.
The Reign of Terror, the austere rule of the Directory, the wars maintained against almost all the nations of Europe, and the military despotism of Napoleon, brought a long eclipse upon philosophical speculation and almost all litera- ture. The Emperor, though himself well versed in history, distrusted speculation, and detested freedom of thought. "If," he often said, "an Empire were made of brass, the philosophers would overthrow it ; " and certainly, if we may judge from the public conduct of some of his contemporaries who possessed high literary and scientific attainments, we cannot say that he was much in error. Physical science alone made progress during his reign, and the vivid intellect of the Gallic race was thrown into retirement, study, and meditation. One great and fundamental error has pervaded almost all French philosophical systems, from the time of Montesquieu down nearly to the present day, the belief in the natural innocence of man and in the perfectibility of humanity. Assuming the natural innocence of man, these writers can account for the vicious and foolish actions recorded in history only by attributing them to bad laws imposed by wicked Kings, and to superstitious beliefs incul- cated by knavish priests, causes which, we think, will be found inadequate, and which will certainly not apply in all cases ; while as regards perfectibility, if we deduct, as when reasoning with these thinkers we are in all fairness bound to do, the benefits traceable to the moral teaching of Chris- tianity, we shall probably find but few advances towards moral perfection.
Passing over Daunou and Michaud, both of whom possessed intellect, industry, and great powers of philosophic thought, Professor Flint rightly directs our attention to two writers under the Napoleonic regime, who have exercised great influence not only on the French, but on the European intellect, and one of whom has just claims to rank as a philosophic historian,—Madame de Stael and Chateaubriand. He justly considers the former to have displayed a firm and comprehensive grasp of the laws upon which the stability and advancement of societies depend, and that though influenced, at least in one of her books, by the sentiments of Rousseau, she far surpassed him in political and historical sagacity. She, however, like most of her predecessors, adhered to the belief in human perfectibility, and advanced it with no little exaggeration, but she deserves credit for having urged that French literature and philosophy needed for their perfect development an infusion of Christian spirit and German thought and imagination. Chateaubriand, while more richly endowed with genius, poetic temperament and descriptive power, was deficient in judgment, logical power, and philosophic calmness, and hence his influence has been wide but not permanent ; but his Martyrs, by its vivid portraiture of scenes of action, has been the precursor of Scott's Ivanhoe and Thierry's Norman Conquest. Though a strenuous champion of Legitimacy, he had sincere love for progress and liberty, but was too excitable and imagina- tive to comprehend clearly the real nature of a constitutional monarchy. We wish that Professor Flint had bestowed more space on Thierry, who, as he says justly, "has almost perfected historiography as a literary art." The present writer has read his works over and over again, and always with increasing pleasure, though we agree with our author that his critical judgment was defective, and that his sympathy with the vanquished has too often led him astray from that dignified impartiality essential to a philosophic historian. In transitu we may observe that M. Thierry has fallen into an error in holding that the Parliamentary opposition to Charles I. was the outcome of the racial hostility of Saxon to Norman, for at that date the races were so mingled as to render distinction impossible; and among the signatures to the King's death-warrant are to be found Keltic, Danish, and Norman names, as well as Saxon, the contest being one of principles and opinions, not of races. M. de Barante, whose History of the Dukes of Burgundy brings him more into repute in Belgium than in France, held that the sole duty of a historian is to give a plain and accurate narrative of the facts ascertained by just criticism of the evidence, and thus to escape the temptation to theorising or a prejudiced perversion of truth. Apparently he hoped for readers competent to draw sound conclusions. His biographical studies on the Vendean war are truly fascinating, and we regret that Professor Flint has not noticed them.
We can hardly discern the grounds of Professor Flint's ap- proval of M. Thiers' History of the French Revolution, qualified though that approval be, if, as he holds (and, we believe, rightly), the author's object was "to do justice to a great event, and to do as much harm as possible to the admirers and upholders of absolute authority and despotic government." An important event which affected more or less seriously not only Europe, but even North and South America, will naturally attract the attention of the reader and the pen of the writer; but what does "to do justice" mean ? It may mean to justify, or to palliate or excuse, or to condemn with or without extenuating circumstances, and upon these points, as regards the French Revolution, civilised humanity is still divided, and likely to remain so. A politician may wish to "do harm" to his opponents, if that means to discredit their views in the opinion of the public ; but then he cannot bring
to his investigations the spirit of candour and integrity that we expect from a philosophic historian. If the merits of this work be impaired by party spirit, the History of the Consulate and Empire is marred by excess of patriotism,—a vice too
common among the historians of France and some other countries. We agree cordially with our author in his state- ment that M. Tillers "would have sacrificed any number of lives, broken any law, crushed any nation, to promote the safety or glory of France." If so, he cannot be deemed a philosopher or an upright or trustworthy historian. A good antidote to his opinions, as well as to the Imperialism of the late Emperor's Life of Cavar, will be found in M. Laztfrey's book on Napoleon I.
The 1:11tramontane or Theocratic School has produced no historians entitled to be termed philosophers, though De Maistre and Lamennais were men of much ability, and would have exerted much influence but for their reactionary views. The doctrinaire school, of which Guizot is the most gifted representative, furnishes a parallel to the eclectic system of moral and mental philosophy, its disciples holding that so far as historical and political theories are founded on a knowledge of the general laws which direct human actions, so far they deserve acceptance, but as they have hitherto been drawn from a partial, inadequate, and frequently prejudiced view, in so far they are erroneous. M. Guizot was deficient in that vivid and pictorial power of narrative which, in a purely literary point of view, is essential to a historian, but he possessed every other qualification for the teaching of history, philosophically and usefully. His discovery (as it may well be called) that Roman legislation under the emperors pressing severely and unjustly on the curiales or middle-class, particu- lady in the provincial towns, led to a general exhaustion of the State, redounds much to his reputation. It had never been noticed by previous inquirers, and it gives a more adequate cause for the success of the Teutonic invasion than any of those previously assigned. The propriety of his selec- tion of France as furnishing the clearest illustration of the advance of civilisation, has been questioned by some, Gioberti preferring Italy and Buckle England. If the possession of a. representative government be a forward step in human pro- gress, Spain may advance her claim, having had a Parliament of four Chambers for at least half-a-century before the days of Simon de Montfort. De Tocqueville, who adopted Gnizot's mode of investigation, and himself held strongly democratic views, holds that democracy is the best form of government, and that all civilised nations are tending towards it, but that the more democratic the democracy is, the more effectually all ranks and social distinctions are swept away, the more danger there is that a military despotism may supervene ; and Pro- fessor Flint wisely predicts that this will come to pass when the strife between capital and labour, or, as we should prefer to say, between loyalty and anarchy, reaches its climax. We have read somewhere that De Tocqueville's book told so much unpleasant truth regarding the United States, that it has seriously impeded the progress of democratic opinions.
Had Professor Flint omitted his two rather tedious articles on Cousin and Comte, he would have brought his book within a more reasonable compass and rendered it more attractive to such ordinary readers as may participate in George M.'s objection to Scotch (or French) metaphysics, more especially as these two eminent men, though they have acquired as philosophers a more than European reputation, have no claire to rank as historians of any kind, though their opinions may, indirectly, have had considerable effect on the students and writers of history.
This book contains so large a mass of information, and is marked by so much industrious research and just criticism, that it is certain to interest deeply the thinking portion of the public ; but brevity and a less metapbysical style of writing would have rendered it, if not more useful, certainly more attractive.
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