7 APRIL 1923, Page 8

THE PROBLEM OF YUGOSLAVIA.

THE present situation in Yugoslavia, remote though it may seem, is nevertheless a matter of grave importance in European politics. The peace of Central and South-Eastern Europe is, at the present moment, largely dependent on a state of deadlock ; it is in unstable equilibrium. Hungary resents her territorial losses with a resentment that can only be compared with French feeling on the question of Alsace. "Francais, roulez-vous quatre Alsaces? "—that is a specimen of the posters placarding the streets of Pest. Hungarian Irredentist societies, with their secret badges, their pro- paganda, their war-cry of " Nem ! Nem! Soha ! " are growing in power ; affiliated Hapsburgian societies plot the return of the little Prince Otto, realizing the enormous advantage this would give them in recalling the allegiance of certain elements in the Succession States. No one who has travelled recently in Central Europe will fail to have :found evidence of this. - On both sides of -the Danube -frontier guards are in a state of tension ; in Transylvania -there is a sort of sporadic guerrilla warfare in progress. :Hungary cannot lie down under the dictates of the Peace Treaty, because they threaten not only her .national pride but her economic existence.

But Hungary is surrounded by the Little Entente- Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia—whose very 'existence, on the other hand, depends on the main- tenance of the terms of the Peace Treaty. If Hungarian insurgents were to cross the Danube at Esztergom or Komarom, or advance on Pressburg, Rumania would advance from Transylvania, the Yugoslays invade South Hungary. The Magyar might be able to tackle one of his neighbours alone ; he dare not take them all on at once. Meanwhile, he grits his teeth; he spreads propaganda among the Great Powers ; he bides his time.

It is upon this deadlock, this diplomatic cantilevering, that the structure of the present peace of Europe rests ; and a fairly rickety structure it is. One of its most obvious weaknesses, one which the Hungarians recognize and endeavour to foment, lies in the internal dissensions 'of the Yugoslav State. That kingdom, conglomerated of the old kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the old Hungarian Banat, of Croatia- Slavonia, and the Austrian Duchy of Slovenia, has not had the expert and tactful guidance during the first few years of its life that it obviously needed. Consequently, the component nations who, a few years ago, were flying into -the arms of their long-lost brothers, are now ready to jump at each other's throats. For this situation one Cannot but feel that the Serbs, with their leaders, M. hike and M. Prebipovie, are chiefly to blame. They -agreed to receive their new brothers into a federa- tion, and then promptly occupied their countries with Serbian troops and imposed on them a constitution that practically amounts to a Serbian. Empire. Take the lease of Croatia. the leader of the malcontents. Under Hungary she had, at any rate, an appearance of self. government, a Parliament of her own, a natural and yet a Western culture of her own. Her people, at least in the North, are highly civilized; she has immense natural resources. Her " liberators " have abolished her Parliament ; tax her resources to an unbearable and even a ludicrous extent in order to increase the Serbian revenue ; endeavour to render her culturally and politically dependent on Belgrade; give all the posts in the Civil Services to Serbs; occupy her capital, Zagreb, with Serbian troops who terrorize the countryside ; and treat her national leader, M. RadiC, whose courage and patriotism in his lifelong struggle against Hungarian absorption have rendered him famous everywhere, as a rebel, almost an outlaw ! Meanwhile, Government news- papers try to poison the minds of the surrounding popu- lations against him by the most preposterous lies. It is small wonder that a Croatian revolt, the establishment or attempt at the establishment of a Republic at Zagreb, seems imminent. But it is obvious that any revolt must be a bloody business ; there is probably no form of warfare so savage as the rising of an exasperated countryside against an army of occupation. And the result of the consequent paralysis of Yugoslavia to Europe may be easily imagined. But M. Radio is too sound a thinker to provoke violence in wantonness ; he withdraws his deputies, seventy strong, from the Bel- grade Parliament ; he uses the cry of a republic as a political weapon. But his real aim is the only sensible one, the acquisition of a constitution which shall give a decent measure of autonomy to the component States, which -shall abolish the quite unfair hegemony, of Serbia and replace it by -a federation somewhat on the American principle, whith will allow Croatia to develop her natural riches unmolested. Moreover, he is far-sighted enough to see that the only hope for Central "Europe lies in a system of free trade, for it is the ridiculous tariffs now in force everywhere which are responsible almost entirely for the present state of distress. Free trade and pacific relations with all the States of the Danube basins are an absolutely essential part of his programme.

So much for M. Radio. But many of his fopowers, especially among the younger generation, are not so long- sighted. They have been exasperated to breaking-point ; they are as passionately opposed to national absorption, especially in this tactless manner, by the Serbs as they are to oppression by the Hungarians. At every village one hears the same story ; they say they will wait for a few months in the hope of obtaining redress by peaceful means, but no more. If the problem is not speedily settled, a Croatian revolt and all that will entail may well be imminent.

The recent General Election has brought things to a head. M. Radie has not only maintained his position ; he has improved it. The Government have obtained barely a third of the seats in the House. The new Government and the new Opposition must inevitably both consist of coalitions : and it is-in this preliminary juggling for places that the fate of the country will probably be decided. Can M. Paid angle enough votes to continue his present policy ? Can M. Radie win the allegiance of enough of the other Moderates to compel a revision of the constitution ? If he does, we shall probably find the present Serbian Empire converted into a loosely-knit peasant republic, in which Serbia's bitterest enemy, Bulgaria, may possibly in time be included. Such a State, with the fine fighting elements of the Serbs and the Slovene borderers, combined with the high aesthetic culture and economic wealth of the Croats, may well have a rosy future, and its people will prove, more- over, excellent citizens of Europe. R. H.