RUSSIAN REPLY
It would be easy to embark on an argument as to which comes first, German settlement or relief of international tension. But it would be a mistake. It is always difficult to explain to People why the order of an agenda is a good reason for holding up discussions about peace. It was difficult during the days of the Palais Rose, and it would be more difficult now that Peace, rightly or wrongly, has been in the air. The Russian note, as it stands, does not put Germany first and is therefore the best election platform that Dr. Adenauer could have Wished. It should be allowed, for the moment, to speak for itself. It will be more eloquent than any self-conscious exposure.
The second reflection is more serious and less simple. Has the Kremlin dropped the curtain with a bang ? Is this the end of the interim of reasonableness which followed Stalin's death, the end of the possibility of peace in Asia and of accommodation in Europe ? On the face of it, the Russians Would seem to have gone back; they not only take their stand ort Potsdam, which is usual, but appear to have revised their agreement in principle that, at some stage, free elections should be held throughout Germany. They would also seem to have rejected the idea of an international conference on Korea. It is tempting, if only for simplicity and because the last few months have shown the dangers involved in any other hypothesis, to conclude that we are back in the Stalin era. But this would be to ignore three known facts. The first is that the Communist leaders have not yet settled down, and • nothing can be certain until they have. The second is that the Russians have every reason to delay, disguise and confuse the German question because they have probably not decided, and have good reason to find it difficult to decide, what they are going to do about it. The third is that the East Germans have revolted and are still revolting against the regime; and this may yet set a limit to the period in which the Russians can afford to do nothing.