Cairo Circus
On Thursday, July 30th, Mr. Tayeb Hussein, the Pakistan chargé d'affaires in Cairo, held a dinner party which may turn out to have been a major diplomatic event. Around his table both sides in the Canal Zone dispute found themselves negotiating informally about an Anglo-Egyptian settlement, without either side having had to break the ice. A minor, but still the first, obstacle to the formal resumption of nego- tiations has been removed. It is also true that both sides are now more anxious for a settlement and wiser about the way to achieve it than they were three months ago, or indeed have been at any point since the Egyptians denounced the treaty in 1951. If each side were able to convey quietly to the other the minimum terms on which they were willing to settle, they might find very little between them. Britain, after all, has publicly stated that she does not wish to continue paying £50 million a year for the privilege of keeping troops in Ismailia. Egypt is equally clear, from time to time, that it is in its own interests that the base itself should be maintained. But agreement will still not be easy. On the Egyptian side, there is the fact, perhaps too often forgotten by British negotiators, that even the most reasonable regime in Egypt is not merely a public but a personal enemy of the British occupation and of all its ramifications. On the British side, there is the reality that the base will be perfectly useless unless it is efficiently maintained for an assured period, and unless access to it in all, and not merely in some, of the likely contingencies is guaranteed. To obtain these conditions will require not merely arrangements on paper for the entry and control of foreign technicians but a belief in the willingness of the Egyptian regime to respect those arrangements in the future. The way to a settlement is still only a tight-rope, even though it has now been secured at both ends.
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