THE EUROPEAN SITUATION.
IN spite of the menacing news that is pouring in from many quarters of mobilization, or rather pre- parations for mobilization, on the French and German
frontier, on the German and Russian frontier, and still more in Austria-Hungary, and in spite, too, of the
unmistakable rattle of the sabre in the German Chan- cellor's speech, we continue optimistic in regard to the general situation. Unless some sudden madness seizes one of the Great Powers we do not believe there will be war. Our reason for this is two-fold. The Powers which are specially interested in the preservation of peace, or, rather, shall we say, the Powers which have least interest in going to war, are the Powers which are in the best position for prosecuting war at the present moment. The Powers which will be most tempted to bring on a war by reason of what is always a very potent temptation, that they would fight at an advantage, are happily the Powers which for other reasons are least anxious for war. On the other hand, the group which contains a Power, i.e., Austria-Hungary, which may come to regard war as necessary to the maintenance of its national aspirations, would clearly fight at a disadvantage. Therefore that group, i.e., the Triple Alliance, is not tempted to precipitate a war.
Let us look at these considerations a little more closely and a little more specifically. What would war mean for the Triple Alliance if it should break out owing to Austria- Hungary declaring that the post bellum settlement in the Balkans was one which she was unable to accept, and would necessitate armed action by her against the Balkan Allies ? We will assume for the purpose of our argument that her intervention would be of a kind that would bring Russia into the field, and that Russia's action would be followed by the other two Powers of the Triple Alliance standing by Austria-Hungary, and finally by France and Britain stand- ing by Russia. With the pieces set in this manner let us take stock of the situation. In the first place, the Powers of the Triple Alliance would be faced with the fact that they were beginning war under great disadvantages com- pared with the way in which they would have begun it two years ago—say at the time of the Agadir incident. They would now have the Balkan Allies against them. The new military Power that has arisen in Europe would throw its sword into the scale against the Triple Alliance. Trans- lated into terms of men and guns, this means that Austria- Hungary, instead of merely thinking about Russia, which would have been her sole preoccupation in the case of war under the old conditions, would have to face the possibility of an army of 500,000 Slays attempting to invade her at her weakest point, that is in her Slavonic provinces—pro- vinces where it would take very little to light the blaze of insurrection. If Austria-Hungary were waging a war which would be represented, and not unfairly represented, as an attempt to crush a purely Slavonic nation, the twenty-six millions of Slays within the Austrian Empire could not but be profoundly moved.
What would make this local difficulty worse for Austria-Hungary would be the fact that such a war would now be waged under conditions in which Austria- Hungary would in all human probability lose the control of the Adriatic. Consider for a moment the strategic situation if an Anglo-French fleet were operating on the Dalmatian coast, or rather from Istria to the Gulf of Cattaro, and that Bulgarian and Servian armies, reinforced by Montenegrin guerilla bands, were penetrating into Bosnia and Herzegovina and threatening Croatia. It is conceivable, no doubt, that the Austro-Hungarian army may be so magnificently equipped and so ably led that it would find no difficulty in crushing the Bulgarians and Servians, in spite of the national enthusiasm of the Allies and their recent war experience, and also in spite of the fact that the army engaged in these crushing operations would be largely composed of Croats and other Slavonia conscripts. But even if we assume that this crushing miracle could take place, still it must be admitted that Austria-Hungary would not have a very great number of troops to spare with which to repel a Russian invasion of Galicia, and certainly would have no troops to spare to reinforce Germany. To put it in another way. Austria- Hungary's military power would be sterilized by the new factor r in the Balkans. Instead of helping to overcome Russia and France she would be entirely occupied with a Balkan war. Clearly then Austria-Hungary would not at the present moment and under present conditions be fight- ing at that advantage which is dear to the Teutonic pro- fessors of the metaphysic of war. Let us turn next to Italy. Italy is an honourable Power, and is no doubt -very anxious to fulfil her obligations to the Triple Alliance to the letter, and would no doubt, up to the declaration of war, give all the support she possibly could to her allies. But if war actually broke out would it be physically possible for Italy to descend into the arena and fight the battles of Germany and Austria-Hungary against her old friend Britain, her new friend Russia, and her neighbour France ? We doubt it, even assuming the best possible will in the world, not only in the Italian Government, but, what is a rather different matter, in the Italian people as a whole. We believe that Italy, regretfully perhaps, would have to say, "The time chosen for the war is one which makes it impossible for us to stand by the Alliance. It is not in our power to fulfil the terms of that Alliance unless —which however we clearly recognize as impossible— Germany and Austria-Hungary can guarantee to us the command of the Mediterranean and sweep from it the French and British fleets. If they could have done that we would cheerfully have fulfilled our obligations, and have invaded France by the Corniche and the Col di Tenda. As, however, it is beyond the naval power of Germany and Austria-Hungary to secure the command of the Mediterranean, our hands are tied. Two years ago we could have exactly fulfilled our treaty obligations, for then the fact that we could not command the Mediterranean would have mattered comparatively little. It would only have exposed our maritime provinces and our trade to hostile incursions—things painful and dangerous, but not involving a capital disaster. Now, however, it must mean something far more terrible. It must mean the virtual destruction of the army of 100,000 Italian troops which are scattered along the shores of Tripoli and Barca. These troops are stationed in a country where the local food supplies are negligible. They have to be fed from the sea. But if an Anglo-French fleet cuts the com- munications of our African army and blockades the Tripoli coast, as it undoubtedly would, that army must ultimately either perish of hunger or surrender to the enemy. This would happen even if the enemies' fleets did not make the possession of the Tripoli ports untenable by naval action, and even if no expeditionary forces were sent, from Tunis on one side and from Egypt on the other, to com- plete the ruin of the Italian forces. In all probability, however, there would be such action, not to speak of the encouragement which would be given to the local Arabs to begin their campaign of pin-pricks. In short, we have given hostages to sea power on too huge a scale to enable us to remain in the Triple Alliance during war. Certain definite consequences flow from our Tripolitan adventures and we cannot ignore them. Finally, we cannot admit that the loss of 100,000 men is a loss which we should be justified in running rather than fail in our obligations. If for no other reason the Italian people would not endure the sacrifice involved in the surrender of the flower of their army. The Ministry which consented to such a sacrifice would not last twenty-four hours."
How would. the other two Powers of the Triple Alliance meet the inexorable logic of such a heart-to-heart declara- tion by the Italian Foreign Minister ? Probably by telling Italy that she was a treacherous Power, and that she would never be forgiven. But that would only make things worse. The Italians, who are amongst the ablest of diplomatists, would at once realize that if Austria- Hungary and Germany won the great war, the hand of Austria-Hungary would be raised to smite Italy hip and thigh. Nothing could avert the vengeance of a successful Austria-Hungary. Italy, then, dare not let the Alliance— now become the Dual Alliance—win. From mere motives of safety she must throw in her lot with the Triple Entente, and obtain from them a guarantee that they would make no peace which would sacrifice her. Otherwise she would almost certainly be "sacrificed on the altar of peace" when the Powers grew tired of fighting. Italy, in fact, would be forced by circumstances to take sides against her present friends. And remember, the latent feeling in Italy against Austria-Hungary will help to produce this result. The chance of getting the Trentino and Trieste would soon make a policy originally adopted out of hard necessity a popular policy. Obviously, then, Germany and Austria- Hungary will not be fighting at an advantage if war comes before the New Year. Even Germany herself would be fighting at a disadvan- tage. Her fleet is strong, but it is not yet strong enough. Not only could she give no help to Austria-Hungary on the Mediterranean. but in all probability she would not dare to try conclusions with us for the command of the sea. Let anyone think what that means for German commerce. We are not going to say anything now as to the condition of the French or German armies or as to the superiority or the reverse of the French war materiel and artillery as compared with that of Germany, or, again, to count " wings" in the matter of an air war. We will only say that no one who knows anything about the subject will be prepared to say that in these respects it is France who would fight at a disadvantage. As to Russia, we have also only one remark to make. The winter is now upon us, and Russia fights at an advantage in the winter. But Russia has at this moment a greater advantage even than that. The one thing that would stir her vast population to its depths would be a war in which the battle-cry would be "The Slav against the Teutonic oppressor." Happily, there is not the least reason to fear that the prospect of fighting at an advantage will fly to the heads of our Government or of that of France, or even that of Russia. We are as certain as we can be of anything human that neither in London, nor in Berlin, nor in St. Peters- burg will the Machiavellian whisper—" If you don't fight now you may never have such an opportunity of fighting at an advantage "—be listened to for a moment. The Triple Entente honestly desires peace, and has honestly been doing its best to suppress the provocative fanaticism of Servia, and to insist that she shall not push her claims beyond reasonable bounds.
We have given the fundamental reasons why we think that war will be avoided. We will now go so far as to hazard the guess that Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia have already decided that there shall be no war. Unless we are greatly mistaken, one of the secret or semi- secret maxims of German statecraft is never to rattle the sabre till she is convinced that the danger of war is over. She holds it to be a valuable asset in her statecraft to be able to say that she never draws the sword out of the scabbard without a thoroughly good reason, and also without imposing her will on an awed and admiring universe. "Victory comes when virtue and valour jointly call her." But an obvious way of maintaining and sup- porting this noble legend of the invincible friend in shining armour is never to put on the armour till a sensible, businesslike diplomacy has first banished the risk of war. Frankly, if the promulgation of the legend pleases Germany and also leads to peace, no one will grudge the great Teutonic Power her little piece of play-acting. We will all most willingly pay her the compliment of an awesome shiver—happy in the thought that the armour is not put on nor the sword drawn half out unless peace has already been amply guaranteed.
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