Political Commentary
Politicians out of step
Patrick Cosgrave
Last Thursday's all-night House of Commons debate, on measures against not all terrorism, but the most recent manifestations of IRA activity, abounded in' ironies. If, as has been asserted, the parli'amentary draftsmen have laboured for eighteen months over these provisions, then the Government's Law Officers were either singularly badly briefed, or stupid; for Mr Jenkins, exercising a competent political intelligence, had more than once to rescue them from the quagmires of legal contradiction. The thing that struck me most, however, was less the sort of thing Mr Andrew Alexander has been sneering at — the fact that the political indignation of last week was never released during the period when only our citizensin Ulster suffered, valid though that point is — than a curious feeling that the House, considered collectively, was still proud of its own moderation, and felt that that moderation was still a vital factor in any collective judgement on the overall situation. In a word, the House of Commons was still being wet; and that continuing wetness will be an important weakness in the months to come. Never, surely, has any legislature possessed of a determination to put down a threat to the life and security of its citizens passed through so speedily measures so feeble.
Yet, as we all know, any member of the House would vigorously repudiate any accusation to the effect that he was not utterly determined to put down the IRA; and he might even add that he would stop at nothing in doing it. But there is an inherent wetness in our parliamentary response to the latest outburst of Irish thuggery. It is extremely difficult to describe the nature of this wetness; all the more so in that the feelings which produce it do credit to the humanity if not the good sense of our legislators. I suppose the moment at which a conviction as to the wetness came most forcefully home to me was one day shortly after Mr Merlyn Rees had become Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Now, Mr Rees is a good and decent man: he is charming, kind, intelligent and able. But he is as unfitted to handling the Irish situation as was another man with the same qualities, Mr Maudling, before him. Mr Callaghan and Mr Whitelaw are forceful, intelligent, sometimes devious men: both made shattering mistakes in their conduct of North'em Irish affairs — though Mr Whitelaw achieved a precarious and brilliant balance that existed for a few moments — but the mistakes they made did not arise out of their characters, but rather, out of their tactics.
Anyway, shortly after he assumed hi office, Mr Rees, responding in the House of Commons to terrorist activity in Ulster, and speaking with deep feeling, wondered aloud, and to murmurs of approval from most of the House, about what drove the terrorists on. How, he pondered, could they think violence could get them anywhere, considering the ineradicable determination of Parliament and all its parties to stand firm in defence of civilised values? Of course — as Mr Alexander, again, immediately noted — violence has been extremely success ful throughout the present phase of Ulster
history. From the moment the IRA consolidated their hold over the more important of the various civil rights. organisations violence has
been their road to success. Their violence and their propaganda produced, not more freedom
for the army in Ulster, but more restraints. Their violence produced not more severe measures of internment, but less severe. Their violence produced not their utter proscription by Her Majesty's ministers, but a tea party with Mr Whitelaw in London. Their violence produced not a renewed statement of British parliamentary faith in an instrument — Stormont — forced on Ulster by London, but its abolition. There is as yet absolutely no sign that British ministers or Opposition politicians (from any of the various Opposition parties) think seriously differently in any way from the way they have thought in recent years: their policy, to adapt Mao, has been always to take one step forward and two back; and the feeble measures now enacted indicate that they have not altered in any way.
To substantiate this thesis, let us look at the two principal causes of the IRA's strength as a terrorist and guerrilla force acting within the United Kingdom. The first is the measure of support — which changes, but always exists — that the organisation enjoys among the Catholic population of Ulster. For this support British governments for a large part of this century were to blame: having established Stormont as a subsidiary legislature, nothing Whatever was done to ensure the same standards of treatment for those living under it as were meted out to those under the direct jurisdiction of Westminster. Catholics were persecuted, and the movement for civil rights which began in 1968 and 1969 was amply justified. Now, however, the hold of the Ptotestant has been broken, and there is no further cause for Catholic disaffection.
The second cause of IRA success — and there has been a cause like this for every successful guerrilla movement that has been known since the war — has been their enjoyment of a base in the Irish Republic where they may rest, regroup, find supplies, and be pretty certain of immunity from any dedicated pursuit by the lawful authorities. Now, of course, we all know that Mr Cosgrave's government is tougher on the IRA than was Mr Lynch's, and there emanate from Dublin from time to time anecdotes about the Taoiseach's special fury at the latest IRA outrage, and it is true that there are one or two ministers in Mr Cosgrave's
government who would like to take really stero action; but the fact of the matter is that the UV' are as free as ever to use their base in the Republic.
It follows — and again this is the lesson of all recent guerrilla confrontations — that a Britian
government bent on beating the IRA would ii0f, everything in its power to curtail their use 01 their base. There ought to be no nonsenslea, ambiguity about which part of the other Isiah"; suspected terrorists could be deported to; and lc; the Dublin government were unwilling ted receive any deportee he should be incarcerat until they changed their minds. Passports an2e visas should be required for any travel frorn Republic to the United Kingdom, and vis'.0 should be issued sparingly. There is, I think, ard immediate need to establish an identity ea system for everybody in this country (thouP. such a need might arise), not even for citizen' of the Republic normally resident in Brita,1,,iii But, should an Irish citizen normally re51o70 here wish to return, even for a holiday, t°.t Republic, he should be required to obtaln.,0 travel document before he leaves, and prodtit„ it on his return. No doubt there would be a Phu; deal of hypocritical uproar in Dublin at all,t”it .._ but that might be no bad thing; certainlY0 could be a part of explaining to a pub 10 government that no country so unwilling „v live up to its words on terrorism could a" longer be treated as friendly by London. And, of course, the border between Nortne_ Ireland and the Republic would have to closed to all but the most carefully supervis..eun traffic. Whenever this measure has _Ahevo suggested in the past, it has been denounee impossible. It is, of course, no such thing expensive, but technically quite feasible be border once closed, sweep after sweep o°u_reed, carried out by the army in Ulster and, in' ore the army should be given a good deal Tee freedom than it has in the past enjoyed on tPurti sweeps. And when, for example, internees bare down the prison camp in which they not comfortably housed the answer should be, "rot to build them another, but to leave them t°
in ruins of their own creation. '
The political response to any such reasoria. programme (and to the other measures vile would be required as part of it, such as„red imposition of the death penalty on all caPL" t it terrorists or their associates) is, openlY, tf.at it would be unworkable and, covertly, would ,merely increase the number of outraory in this island. The latter it might do for a brief period, before the measures began to —ice effect — but we are then faced with the ch°t 0 of one brief and virulent period as agai io long and steady escalation, the final which will make Birmingham look ainntie What is more, and this is in many resPeeot most significant point to emerge in re'ace weeks, the people, if not their politiciana'„ to prepared to support the most ruthless actior, crush this latest enemy within the door-,1 and not the reluctance of Westminster, is vital new element in the situation. It has been a characteristic and ,,tretioet observation about British politics in r7.,,ep years that governors and governed have v'evi out of step; and many politicians ne something called a difficulty of cominull„iro. tion. The brutal fact is that no recent goy' of ment has been able, over a whole ranee() matters, to do what the people have 1,01,05 them to do, not because the things thernae. are impossible, but because the politt or when the crunch comes, have been unwillia!od pusillanimous. For all the taradiddle hosii pseudo-excitement of a bill passed thr°0 the its clauses in an atmosphere of panic and inrner shortest amount of time possible, the ethen gency of last week was false, for nothing., soy done by the House of Commons showe° reel real understanding of terrorism, or a,_n„Yg off,' determination to do much more than snr"°0110 on to our already overworked soldiera 100 ' tpoolpicoelititchieanrse.sponsibility that ought to be'
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