THE EMPEROR AND MEXICO.
TlIE Mexican expedition will form one of the strangest pages in the history of the Napoleonic Empire. The more its true narrative becomes known, the more it is seen that the credit or discredit of the scheme belongs to the Emperor himself. In France the expedition has never yet been really popular for reasons intelligible enough. To ninety-nine Frenchmen out of a hundred distance does not lend enchantment to the view. All French hopes and fears and ambitions centre'in France to a degree we can hardly understand; a colonial empire possesses little attraction for the French mind. The loss of the Canadas, and Louisiana, and the Mauritius, are injuries on which French historians never dilate with much fervour. Their lamentations are reserved for the loss of the provinces which the First Empire added to France. A Frenchman always seems to us to regard the possession of colonies as a self-raised millionaire does a library. He thinks he ought to have one, but he has no wish to us' it. England has enormous dominions beyond the seas; and, therefore, it is held, as a matter of faith, France ought to have them also. But if it was not for this, the French would not value the gift of all the Indies. The consequence is, that the popular desire of extending the dominion of France out of Europe is a fluctuating and feeble one. Algeria is valued not for itself, but for the belief that it strengthens the position of France on the Mediterranean, and Mexico is too far off to excite much interest.
Moreover, the course of this Transatlantic expedition has not been gratifying hitherto to the military sentiment of France. There is very little credit to be got by defeating tie half-bred armies which General Scott scattered almost without a battle ; and, on the other hand, there is con- siderable discredit in not conquering them at once. If the next mail should bring news that the City of the Montezumas was occupied by French troops, the victory would come too late to confer any new prestige on the invading army. The expense, too, of the war is very great. The troops dislike the long sea voyage, the sickly climate, and the guerilla warfare, which are incidental to the campaign. All attempts to excite popular enthusiasm about Mexico have failed hitherto. Very little is allowed to transpire about the progress of the war, and to judge from the tone of the French press, the news which would be most welcome at Paris would be that some arrangement had been made by which General Forey's army could be withdrawn without- discredit. At the same time, it is clear that this feeling of opposition to the Imperial policy is passive rather than active. As to the immediate course of action there is no difference in opinion. If Napoleon III. could be overthrown to-morrow, and replaced by Henri Cinq or Ledru Rollin, or the Comte de Paris, the French troops would be pushed forward all the same. The honour of France is involved, and cannot be satisfied till the tricolour is hoisted on the Plaza Mayor of Mexico. According to all. probability, this event cannot be long delayed. The opposition that the invading force has received has been chiefly of a material character. The diffi- culties of the expedition were underrated at first ; but this mistake has been corrected. With the arrival of the expected reinforcements, there seems little doubt that General Forey will be able to repeat the assault on Puebla with more suc- cess ; and whenever the heights of the Sierra Madre are gained, the Mexican troops will hardly risk a battle on the plains of Tenochtitlan.
But with the possession of the capital the difficulties of the expedition are not ended. Two courses will then be open to the French Government. They may withdraw their troops, after making such an arrangement as will preserve their honour ; or they may annex the Mexican provinces, either openly or indirectly, which it matters little. According to the hasty judgment of superficial observers, it was supposed that the first course was the one most likely to be adopted. The Emperor was believed to have made a mistake, to have been misled by false information, and to be only anxious to get out of the scrape he had got into with the best grace he could. Those who, without any personal admiration for Napoleonism, still cannot shut their eyes to the far- sightedness which characterizes the Imperial policy, hold a different opinion. We have always believed that the expedi- tion was not a matter of accident, bnt part of a deliberate scheme, and recent events have tended to justify our opinion. It is known that Napoleon III. himself pro- fesses to attach extreme importance to the campaign, and resents any criticism upon it with an unwonted sus- ceptibility. In his early writings, he states that the nation which could hold the two isthmuses of Suez and Panama would command the commerce of the world ; and every scheme which could facilitate the acquisition of these positions by France has always been cordially supported at the Tuileries. Now, there is no question that, if France could secure a commanding influence in Mexico, the difficul- ties in the way of her absorbing the feeble States, which lie between that country and Panama, might be easily sur- mounted. And the one obstacle which really hindered France, or any other European Power, from acquiring a footing in Central America, was the existence of the American Union. The moment that the civil war in the North removed the power which had enforced the Monroe doc- trine, the Emperor seized the opportunity to work out his long-cherished scheme. If the Confederacy should suc- ceed in establishing its existence, there is nothing to thwart the accomplishment of his plan. If, on the other hand, the Union is restored, the whole power of the -United States would be exerted to hinder Mexico from falling into the hands of a European sovereign; and it is doubtful whether Loilis Napoleon would consider it worth his while to go to war with the Union for such an object. Hence it was impossible for the Emperor to declare his tactics openly till the issue of the civil war m North America was decided. As fortune has favoured the arms of the Confederates, the policy of France has become more and more open, till at last the Emperor has announced his intention of defying the Monroe doctrine. It is now admitted that the object of the interference in the affairs of Mexico is to raise up a Latin nationality, which may contest with the Anglo-Saxon the possession of the New World. And as there is no way of doing this except by annexation, it is hardly denied that the intention is to annex part at least of the Mexican provinces. It is probable that the design does not stop here. There may be some exaggeration in the Con- federate version of French intrigues in Texas, but there is nothing improbable in the idea itself. If France should succeed in establishing herself in Mexico, Texas would naturally revert to her old connection with her sister province. An empire composed of Mexico • and Texas would be grand enough to satisfy the ambition of a Napoleon, and to excite the enthusiasm of France. Whether the scheme be realized or not, depends solely, in our judgment, upon the issue of the civil war. The Emperor knows this, and bides his time. For our own part, therefore, we should not be surprised to learn that the delay to General Foray's advance has been owing to design rather than to accident.
With regard to Mexico itself, it is impossible to judge very accurately as to what the effect of annexation will be upon her. On the whole, we are disposed to think it will be to her advantage. -Unless all accounts of that country are utterly false, the establishment of any settled Government must be a gain. And if she is to be annexed at all, her mongrel popula- tion are less likely to be improved off the face of the earth by French than by American conquerors. On the other hand, America, South as well as North, and South even more than North, is certain to resent bitterly the creation of a Latin monarchy on the continent. To the South, whose political existence is based on the doctrine of secession, it is dangerous to have a powerful neighbour on her frontiers who can offer any discontented State of the Confederacy the aid of her arms. Louisiana, with the strong French element in her population, might well be tempted to return to the dominion of France, in case any disagreement arose between her and the Government of Richmond. The existence of a Mexican-French kingdom would prove fatal to those hopes of indefinite extension South- wards on which the Confederacy was established. A year ago the disclosure of this plan would have done more than any- thing to reunite North and South with a view of warding off a common danger. Probably the hatred between the two communities has grown too intense during a year of cruel conflict for this motive for reunion to operate with success. It would be a strange retribution, if the result of secession should be to destroy the dream of empire which the South cherished, even more than the North. The truth of the motto, "United we stand, divided we fall," must have come home to the chiefs of the Confederacy when they read the Emperor's letter to General Forey.
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