THE CASE OF THE U.D.F."
Sta,—My attention has been drawn to an article by Mr. Donald Taylor in your issue of January 17th, under the title " The Case of the U.D.F." The partisan nature of this article will be obvious to all with a knowledge of Irish affairs, and the use of party cries such as " the notorious ' B ' Specials " or the statement that " at one sweep all who desired the union of Ireland in opposition to the Northern Government were branded as potential ' fifth columnists' " can only tend to accentuate the political breach which Mr. Taylor himself blames the Government of Northern Ireland for not healing.
The present, however, is not the time for adding to the literature of Irish controversy and I shall, therefore, confine myself to the suggestion, which Mr. Taylor has been at some pains to convey to your readers, that the Northern Ireland Government took advantage of the threat of invasion to add to the numbers of what is described as " the private army of the Government party."
This suggestion is unfounded, and hardly tallies with the fact that, though administered by the Ulster Special Constabulary, the volunteers, as Mr. Taylor admits, are trained by and work with the Army. The intention and attitude of the Northern Government in the matter as well as the circumstances in which the force was raised appear in the following statements made by me in the Northern Ireland House of Commons in reply to Parliamentary Questions.
On October 22nd, 194o, I said :
It will be remembered that the Local Defence Volunteer Force was formed in the face of a threat of imminent invasion, when every hour was precious and the need for speedy organisation was most urgent. It is impossible, however, to raise an effective armed force quickly without an administrative basis to work upon. In Great Britain that basis existed in a wide-spread chain of Territorial Army Associations which were used for the purpose. Here we had not that basis, and in the circumstances it was decided, after consultation with the War Department, to utilise the Special Constabulary organisation which existed in each of our counties. For my own part I do not know what else could have been done to meet the urgency of the situation effectively, and the General Officer Commanding has informed me that in his opinion the substantial degree of progress which has been attained could not have been reached in the time without the aid of the Special Constabulary organisation.
I have adverted to the formation of the force, because some publicity has recently been given to the suggestion that the method adopted sprang from political and sectarian motives. Such propaganda is unfounded, and it is either mischievous or uttered in ignorance of the material facts. From the beginning, the object of this Government has been to do all that lay in its power during a period of unparalleled urgency and peril to raise and arm a force which would be efficient for its role. That role is neither more nor less than the role of the corre- sponding force in Great Britain. It is, as I have previously stated, a military role, and for drat reason I have constantly been in discussion with the General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland District, with the object of promoting the military efficiency of the force.
As I have said, our anxiety, as a Government, is to make the force the best possible weapon for its purpose., and to this end we arc, and have been, ready and willing to facilitate in any way we can such steps concerning the control, the status and the organisation of the Local Defence Volunteer Force as the Imperial Government may consider desirable And again on November 19th, 1940: The readiness of this Government to agree to military control of and a military status for the Local Defence Volunteer Force has been made plain to the military authorities and to the Imperial Government, and, as I have previously indicated to the House, this Government is willing to facilitate any steps in this direction which the Imperial Government may consider desirable. • What is desirable in this connexion plainly involves military as well as other considerations. Meantime with the Volunteers them- selves there is a lively realisation that what matters most to them and to the country is their proficiency in arms, and that the common enemy is not likely to pay much attention to anything else.—Yours
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