A FOREIGN SECRETARY SIXTY YEARS AGO.* Tins is an interesting

contribution to our better knowledge of Canning, the most brilliant and original of British Foreign Ministers in this century, maintaining and securing as he did the policy of Pitt, and raising the prestige of England in peace as much as the Duke of Wellington had raised it in war.

The six years during which he directed our affairs abroad were years of which Englishmen may be proud, even when the treaties and despatches dictated by Canning have become waste- paper. It is said that, when dying, he expressed his belief that in two years all he had done to place England in the front rank of European Powers would be undone by his ultra-Tory successors ; but to this day the echoes of his " system " have influence, and much of his work has never been spoiled by lesser men. He stultified the Holy Alliance; with firm modera- tion he led all that was good in the Liberalism of Europe so as to gain the respect even of his opponents. He brought Europe partially to understand that the interests of Kings and their peoples need not necessarily be at variance. Backed by the vast force of popular aspiration, he controlled revolution by raising well-founded hopes of liberty, before which the spectre of "divine right" to coerce opinion was bound to fade. To this day, much of the British progress of which we have heard a great deal in the Jubilee year, may be attributed to Canning's assertion of British principles, formulated by him in vigorous and even startling language.

* Some Official Correspondence of George Canning. Edited, with Notes, by Edward T. Stapleton. 2 vols. London: Longmans. 1887. In excellent notes and a careful introduction, Mr. Stapleton puts the modern reader in possession of the opinions and the position of the more prominent statesmen who had to deal with

the dangerous and difficult subsidence of the Napoleonic deluge. He lightly sketches Mr. Canning's career before he leaped into power on Lord Londonderry's death. We readily accept Mr. Stapleton's version of the reasons why Canning, who had been Queen Caroline's confidential adviser, withdrew from the King's service for a time ; but we agree with him in thinking that Canning's liberal ideas on Catholic Emancipation and the Corn- Laws, and his dislike of Lord Londonderry's adhesion to Metternich's Continental system, chiefly hindered him from taking office for a time. But his way once clear, he stood con- fessed, even by the Duke of Wellington, as the only possible Foreign Minister. The great soldier did not foresee how soon he and the " ultras " of the Cabinet would be ciphers beside the genies of Canning, and by no means able to "keep him in order." The intrigues of Ministries defunct so long ago would not claim interest except as curiosities of history, were it not that Canning's abandonment of his intention to go to India as Governor-General in the spring of 1822, and his acceptance of office at home, changed the face of European affairs. He found the Holy Alliance, of which Metternich had the guidance on its terrestrial side even while the Emperor Alexander remained high priest of its mystic mission, claiming to direct English policy, or at least to have the approval of our Government. Canning steadily ignored its decrees, and remained indifferent to the diplomatic congresses which were to overawe Europe, and treat its various nationalities as a homogeneous federation to be coerced in the interests of reactionary Governments. Strong in a wiser estimate of Liberal forces, Canning refused to accept the sanctions of Cossack and Croat regiments as sufficient, and with reviving hope from the attitude of England, the revolution which had broken oat, though but in a spluttering fashion, from Spain to Naples and Piedmont, was in a great measure calmed. Liberals became patient, and it may be that if Canning had not died, the Bourbon dynasty might have been spared 1830, and the storms of 1848 might have been dispersed. Hardly had Canning got into harness, when he took in hand the recognition of the South American Colonies of Spain. In the Cabinet minute on the injury to our commerce, and the international confusion which re- sulted from the inability of Spain to govern her boasted "Indies," is well represented the force of thought and of style which

marks all that Canning ever wrote. He urges. the new departure as "a vigorous and prompt vindication of our rights," and remarks of our previous over-respectful policy towards the Spain of Ferdinand, "Such refinements must have an end;" "the practical business of the world does not admit of a perpetual exchange of benefit for injury ;" and again, "It is no fault of ours that Spain, at the same moment that her agents are insulting our flag and preying upon our commerce in America, is involved in revolution at home. Her condition in that respect is no motive for hastening our measures; but neither can it be held a reason for retarding them. We do not take her anarchy as an offence, bat she must not plead it as a privilege." The chiefs of the Holy Alliance did, however, take her anarchy as an offence, and Canning's recognition of the American Colonies was of far greater importance as the card by which he trumped the trick of the Emperors and Kings, than as a commercial gain to England. It is hard now to estimate the frank courage of his letter at this juncture to Monsieur, afterwards Charles X. of France. We quote from it a passage, a sort of profession of faith which Metternich, no doubt, would have gladly crowned by martyrdom :— " Your Royal Highness will not suspect me (I venture to believe) of being infected by Jacobinical principles. My public life, each as it is, has been passed in combating them ; but I do frankly and sincerely declare to your Royal Highness, with all the principles and prejudices of my public life full upon me, and with Mr. Burke's last works and words still the manual of my polities, that if I were called to choose between the principle laid down in the speech of the King of France [i.e., that the Spaniards depended for their constitution on their King's favour] and its antagonist principle, the sovereignty of the people, I should feel myself compelled to acknowledge that the former is the more alien of the two to the British Constitution."

In the midst of his Spanish preoccupations, as recorded in these volumes, a curious note occurs in which Canning asks Lord Eldon whether, by answering a letter from the Papal

Secretary of State, and by advising the King to answer one from the Pope, he should, as British Minister, blear the penalties of prtemunire, a question which was answered affirmatively by

the Lord Chancellor, as well as by the Attorney and Solicitor General. The question has some present interest, though not of the kind obviously suggested by Mr. Stapleton, who judges Canning to have been wrong in his steady support of the Catholic cause and of the pacification of Ireland, and who is almost ready to apologise for what was foremost among the great statesman's positive convictions, maintained even to the wreck of his Cabinet in 1827, and to the injury of his health by the attacks it brought on him. The recognition of the American Colonies doubtless earned for Canning a splendid popularity, and it was the occasion for that burst of oratory wherein he claimed to have "called the New World into existence, to redress the balance of the Old," and which is the best-remembered of his speeches. But it was as a defiance to the Continental wire-pullers, a solid fact which at once proved the absolute reversal of the Castle- reagh policy, that it was chiefly important. Metternich had been misled by the Tory diplomatists into thinking the English profes- sions of Liberal doctrines mere feints to keep John Bull in good temper. Thenceforward there was active and bitter warfare between our brilliant Foreign Secretary and Metternich, the veteran chief of European diplomacy. "England," said Canning, "should hold the balance not only between contending nations, but

between conflicting principles Keeping a distinct middle ground. Staying the plague both ways." In the face of the European amalgam in which were suspended the whole governing forces of the great Empires, together with the dozen detectives of a German Serenity, Canning asserted the separateness of English nationality, refusing to meddle except where the practical interests of his country demanded action. "The true policy of England is to move steadily on in her own orbit," he said, "without looking too nicely to the conduct of the Powers in alliance with her ; to be content with her own glory, and by its example to excite other nations to arrive at the same advantages which her peculiar system has bestowed upon her ; but not by a wild crusade to endeavour to force those advantages upon other nations." Need we wonder that Metternich considered Canning as a vieteore malfaisant ? while the Englishman wrote to our Ambassador in Paris, "Metternich is the greatest rogue and liar on the Continent ;" and again, in a letter to his chief, Lord Liverpool, "I am quite clear that there is no honesty in Metternich, and that we cannot enter into joint counsel with him without the certainty of being betrayed. It is not only his practice, but in our case it will be his pleasure." Yet there was a diplomacy more dangerous to England than that of Prince Metternich. Without using the bitter words of the Duke of Wellington, that "Canning's temper killed him," we cannot doubt that personal likes and dislikes sometimes coloured Canning's judgment, and the pleasant society of Prince and Princess de Leven partially biassed him in Eastern affairs. The editor of these volumes, venerating his hero—as, no doubt, he should do—yet throws valuable side-lights on the undue hopefulness of Canning when he agreed to take common action with Russia in gaining recog- nition for the insurgent Greeks as justifiably rebellious. We pass interesting letters on the Oregon boundary, on relaxation of the Corn-Laws, and on the intrigues of the " No-Popery " Ministers against their Emancipationist colleagues. The further light thrown on Canning's attempt to keep Russia in line with England in her dealings with Turkey, and on the Duke of Wellington's share in the protocol of St. Petersburg, signed on April 4th, 1826; the story of the gradual though unconscious surrender to Russian insistence, veiled as it was by appeals to the generosity and highest principles of the British Minister, are of interest as long as there shall be any "Eastern Question." When the protocol was signed, Nicholas had succeeded to Alexander; but however different the man, Russian policy remained the same, for it is as permanent as our own can be changeable. The Duke had been sent on a mission at once of condolence and congratulation ; but he was not suffered to leave SL Petersburg until he had agreed to the clause by which Russia was given a right to intervene in Greek affairs " separately " should need arise, and, of course, "in the interests of religion, justice, and humanity." Russia had, since the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812, maintained a perennial quarrel with the Divan concerning the affairs of the Principalities, which, of course, indirectly helped the Greek insurgents, while as a member of the European tyranny, she repudiated rebellion ; but now that the possibility of separate intervention was admitted, Canning's hope that Russia should keep line with England became illusory. The Duke of Wellington, meanwhile, thought he had done well in his diplomacy, though Canning was dissatisfied. But his dis-

satisfaction was soothed and his best ambitions were flattered by Nesselrode and Lieven. At first, we find the English Minister noting, with partial comprehension of Russian craft, that "Russia quarrelled with Turkey, for all causes except the Greek," nor was he satisfied with verbal assurances of high- minded self-denial which the Czar had not confirmed in writing.

It suggests the leading place held by Canning in European affairs, that the Russian diplomatists should have spared no pains to secure his goodwill, or at least his neutrality. Canning, however, might have passed unmoved through "the atmosphere of dishonest intrigue and shameless deception," but "the design of Ibrahim Pacha came," says Mr. Stapleton, "as a godsend to the Russian Cabinet : "—

" The depopulation of the Morea constituted a bait of rare quality to attract the British Minister, if care were only taken to prevent his carrying the bait off the hook, and leaving the fishermen empty. Count Lieven, as has been told, rushed off to Canning full of candid professions of esteem and admiration for him, and proffered the bait. To their immense satisfaction, it was swallowed with the utmost promptitude. Canning accepted the whole responsibility of stopping the contemplated crime, whatever assistance it might give Russia."

"The compliance in every direction of the Porte," however, postponed British intervention, and the design to depopulate the Morea was given up.

The whole of the editor's memorandum on the Greek Question at p. 35, Vol. IL, is profitable reading as an exposure of the methods of Russian diplomacy. At that time, as both before and after, the strength of the Empire that sits astride on the boundaries of East and West is exhibited in similar skill of in- tellectual fence and use of language, rather than in her material forces. We see our statesmen trembling for the fate of Turkey if attacked by Russia, and awed by the 800,000 soldiers sup- posed to be ready to march any and everywhere. The helpless- ness of the Turks is taken as proved throughout the long struggle for Constantinople. Yet it is at least curious to find in the memoirs of Metternich that while the veteran statesman, confidant as be was of many of Alexander's secrets, confesses his ignorance of the exact state of Russia, he writes just after the Czar's death : —" Ce qne j'ai pa constater jusqu'a nub entiere evidence pour moi, c'est le fait qu'Alexandre n'avait plus, dans les derniers temps, qu'une seule affaire qui le prSoccuptit, et c'etait de se sanver lei et son pays d'une perte qu'il croyait assur6e." (Memoires, IV., pp. 278 279.) The picture of Russian affairs by Tolstoi, in his great work, War and Peace, suggests doubt as to the power of Russia to back by force the prestige won for her by her diplomatic gifts. Recognising to the fullest extent the genius and success of Canning, it is impossible not to perceive in these volumes, supplemented by the political life pub- lished by his private secretary, Mr. A. G. Stapleton, indications

of how, to a certain extent, the noble and honest but enter- prising genius of the great Minister was used as a cat's-paw, and how he was more or less influenced, and his alarms soothed, by the subtle professions of Prince de Lieven and his wife. Indeed, in a conversation with Metternich, the Emperor Nicholas expressed his hope of using the English Minister to pull the Greek chestnuts out of the fire. Canning was flattered in his favourite ideas, and strengthened against the opposition of his colleagues. No doubt he was allowed to perceive that to break with Russia would be to confess himself gulled, and to be checked in the success which he had hitherto commanded by his foresight and skill. In an able paper, Mr. Stapleton seeks to defend his hero from the charge of inconsistency by his inter- ference in Turkish affairs. No doubt, in the interests of our commerce, Greek piracy had to be brought under the control of law, and, from higher motives, the cruelty of Ibrahim Pasha had to be restrained ; and if Canning had lived to control the policy in which he had embarked, it might not have culminated as it did in what Metternich called the " crime " of Navarino, followed by the successful war through which Russia secured in 1829 the Treaty of Adrianople. There might have been a different direction given to the series of events which have since occurred, and have been turned by diplomatic skill and know- ledge of men to the advantage of Russia.

We have dwelt on this incident of Canning's diplomacy. It was the last of his foreign anxieties, and the negotiations were interrupted by his illness and his accession to the Premiership. No doubt Canning's soul was embittered by Tory Dukes at home and Metternich abroad, but these volumes strengthen his claim to rank with the greatest of our Foreign Ministers, though but five years in power. Conscious of skill to ride on the Liberal whirlwind of Europe and direct the storm, no man was more

scrupulous in respecting rights. Struck down when the signa- tures to the Treaty of London were hardly dry, who can very exactly gauge his wisdom in that matter In a note, Mr. Stapleton sums up the effect of it :—

" Canning had now yoked the three Powers, Russia, France, and England, under one bar ; not that Russia and France thought so ; but that, whatever the ultimate designs of those Powers, they had at this moment deemed it expedient to come into line with England. The co-operation of the alliance was regulated by an instrument of concert, abjuring the use of force, and abjuring indi- vidual aggrandisement& Russia most probably regarded the pro- ceedings at this stage as a harmless amusement, out of which might come a favourable opportunity for some signal advantage to be acquired without resorting to inexcusable violence, and utterly out- raging the public opinion of Europe. France, guided in policy by the Royal Family, quietly kept in view the possible creation of a Greek Monarchy occupied by a French Prince, which might supply eventually a t4te du pant for French predominance in the Levant."

We must look on these volumes as but an instalment of further information. No doubt Canning's period of office recedes into that twilight of the Tories which existed before the blaze of reform and the Victorian progress ; but though uttered sixty years ago, Canning's words are at least better worth studying than a penny paper full of modern harangue made up of popular phrases. The miscellaneous letters published by Mr. Stapleton are not of special interest, except a few from Giffard, one from the ladies of Llangollen, and perhaps half-a-dozen others. They

hardly needed the careful analyses made of them. Nor will gossipers find pasture within these pages. The little scandal rarely hinted at has long ago been made public. The handsome volumes would have been all the more welcome if a portrait of their hero could have been given as frontispiece.