The League of Nations The American Peace Proposals and the

British Reply- THE publication, in April last, of Mr. Kellogg's suggested Peace Pact has definitely lifted the American proposals out

of the sphere of the academic into that of immediate and practical politics. Great Britain, through her Government, has to show by the answer she gives what her policy is to be in this urgent and most momentous question.

THE PACT NECESSARILY VAGUE.

My own view is that the British Government ought to sign the Pact without reservation, amendment, or delay ; I say this although I recognize that there are grounds on which some honest hesitation is possible. First, the extremely general wording of the American draft constitutes an un- doubted difficulty to British opinion, which always hesitates

to undertake general and indefinite commitments, however

unobjectionable, and has therefore usually refrained from laying down general principles in legislation in anticipation of positive enactment. On the other side, even setting aside reasons connected with the peculiar character of the American Constitution, there is solid ground, arising from the charac- ter of international law, for giving the Pact this general form. International law, unlike municipal law, cannot usually go deeply into detail. The want of an organized International legislature makes it impossible to draft instru- ments for the regulation of international relations which shall be comparable to a British statute. All that can be done is to lay doivn general principles, which is one reason why any far-reaching codification of international law is so difficult. ABOLITION OF THE RIGHT TO WAR.

The indefinite right of war, although limited by the pro- visions of the Covenant, still exists. It enables any State to use the threat of war in disputing with a weaker neighbour ; it instils force as the only ultimate appeal in international affairs. Its indirect effect is more important still. So long as the right of war exists, even limited as it is to-day under the Covenant, even though it is only to arise in certain con- tingencies, every Government must reckon with it. No State can ignore it, and consequently each must make such national preparations, by armaments and alliances, as will save it from the consequences of a possible exercise of this universal right. To abolish the right of war would thus be a most important step in the progress of mankind. That right is a real obstacle to assured peace. And since it is indefinite and general in character it can only be abolished by a formal enactment, such as President Coolidge has proposed.

THE PROBLEM OF " INTERFERENCE."

Another objection to the generality of the American pro- posal is less respectable. There is at least a suspicion that some of the States addressed have in their replies desired to retain the right of war in certain cases. Thus Article 10 of the British reply has been interpreted as seeking to estab- lish a British Monroe Doctrine prohibiting " interference " in certain cases. The countries meant are presumably Egypt and Afghanistan and probably the Arabian States, including Mesopotamia and Palestine. The expression " interference " is harder to interpret exactly. Some phrases in the article in question seem consistent with a very wide interpretation of the treaty, including perhaps any questions of political in- fluence of a foreign Power in those regions. If it were meant that the British Government reserved the right to go to war in cases of interference in that sense, that would be a very serious and perhaps fatal blow to the whole project. It would be comparable to the reservation of matters of honour and vital interest in arbitration treaties. To renounce war only in cases of minor importance is to refuse to renounce it at all. If Great Britain reserved certain questions in the manner indicated, other nations would undoubtedly do the same, and the renunciation of war would be reduced to an empty and meaningless formula.

This article can, however, and more reasonably, be inter- preted otherwise, as meaning simply that an attack on such countries would be equivalent to an attack on the British Empire. With respect to countries at present occupied by British troops, such as Egypt and the Arab countries, this

is obviously true. In other cases the position is different. A statement that an attack on a frontier State such as Afghanistan would be regarded as equivalent to an attack on ourselves would not, in principle, be absolutely fatal to the idea of renouncing war, but it would seem most un- desirable, both as gratuitously adding to our own responsi- bilities, complicating the negotiation of the Pact, and doubtless leading other countries to make reservations which the authors of the Pact might not regard as reasonable.

No MACHINERY TO IMPLEMENT THE PACT.

Other objections which have been raised now seem less substantial. The argument of self-defence has been met by the American statement that the renunciation of war will only operate as a reciprocal obligation, and therefore any aggression will liberate all the other signatories from their obligations thereunder. The absence in the Pact of machinery for settling when and how its provisions shall come into operation is, however, a real incompleteness which may prove important where the machinery of the League is not available. It is difficult, as has often been proved, to decide whether one State has been genuinely threatening war against another— for instance, by massing troops on the frontier—thus justify- ing the other party in taking measures of self-defence.

MAKING WAR AN INSTRUMENT OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY.

The suggestion that the provisions of the Covenant, or of Locarno, may be threatened, can be met by the same answer, or by a better answer still. The Covenant aims at securing peace. It contemplates coercive action, where at all, only against countries that in defiance of its provisions have broken the peace. It regards nations, for the first time, as a civilized community, all members of which have the duty to combine to prevent and punish a breach of the peace. If in extreme cases war is necessary for this purpose, such war is an instrument of international, not of national, policy, as distinct from the other as the action of a policeman making an arrest is from the commission of an assault by one individual on another. Had the Americah draft wished to forbid such war as a measure Of international coercion, it would not Piave expressly limitdcl itielf to the renunciation of war usihni-" instrument of national policy."

TOWARDS ARBITRATION AND DISARMAMENT.

The objections to the American proposals do not, therefore, upon examination, appear substantial, while the advantages of their acceptance would be immense. The elimination of the right of war would, provided the renunciation were genuine, change at one blow the whole basis and aspect of international relations, which to-day are largely founded on mutual suspi- cion. Further, it would provide a basis for further progress in the direction of arbitration, since an alternative to war as a settlement of international disputes would have to be found, while the best objection to compulsory arbitration—that it removes the right to secure justice by force—would be gone, the application of force having already been renounced. Simi- larly, the renunciation of war would make disarmament a much easier problem.

Another advantage coming to the world from acceptance of the American proposals must not be ignored. Without committing herself to any promise, implied or expressed, to undertake any active obligation for peace, America has in this

Pact recognized that she possesses a grave interest, material and moral, in the preservation of world peace, a recognition which will almost necessarily be accompanied by abstention from any interference with honest efforts by other nations to preserve peace according to the obligations which they have undertaken. For these and many other reasons—as, for example, that the solution of our long-standing difficulties about the freedom of the seas will be greatly facilitated—it is of the utmost importance that we should accept the American proposal, not only as constituting an immediate step forward in the organization of international peace, but also as giving promise of further progress, particularly in the direction of arbitration and disarmament.

CECIL OF CLIELWOOD.,