Test Case
To judge by a succession of obviously inspired 'leaks' to the American press, President Kennedy's advisers have persuaded him that the time has come to affirm American freedom of action to resume nuclear tests; and presumably if he makes the affirmation, the tests will shortly begin, for there would be no point otherwise in courting unpopularity as the first breaker of the truce.
The excuses for resumption were summarised by Joseph Alsop in the Herald-Tribune last Friday; and what they amount to is a charge that the Russians have been quietly testing nuclear weapons all along. 'Quietly' is the opera- tive word: a variety of expedients, some Ameri- can nuclear scientists now believe, are available to damp the earthquake-effect of explosions; and there is consequently no reason why the Russians should not have continued their experiments, in underground testing-beds deep in Siberia, with- out the West knowing what was going on. 'We do not know the Soviets have been cheating,' Mr. Alsop concludes, 'but they could have cheated very easily; they can still do so; and the benefit to them can be considerable.'
But how considerable would that benefit be? From such secret tests the Russians could have refined their nuclear weapons, and gained a more accurate knowledge of how they will behave. But this can only be valuable if the weapons are used; and, if they are used, refinements are likely to be wasted. Theoretically it is conceivable that in the event of war breaking out between East and West the adversaries might restrict them- selves by tacit agreement to the use of tactical nuclear weapons, fired from mortar and cannon, in which case the greater experience of the Rus- sians would assist them; but in practice the notion that the powers could be so restrained is wildly improbable—nuclear war, if it breaks out at all, is almost certain to be on so giant a scale that the refinements will perish along with the scientists who dreamed them up, and with every- body else.
Nor is the fact that the Russians have been cheating, even if it can be substantiated, neces- sarily a good excuse for breaking the pact. The US stopped tests with its eyes open, knowing that the Russians would cheat if they could; the main object of the decision was less to stop the Rus. sians than to discourage the spread of testing. by other countries. Admittedly this gesture failed, on account of de Gaulle's intransigence; but the need still exists to discourage others on the wait- ing list for the nuclear club, and President Ken- nedy will be in a stronger position to arouse them to the hazards of unrestricted nuclear com- petition if he can resist the importunities of his advisers.
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