Kassem and Kuwait
B. CHILDERS 10 NUKE a Certain Other Occasion, there is little mystery about Mr. Macmillan's deci- sion to activate a long-prepared 'Kuwait contin- it4eacY' plan and land British forces there. The I °reign Office had been moving quietly towards st the abrogation of the 1899 'protection' treaty With the ruling Sheikh. Nominally independent since 1914, Kuwait had recently joined inter- II: national organisations (and had been supported if in one such assertion of independence by Kas- `ern's Iraq). New Kuwaiti currency had been io minted, and earlier this year the provocative British jurisdiction over foreigners in the Sheikh- dom had been ended. But for Kassem's move, ill the end was clear and the reasons obvious. ic Kuwait has been the focal point of Arab nationalist resentment about Britain's whole iy archaic treaty position in the Persian Gulf. The gi Scotland-size Sheikhdom has been transformed by rj It fabulous oilfields from a pearl-fishing, dhow- building strip of sand into a modern, welfare city- 1.5 state. The ruling Sheikh is fairly enlightened, as ii Sheikhs go; and while evidently unable to do isluch about his arrogant relatives' demands, he has seen to it that very considerable slices of his ir 1:150 millions in annual oil income are devoted ,tt to Kuwait's 300,000 Arabs. But most of them are v4 non-Kuwaiti Arabs, brought in to run things since oil began flowing; and they are Arab nationalists. They, and Arabs throughout the Middle East, have resented the fact that Kuwait's income sur- pluses have been invested clear outside the Arab world, in London. They have identified both this -I process and the character of the Kuwaiti regime 111--the revenues go to the Sheikh personally—with h it's protection.' The Foreign Office obviously decided that if Kuwait's sovereign independence could be recog- nised by all Arab States, so that there would be a It mutt/pie Arab interest in the oil revenues, this lel stigma would disappear. Obviously, too, the FO Ittlhope was that if the Sheikh now began (but gently, Please) investing his surplus revenues in the Arab tst, world, no sharp questions would be asked about rrthe previous surpluses, which now constitute an 13t alarming £250 million slice of the sterling area's , entire reserves (the thought of any sudden with- 4(ctrawal would have produced consternation in bt VVhitehall). When the Sheikh recently announced his willingness to contribute a modest £5 million ul to a joint Arab development fund, and when the ctt Arab States seemed agreed on Kuwait's inde- pendence as an Arab League member, the FO went ahead. The treaty was abrogated.
General Kassem's claim shocked the Middle East as well as Britain; and Western press cyni- cism about Arab politics ought not to mask the reason. As well as the practical fear that Kuwait's wealth might end up in one Arab country alone, there is the deep conviction, part of the Arab nationalist creed, that unification should be voluntary, and that Arab troops should never be sent against other Arabs. Explicitly in the first case, and by scarcely veiled threat in the second, Kassem has flouted both these principles, and on inadequate legal grounds. He declared for the absorption of Kuwait; and the fact that Kuwait is ruled by a sheikhly aristocracy, rather than by a nationalist regime, has not mitigated this action. Arabs assuredly know that if the Kuwaitis had yearned for union with Iraq, they would have demonstrated this clearly long ago, the Sheikh's troops notwithstanding.
Why did Kassem do it? One material tempta- tion is obvious; but another reason, little noted so far, is that Kuwait's natural bay is the ideal terminus and port for a railroad out of Iraq— Basra just cannot be expanded sufficiently, and Kassem recently spoke of plans for creating a major new trade artery between the Mediter- ranean and the Persian Gulf. But neither Kuwaiti wealth nor the port adequately explains this sud-
. . well now, Mr. Ling, let's forget your starving millions for a moment. .
den move; nor does the fact that a general Iraqi claim to Kuwait far antedates Kassem. The whole tenor of his announcement bears his per- sonal stamp: it strongly suggests a decision taken without the knowledge of his able and widely respected Foreign Minister, Hashem Jawad (who. reportedly has tried to resign in protest).
Kassem seemed to me, meeting him even in 1958 soon after the Revolution, a man with an unstable mind, like quicksilver—erratic, fitfully shrewd, but psychologically insecure. He openly claims to be 'The Sole Leader' and 'above party.' His tactic of knocking nationalist and Com- munist heads together below him has cost him most of his early popularity in Iraq, and I believe it has also cost him what little personal sense of security he ever had: he does not know where he can turn for support. Last week, a sick man, he may well have been looking ahead to a fairly bleak Revolution anniversary on July 14.
All this was surely known to the Foreign Office, and the abrogation of the 1899 treaty ought to have been linked with Arab League consideration of Kuwait's admission; in other words, the aim should have been a fait accompli of Kuwaiti independence with the help of the other Arab States. The only excuse for the actual timing may be that the FO feared Kassem might make his claim even before abrogation, and therefore accelerated the announcement. What- ever the truth, it is a tragedy that a sound new policy aimed at placing Kuwait in Arab hands should have been followed by the landing of British troops there. The evidence is still not, to my mind, satisfactorily that there was a suffi- ciently imminent Iraqi military threat to warrant landings as distinct from assembly in Kuwait Bay. The UN ought to have been called upon, at least for 'presence,' from the outset.
The Arabs now have the problem of ending the crisis, and it is not easy. Saudi Arabia, which shares sovereignty with Kuwait in the enormous oilfields of the Neutral Zone (almost openly included in Kassem's claim), is particularly insis- tent on an early and unequivocal Arab League recognition of Kuwaiti independence. The other Arab States have evidently decided to give Mr. Hassouna, the Secretary-General, a few days to seek some quiet settlement that will avoid humili- ating Iraqis as well as Kassem, in the League Council, over Kuwait's application. Whether by some formula—though what it could be is hard to imagine—or by open clash, General Kassem's standing cannot emerge enhanced. July 14 in Iraq will be, at the least, a day of shadows. It could be something more: Iraq has shown no enthusiasm over Kassem's bid at all.
Meanwhile, there are disturbing signs that Lord Home does not understand the extreme delicacy of Britain's position, and how the tacit identity of aims between Britain and Arab nationalism in this immediate crisis could quickly fall away. To triumph about British ability 'still' to move 'swiftly and efficiently' is asking for trouble. Publicly to 'advise' Cairo that British warships 'will' transit the Suez Canal for Kuwait, past Port Said, was needless provocation. The 'old days' are gone, and one neat military operation ought not to produce publicly aired nostalgia. The Arabs have their memories too.
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