SIR,—David Cairns concedes that the Israeli myth about Arab evacuation
orders has been exploded, but says there was no Israeli expulsion policy either. He then says 'some' Haganah commanders did 'encourage' an Arab exodus; that 'many' saw its 'immense advantages'; but that the Zionist leadership, 'perhaps naively,' had no 'ready formulated policy' until 'the second truce' (in October, 1948). And then, Mr. Cairns says, the Zionist leaders did make it 'official policy' actively to 'encourage' the, Arab flight. Having said all this, Mr. Cairns writes: 'that they planned it, worked for it, or that the idea even entered their heads—this is a wild invention which Childers has not begun to substantiate.'
Since a government still vehemently denying that 'a single Arab' was expelled controls the relevant archives (or verbal secrets), we obviously lack the total proofs.. We always do about grim secrets. But let us see. Did 'the idea' never enter their heads? It had entered Herzl's decades earlier (cf. the Zionist founder's proposal, in his Diaries but not in his 'nicer' works for general consumption, that the Arabs' be quietly 'worked across the frontier' and then kept out). In 1944 even the British Labour executive got the general idea Co the point where they publicly—and discreditably—proposed that the Arabs be 'encouraged to move out as the Jews move in.' Yet in the midst of all this--and through all the years while they were conducting their racial boy- cott of Arab labour in Palestine—the Zionist leaders themselves just never even thought of 'the idea'?
And was there no 'ready formulated policy'? Even in September, 1947, the Zionists had ready 'an offeti- sive-defensive plan to strike at the enemy,' a plan covering every Arab village in the whole of Palestine. I quote further from the verbatim account of the Haganah operations chief, given in the pro-Zionist Sacher's Israel: Birth of a State (p. 217): 'We had a map in which the strategic characters of every Arab village and the quality of its inhabitants were indi- cated.' This, at a time when, publicly, the Zionists were accepting partition.
Then, in late November, 1947, came the UN parti- tion vote. At once, Mr. Ben-Gurion sent buyers to Europe for major new arms supplies. Within three weeks, the official Palmach began attacking Arab villages deep in Arab areas: before even the volun- teer Arab forces went into Palestine; five months before the Arab States' armies went in. These attacks 'caused great disturbances and started an exodus' (Mr. Kimche). Next: in late March, the Zionists got their new arms into Palestine. At once, and to the tune of clear panic-incitement by the centrally directed Haganah radio as well as by Irgun's. the entire Zionist military force launched a systematic offensive against every Arab centre of population it could reach. And the mass Arab exodus began. noted Ben-Gurion's description of the goal—to make the State 'larger and Jewish.' Mr. Cairns first says this is quoted out of context; but then, 'even if the context were right.' he says Ben-Gurion was only claiming foresight after the event. The same Ben- Gurion who, Mr. Cairns says, did make it 'official policy' to 'encourage' an exodus, but only 'by the second truce.'
As for the August 5, 1948, Israeli letter to the UN, refusing to readmit the (by then) 500,000 refugees on 'insuperable economic' grounds, as well as security, Mr. Cairns dismisses it. He says it came six months after the exodus began. It came just as soon as Israel was challenged by the UN to state her policy towards the refugees. Mr. Cairns also says' it was written in the middle of war. That is just the point. Here were 'perhaps naive' Zionist leaders, with- out 'formulated policy,' who during a continuing war and continuing exodus made such far-reaching economic calculations that they decided formally and permanently to deny the refugees return. All these 'ideas' had very much entered their heads by late July, 1948; their troops had been systematically attacking and terrorising Arab centres since Decem- ber, 1947, massively since the end of March, 1948; they had their maps ready in September, 1947; they had been treating Palestine's Arabs like dirt (let us not mince words) for over thirty years. And Mr. Cairns accuses me of 'wild invention.'
And Dayan's 'persuasion' (more euphemism) of Lydda's and Ramle's Arabs was 'countermanded'? He did it; they were driven out; untold children died eji route. And even this 'countermanding,' Mr. Cairns says, was reversed by October, into 'policy' to, 'encourage. . . .' Enough said.—Yours faithfully,
Previous page
