THE WARS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.* THE wars of the
ninteenth century are remarkable for com- prehensiveness and design, the polish, as well as the breadth of the workmanship, and the vigour and deadliness of the blows struck by the great leaders of fleets and armies ; Napoleon on the Continent, Nelson on the ocean, and Wellington in India and in Europe. Great feats of arms were performed by the French Marshals, by the Archduke Charles, by Blucher and Schwartzen- berg, by Lord Lake and Lord Hill; there were in the British Navy men who might have been Nelsons, had the British Admiralty known how to choose; but their just renown is subordinate to that of Napoleon, Nelson, and Wellington.
In these two volumes of Sir Edward Cust's Annals, Napoleon and Nelson are the principal figures, for Wellington bad only won the confidence of England, had only shown how much there was in him, by the end of 1809. While Nelson lived his victories at sea kept pace with those of Napoleon on land, for the " Nile" was in its way a Marengo, and Trafalgar was something more than an Austerlitz. For Austria and Russia rose again and again, but the French marine never recovered the blow which Nelson struck as he fell. Wellington, in 1805, had dont in India as much as Napoleon in Italy in 1796-7, but in Europe he had never held a command. Before 1809, however, he had driven Soult out of Portugal, and had beaten Victor at Talavera ; yet he had not equalled Nelson or approached Napoleon. He had only begun his career. Therefore it is that the main interest of the story of the wars of the first nine years centres in Napoleon.
These wars were essentially wars of conquest. The revolu- tionary leaders fought for existence ; the First Consul and the Emperor fought for empire. The armies were athirst for glory ; but he coveted power, and revelled in the exercise of it. As a fine musician delights in the composition and per. formance of his works, so Napoleon delighted in the planning of campaigns and in the execution of his plans. He laboured incessantly, and only made peace with one power that he might fall upon another. Returning from the barren glories of Africa, he found in Europe a field where he could reap solid harvests of power, as well as pluck more wreaths of glory. The master of a restless and military nation, whose character he thoroughly understood, he turned to account alike its worst and best qualities, and astounding all Europe by the campaign of 1800, he started forth from the battle-field of Marengo upon a career which has no parallel in modern history. That he was surprised at Marengo, that he was nearly beaten, that he ought to have been destroyed, that he was only saved by the culpable negligence of the Austrian cavalry com- manders, does not detract from the shining merit of the design and its brilliant execution which led him to that field. The passage of the Alps, the descent upon Milan by that very ford at Turbigo where M'Mahon crossed in 1859, the
* Annals of the Wars of the Xi/fete/ea Century, compiled from the most authentic) histories of the period. By Sir Edward Gust, Liontenant-Ganeral. Vol. 1800-0 ; Vol. IL, 1800-9. John Murray. march upon Alexandria by Stradella and Montebello, would have remained among the highest exploits of war, even had Melas supported his eager infantry by his abundant horse, had crushed Kellerman, and routed Dessaix. We could have wished that Sir Edward Cust had described with more distinctness the changing features of this battle, and that he had not put so much faith in the writings of the untrustworthy Savary as to take away from Kellerman the merit of charging the Hungarian infantry on his own responsibility. Montebello made Lannes a duke in after years, when dukes were needed to support an imperial throne, and Kellerman deserved equally a dukedom for his bril- liant conduct at Marengo.
Within a year of Marengo, Napoleon had succeeded in making arrangements with various powers which were dignified by the name of " treaties of peace." They were, in fact, merely sus- pensions of war. All parties were seriously damaged and needed time to refit ; but the strife, far from being ended, had really only begun. The diligent students of the "Correspon- dence de Napoleon I.," published by the order of Napoleon will find how welcome a breathing-time was to one who had just arrived at supreme power. That the First Consul would have done much to induce England to act a part similar to that of Prussia, and look on while he destroyed Austria and reduced the Continent, we are ready to believe. But the English statesmen, if they were not wise, were patriotic and firm, and clear-sighted enough to see the aim of the sinister friendship proferred by the young conqueror. Napoleon employed his golden interval of peace to augment and organize the military and naval forces of France and Italy, the instruments with which he intended to reduce the Continent and Great Britain. It was a period of general distrust and intrigue, and ended in a renewal of war.
It is remarkable that Napoleon resumed his strife with Europe by devising the invasion of England. He had, for a moment, hoped to keep England neutral until he had compelled Austria to submit to his will ; but England proving refractory, he deter- mined to begin by invading her soil. This was sound strategy. England once laid in bonds, there was nothing in Europe that could resist him. When a man of genius is at the head of the French nation, continental Europe is entirely at his mercy. But England comes in to form a counterpoise to the vast power of offence possessed by France. The history of Europe, from 1805 to 1809, shows that, without England, Europe must have suc- cumbed, and her princes have become the vassals of the Emperor. By the aid of English ships, English gold, and at length of English soldiers, the scale was turned. Napoleon's design of invading England was, therefore, a wise design. He spared no pains to prepare for the enterprise ; but though he could make generals he could not make admirals, and his failure to secure the command of the Channel caused him real chagrin. The one enemy whose pertinacity he dreaded most, whose flag annoyed him on every sea, remained not only unconquered but untouched, and his own fleets were either destroyed or rendered useless by blockades.
Therefore he resumed the war of conquest on continental Europe, striking his first blow at Austria, the one power which stood and stands between France and Germany. The march of Napoleon from the North Sea to the Danube, his capture of Mack at Ulm, his brilliant successes at Austerlitz and Jena, afford the finest subjects of study to the military student.. From the moment he gave up his scheme of invasion, to the culmination of his career at Wagram, triumphs attended him wherever lie rode. If care sat behind his charger victory eclipsed him by her effulgence. No general ever waged war with more forethought, none ever made a more striking use of the opportunities offered by fortune, than Napoleon during these four years. He caught General Mack in a net, designed and set with deliber- ation. He overthrew the Austrians and Russians,at Austerlitz by skilful tactics, inspired by the circumstances of the moment, and unflinchingly executed. There cannot be a finer instance of the frailness of a lovely paper plan drawn up according to the prin- ciples of war, when opposed by genius which is able to conceive and execute in the saddle and on the battle-field. In his campaign against Benningsen, in 180'T, he moved with greater circumspec- tion, but did not act with less daring ; and his decisive move- ment at the battle of Friedland is one of the finest applications of sound principle, as it was one of the most successful, for he seized by sheer force the Russian line of retreat; and we are at a loss to see why Sir Edward Oust should regard the attack- of Key as a simple act of daring, and one "probably according to no rule of strategy," when it was based upon the one principle which, if successfully applied, yields the amplest results.
Napoleon, at this period of his life, displayed a boundless forethought and a most rapid and just insight ; he was capable of the most patient deliberation, and the most impetuous action. Caught by the Archduke Charles in 1809 at a disadvantage, he invented his movements from hour to hour, and by dint of daring and promptitude he not only saved his own army, but broke that of his antagonist in two, and, moving swiftly, opened the road to Vienna. At this period of his life no situation, however embarrassing, was too much for his genius. Repulsed at Aspern, and driven into the island of Lobau, he spent six weeks in pre- paration, and then, issuing forth, struck like lightning, and out- manoeuvred his opponent upon his chosen ground. There are few great acts of war which make a more powerful impression upon a vivacious imagination than this tough struggle between Napoleon and the Archduke Charles. The conqueror was then at the summit of his glory.
We wish we could say that Sir Edward Cust had told the story of this career, and the world-wasting conflicts all over the globe which it caused, as well as be evidently could have told it. The form and the plan of these Annals are admirable. There is much in the quiet and unpretending style of the annalist which is excellent. His reflections are often judicious. But he has some- times nodded over his task, and surely he cannot have himself corrected the proofs. It has rarely been our lot to meet with so many misprints. One might make a small supplement of errata. The occasional dropping down of the style to the level of what, before the era of "examinations," was called officers' English, may be regretted, and pardoned where it does not, as, in some instances, materially affect the sense of a passage. A little inconsistency and a few cases of inconclusive judgment may be passed over, because the good intention of the author is so manifest. But these misprints of proper names! They start up in almost every page. As to the names of foreign officers the printer has printed them & discretion. We have marked scores in passing over these two volumes, correcting them with a pencil until compelled to desist in sheer despair. For instance, we find " Clarapede " for Claparede, " Oudenot "for Oudinot, " Villette " for Villatte, " Margarou" for Margaron, " Ueles " for Ucles, " Hostalritz " for Hostalrich, " Lournika " for Louiinha, " Langewith " for Langworth, Thomieres " for Thomieres, " Lizandro " for Zizandro, " Brincbi " for Bianchi, "Echiniihi" for Eckmuhl, " Durousel for Durosnel, " Komoru " for Komorn, "Marmot" for Marrnont, " Doubrouski" for Dom- browski, " Menaud " for Mesnard, " Roguint" for Rogniat, " Chassalonge " and " Chanteloup " for Chasseloup, " Polstoy " for Tolstoy, and many others. Some sentences, and parts of sentences, have been left, which we are sure Sir Edward Cust would have corrected, had he read them. Thus, Napoleon is said to have "instituted a sort of Exchequer-bill arrangement, by which he could still further advance for immediate use the anti- cipation of the direct taxes." " While he was yet in Spain his untiring mind comprehended the most wonderful details of mili- tary organization." "The Austrians, as usual, moved slowly ; and in addition to this incurable habit of theirs, the weather was execrable." " Marshal Berthier was sent, as major-general of the army, to the valley of the Danube, to be ready for Napoleon's arrival to assume the supreme command." "Massena proved him his just apprehensions from the troops of the Archduke on the side of the Danube." "About 4,000 Austrians were made prisoners, many of whom with guns and colours." " Soult, on the 12th, surprised at Landsberg an Austrian regiment of cuirassiers with six guns, who were marching their army by forced marches into Ulm." These are only a few taken at random. They contrast with the usually careful composition of our author. Although we can well imagine that Sir Edward Cast, if he read his own books, has suffered greater torments than ourselves, still we are bound to say that he deserves to suffer. It is unpardon- able to send forth a book so blurred with miapelled names. If these volumes are to b6 of use to young officers, it is positively essential that these blots upon what, in spite of defects, is a good work, should be removed. Until they are removed the value of the Annals as a book of reference is seriously impaired. Let us hope that the two volumes, which will bring us to the end of the French wars, will be read by some competent person before they are given to the public.
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