Billow on His Successors

Memoirs, 1909-1919. By Prince von Billow. Translated by Geoffrey Dimlop. (Putnam. 25e.)

linirmArir as ever, and still more bitter than before, Prince von BilloW poses in the third and last volume of his memoirs as the skilled workman who has lost his job and must watch clumsy apprentices blundering more and more desperately. He finds an evident pleasure in exposing the mistakes of his successors, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, Herr Michaelis, Count Hertling, Prince Max of Baden. No enemy critic has said harsher things about Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, whom the Prince accuses of ignorance, want of tact, vacillation, jealousy and gpite. In 1914, • " the clumsy stupidity of our rulers gave our enemies every chalice of *rousing the public opinion of the world against our pacific loyal people. Those who in 1914 had the direction of Germany's pohey

were neither cunning incendiaries nor ruthless swashbucklers—they were fools:"

Billow himself had supported Austria in 1908, when she flouted the Berlin Treaty by annexing Bosnia, but he blames his successor because he did not " keep a determined check on Austrian policy" He says that in the spring of 1914 Russian diplomatists told him that Austria was planning an attack on Serbia. At the same time Russian jealousy was excited by the appointment of General Liman von Sanders to a Turkish army command. The archduke's murder he defined at the time as " either a debarras or an embarras," and he declares that the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, Count Szogyenyi, regarded it as a debarras—" a dispensation of _Providence." which ,had eliminated a dangerous man. Bethmann, he says, took a somewhat similar view ; "this murder was abominable, yet its political results would be good, since now the heads of the Russian Government, above all the Tsar, would turn from Serbia."

Billow retorted with an anecdote—he is never at a loss for anecdotes, and they are all to the point—about the Tsar Alexander I, who, on being told that" Louis XVIII could not employ Savory, who had held the court-martial on the Due d'Enghien, replied : " Is that all ? Why, I dine every day with Bennigsen and 1LIShakciv Who- strangled my father (the Tsar' Paul)." In any ea,e, Billow did not believe that the Serbian GOVernment instigated or denied the assassination.

For Billow, as indeed for most people-who have studied the question, the fatal blunder on Germany's part was to give Austria a blank cheque—pledging support; whatever she chose to do in Serbia. He says that even as late as July 26, after the Austrian Minister had left Belgrade, the Berlin Foreign Office was unperturbed ; a high official whom he met at Norderney that day telephoned to ask if he should return to Berlin, and Was told that it was a false alarm. Up to August 1st the Foreign Office was warning the Press not to attack France or England, as those Powers were expected to remain neutral. On that day Germany declared war on Russia. Albeit Baffin, the Hamburg shipping magnatetine of the few men whom Bfikor never mentions without praise—called on Bethniann- Hollweg when the ultimatum was being drafted. " Why such haste to declare war on Russia ? " asked Baffin, to which the Chancellor replied : " If I don't, we shan't get the Scicialists' to fight." Bailin is credited with a shrewd comment on the unconditional support given to Austria.

This last seemed our worst stupidity.' Had he, Bailin would say, found himself forced to let his partner go to Monte Carlo for the pur- pose Of risking their joint capital on red or black; pair or impair, lie would have insisted at any rate.on going with him and standing at his side to place the stakes. But to send him off alone to Monte Carlo with full permission to play as he liked there ! "

Billow himself had an early experience of the sorrow that the 'War was to bring to millions, for his brother, a General of cavalry, was killed before Liege on August 5th. He'found the Emperor " excited and yet exhausted," anxious that he should take the Roman Embassy and yet unable to induce the Chancellor to agree. ' When BilloW Called on the Chancellor, he was reminded of the Hebrew scapegoat, painted by Holman ltunt ; " with a look of ineffable anguish in its eyes."

"At last I said to him, Well, tell me at least how it all happened.' He raised his long thin arms to heaven, and answered in a dull,

exhausted voice, Oh—if I only knew ! . He mastered himself, and said, in a quick stutter ; This may be a violent storm but short —very short. I count on a war of not more than three, or perhaps at the very most four, months, and I'm basing my whole policy on that. And I hope that in spite of the war—or because of it, even—we may reach some really sound, friendly, trustful relationship with England—and then through England with France."

Billow thought such hopes vain. Cynics in Berlin were describ- ing imaginary peace negotiations in which France seemed will-

ing to dismantle her fortresses, but which were broken off when .

Germany required France to take half a dozen of her present diplomatistsa jest which delighted the author.

Billow's account of his special mission to Italy in December, 1914, is of considerable interest. He maintains that the German Foreign Office did not want him to succeed in keeping Italy out of the War, lest he should regain his old prestige. Flotow, the titular ambassador, said as much to his councillor in Rome. Jagow, in Berlin, communicated Billow's confiden- tial reports to the Austrian Government, regardless of the fact that Billow was always criticising Austria for her folly in not making concessions to Italy. It is conceivable that, under strong pressure from Berlin, Vienna would have yielded the Trentino and bought peace with Italy. But no preisure was applied. The German Emperor and his Ministers were as if hypnotized by their ally, who for his part had no scrUples later in trying to make a separate peace with France. Pope Benedict XV, we are told, instructed Cardinal Piffl—the Archbishop of Vienna whO died the other day—to urge the Emperor Francis Joseph to sacrifice the Trentino. " The Emperor would not even let him finish. His old face crimson with rage,. he seized Piffl's arias and literally thrast him from the room." Billow's warnings were ignored. Berlin preferred to believe Flotow who, as late as March, 1915, was declaring that Italy would never dare to fight Austria ; Bethmarui: Hollsveg himself was more pessimistic, but professed his in- ability to influence the Austrian Government. Once again the " brilliant second," in William II's phrase, had his own way, to Germany's detriment. When Billow returned to Berlin, the Chancellor implored him to preserve silence about the Austrian blunders, lest German morale should be impaired.

13etlunium7Hollweg's long-delayed resignation came in July, 1917.. . It is clear that Billow hoped to return to office. He reports the Emperor as saying to Count August Eulenburg : " Go and find my wife and tell her she'll have her. Billow back again." He thinks that lie could have made a reasonable peace on condition that our enemies saw no weakness in us." He would have restored Belgium, given the Trentino to Italy, and, " if necessary,". French Lorraine to France, and might perhaps have neutralized Alsace-Lorraine. Many people who can recall the situation as it was then will share Billow's view that on such terms the War might have been ended a. year sooner. lint Billow Was denied the opportunity. Instead of appointing his most experienced statesman, the Emperor, on the advice of Valentini, chief of his secretariat, chose Michaelis, a minor official, who was as little known in Germany as he Was abroad, and of whom the Emperor had never heard. Gerniany was then, of,course, ruled by Ludendorff, and the civilians counted for little or nothing. But the appointment revealed the hopeless incapacity of the . Emperor and his _advisers, though William II, speaking of the new Chancellor to the King of Saxony, said :. " He really is. the best I've ever had."

Enough has been said to show that Billow's. closing volume is, like the two others, of absorbing interest and of very -con- siderable historic value. His bias is obvious, but his knowledge of men and affairs is wide and intimate, and-he is a witty and entertaining writer. Just as Louis XIV is iest known through St. Simon, so William II and his court will be remembered most clearly through the fallen Chancellor who took this posthumous revenge on him. Mr. Dunlop's translation of a difficult original with many, quotations reads well, but is marred here and there by such slips as the translation of " freisinnige "—the old party name of- the independent Radicals—as " free-thinking," which conveys a sinister mean- ing to the English reader.

EDWARD HAWKE. •