India The Immediate Task
NOW that the National Government has been returned to power, the Prime Minister will be able to turn his attention to the greatest external task which confronts the nation—a just settlement of the Indian question. No time must be lost, however, and the Government's determination to change the present unsatisfactory con- dition into a permanent free-will partnership, based on mutual interests, must be restated without delay. In no circumstances must the Round Table Conference fail.
The Government must make clear that no " die-hardism " will be permitted to deflect the British people from carry- ing out the oft-repeated promise of giving India responsible government, and that Great Britain will genuinely seek to make the " transition period " as short as possible so that a self-governing India shall have the control of her finances, of defence and of external relations similar to the other self-governing Dominions, at the earliest possible moment.
It would be idle to deny that there is a large section of opinion in Great Britain that would be glad to see the Round Table Conference fail. Another section, sincerely inspired with a desire to act justly, advocates the imme- diate putting into operation of Provincial autonomy, on the lines of the Simon Report, but holds that the question of the Federal Government at the Centre should be shelved in view of the failure so far of the Hindu-Muslim negotiations, though how it is proposed to establish workable electorates in the Provinces while the communal difficulty remains unsolved is not stated. No hope lies along that road. If an attempt were made to force Pro- vincial autonomy on India, ignoring the major question of a strong Central Government, the majority of the Indian Delegates to the Round Table Conference would return home empty-handed. Within six months the situation in India would be worse than it has yet been. The moderates would be disheartened, and would no longer be in a position to fight the disruptive elements. If the forces making for a settlement to-day are ignored and confidence in British good faith lost once for all, the future will be dark indeed.
It is still possible to reach a settlement which would be satisfactory to the great majority, not only of the members of the Round Table Conference, but of the peoples of India, based on a realist policy which recognizes that there must be a transition period, with reserved subjects, of ten, fifteen or perhaps twenty years. The immediate necessity is to get the new Indian Free State launched upon its career safely. The finishing touches can be added later. The goal of British policy in India must be restated : the establishment of a Free India, enjoying all the privileges of a Free State within the British Common- wealth ; a permanent partnership entered into of their free will by both contracting parties, India taking over the reserved subjects after the transition period, to be decided by future negotiations, has elapsed. Since the Hindu-Muslim negotiations have failed so far, the British Government must discharge its reponsibility by giving its decision. The solution reached might not be an ideal one, but it would probably satisfy ninety per cent. of the wishes of both sides. There might be a good deal to be said for the appointment of a Committee of two or three British public men (including a trained constitutional lawyer) to advise, but the final decision must be the Govern- ment's. Subject to this assurance, the Round Table must now proceed to hammer out the broad principles of the Constitution, leaving the experts to work out the details. But the British Government must go ahead with its settlement and enforce its decisions. In the matter of finance difficulties might be eased by the creation of a Financial Council with statutory quali- fications and statutory powers of advice, and with the right to have its views placed before the legis- lature in case of need. The Viceroy would have the power to return any bill, the power of veto, and the power of reservation for the pleasure of the Crown, while finally the Crown would have the power of disallowing any Act. Perhaps the most difficult problem is that of the Army and Defence. But it is far from being insoluble. The most obvious step would be the appointment of an Indian member of the Federal Government as Minister of Defence, responsible to the Viceroy for working out the policy of the Crown, an advisory Indian Defence Committee, to correspond to the former British Imperial Defence Committee. to be established, [consisting of experts—British and Indian—including perhaps two or three representa- tives from the Indian States, to advise the Indian Defence Minister. The Army budget should be settled on a con- tractual basis for a period of years, but should be liable to revision. The Defence Minister after his appointment should explore the possibility of a reduction in the size of the Army in India, and it would be the duty of the Viceroy, if the scheme were accepted, to carry it out. This Minister, with all the prestige and status of the re- presentative Minister of the Crown, would deal with the British Government on all Army questions. The principle should also be laid down that the Indian section of the army should never be removed from India without the consent of the Indian Legislature. Every possible guarantee should be given by Statute of Parliament to the British Army and to British officers and men in the Indian Army as to pay, emoluments, pensions and status. Subject to these guarantees there should be no real difficulty in persuading British troops to serve the Government of India, any more than there has been any difficulty in getting British officials in the Indian Civil Service to serve under Indian superior officers. In this matter a great change has taken place during the last twenty years.
As far as external relations are concerned, the solution during the transition stage presents little real difficulty.
It is suggested that the Foreign Secretary, or Minister for External Affairs, should be responsible to the Viceroy. Such matters as Peace and War and relations with Foreign Powers during the transition period would be outside the control of the Indian Legislature and would be co-ordinated with the policy of His Majesty's Govern- ment in Great Britain. But a genuine effort should be made by Great Britain to devolve her powers and enable India to control her foreign relations, just as Canada, South Africa and the Irish Free State do in consultation with the other Dominions through the Imperial Con- ference. Such matters as the appointment of the- High Commissioner in London, Trade Commissioner and Con- sular officials should be left to the Indian Central Government.
It is obviously impossible to sketch out in detail an entire Indian settlement. But we believe agreement could be reached on the broad outlines here traced, sub- ject to confidence in British good faith being established by a definite statement by the Prime Minister as to British intentions. If we seize the present opportunity we can settle the Indian question and place British-Indian relations on foundations of good will and mutual esteem, which no mere safeguards, imposed without the consent of India, could ever achieve..
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