Debatts anb 113roteebings in Varliamtnt.

THE O'CONNELL WRIT OF ERROR.

The House of Lords reassembled on Monday, to receive the opinions of the Judges on the questions submitted in the appeal of "Daniel O'Connell versus the Queen, in error." The public were admitted soon after ten o'clock, and the galleries were crowded. The Duke of Cam- bridge entered the House nearly at the same time ; the Lord Chancellor took his seat on the Woolsack about half-past ten. The attendance of Peers was very thin; besides the Law Lords, not more than a dozen were present. The Judges in attendance were Chief Baron Pollock, Lord Chief Justice Tindal, Mr. Baron Parke, Mr. Baron Gurney, Mr. Baron Alderson, Mr. Justice Patteson, Mr.Justice Coltman, Mr. Justice Williams, Mr. Justice Wickman, and Mr. Justice Manle. The Lord Chief Justice-Of the Common Pleas (Sir Nicholas Tindal) reported the opinions of the Judges on theequestions seriatim.

The first question was this—" Are all, ,or .any, and if any, which of the counts in the indictment, bail in law. so that if such count or counts stood alone in the indictment, no judgment against the defendants could properly he

entered upon them ?" " Our answer to this question depends upon the con- sideration of another question—namely, whether all the counts of the indict-

ment were framed with that proper and necessary certainty, with respect to the substantive charges of conspiracy, which the law requires to be done in such cases ; for, undoubtedly, if any of the counts should be found to have been framed in so loose' inapt, and desultory a manner, as that the defendants would have been entitled to a demurrer on them, nothing could have prevented them from enjoying the same privileges in respect of proceedings in error." In order to constitute a conspiracy, it is necessary that two or more individuals shall enter into an agreement or understanding together, to effect something un- lawful, or if not unlawful, that they shall thus agree together to effect some lawful object by unlawful means. The offence, unknown to the common law, was first defined by the statute of the 33d Edward I.; and a breach of the law takes place whenever the conspiracy is proved to exist, whether or not any act was performed in pursuance of the agreement by the conspirators. "No serious objections, it appears to us, could be made or sustained against the sufficiency of any of the counts prior to the sixth count. No doubt whatever exists, in our opinion, that the charges in the first five counts do sufficiently sustain the charge of a conspiracy ; and the several overt acts are likewise clearly and sufficiently described therein. Nor is there any doubt on our minds that an agreement and understanding between divers persons to raise dis- contents, and excite disaffections, and to stir up jealousies, hatred, and among and between certain classes of her Majesty's subjects, and more espe- daily among her Majesty's subjects in Ireland—all of which are enumerated, described, and charged in the first four counts—do form and sustain a distinct and definite charge of conspiracy, founded upon an agreement between the several defendants to do an illegal act, or several successive illegal acts; and it appears, therefore, to us unnecessary to take into consideration other objections alleged against the other counts. With respect to the sixth and seventh counts, we all concur in the opinion that they do not state the illegal purpose of the defendants, and the object of their agreement, with sufficient precision, or with so much certainty as to lead us to form a belief that it was any other than an agreement to do some act which would be a violation of the law. Those counts—I mean the sixth and seventh—do certainly allege that the defendants caused and procured divers large numbers of persons to assemble and meet for seditious and unlawful purposes, and to endeavour by means of intimidation, and by threats of physical force, to cause certain organic changes in the govern- ment, the laws, and the constitution of the realm. Now, although it may be very reasonably inferred that this proceeding was an illegal one, still it has not appeared to us that it is sufficiently well or clearly defined. The word 'in- timidation' is not a technical word—it is not vocabulum artis, having a ne- cessary meaning in a bad sense ; and in order to give it force, it ought at least to appear from the context what species of fear was intended, or upon whom that fear was intended to operate. The count leaves us in uncertainty as to whether it was the peaceable subjects of her Majesty dwelling in Ireland who were to be intimidated, or whether the public authorities were those on whom this means of obtaining their objects was intended by the defendants to operate, or lastly, whether it was the Legislature of the realm that was in question. Then again, it is alleged in the indictment, that the changes to which I have already referred are to be effected by means of

i

physical force,' without, however, any allegation being contained n the in- dictment that such force had been used, it therefore seems to me and to her Majesty's Judges, that it would require something more than a mere display of numbers in order to sustain those counts." All the Judges concurred, also, in thinking that the conspirators' objects and attainment of those objects, as set forth in the eighth, ninth, and tenth counts, constituted a violation of the laws of the land ; and no doubt had arisen of the sufficiency of the eleventh count. "In answer therefore to your Lordships' first question, I have to inform your Lordships, that we are all of opinion that the sixth and seventh counts of the indictment are bad in law, so that if they stood alone no judgment could pro- perly be maintained upon a verdict obtained upon them." The second question was the following—" Is there any, and if any, what, de- fect in the findings of the Jury upon the trial of the said indictment, or in the entering of such findings?' The Judges thought that the finding of the Jury on the first, second, and third counts could not be supported by the law. "With respect to the first and second counts, our opinion is formed upon the ground that the Jury found eight of the defendants not only guilty of a joint conspiracy, but also they found some individuals of those eight persons sepa- rately guilty of distinct conspiracies on the same counts. With respect to the third count, our opinion is formed upon the ground that the Jury found three of' the defendants only guilty of a conspiracy to effect all the objects stated to have been contemplated by the whole in that count ; the rest of the defend- ants, with the exception of Thomas Tierney, were found guilty of part only of that conspiracy, and Thomas Tierney was found guilty of a still smaller part. Similar objections exist in our opinion to the principle of the verdict on the fourth count, on which all the defendants were found guilty, with the ex- ception of Thomas Tierney, who was found guilty of part of that count only : and our reason for coming to this conclusion s, that whereas each count charges one conspiracy, and no more, against the defendants, so the Jury could only find a verdict of one conspiracy on each count, and no more ; for though it was within the competence of the Jury to find all the defendants guilty or not guilty of the distinct offences charged in the count, it was not so to find them guilty of other objects charged as offences in the other Counts; for that would be a finding of several conspiracies where only one was charged. The Jury was only competent to find one conspiracy, as one only was charged ; and we therefore unanimously agree in the opinion that the findings of the Jury on the first four counts in the indictment were not authorised."

The third question was this—" Is there sufficient ground for reversing the judgment by reason of any defect in the indictment, or of the findings, or enter- ing of the findings of the Jury upon the said indictment ? " This comprised the same points as the eleventh question ; and as there was a difference of opi- nion among the Judges on this question, he only stated his own individual opinion. "I conceive it to be the law, that if there be one good count in the indictment, and that the defendants be found guilty generally, and under that verdict brought up to receive judgment for the offence of which they are con- victed, such judgment cannot be reversed by any proceedings upon a writ of error, by reason of any one or more of the other counts of the indictment being bad." In the practice of the courts with respect to civil cases, a verdict ob- tained in a cause where one of the counts was good and another bad, would be reversed, and the parties obliged venire de novo ; because such a verdict, being for damages, rests as much on the bad as on the good count or counts, and the Jury have no power to find a verdict upon separate counts. The rule, how- ever, occasions much inconvenience, even in civil cases. Between civil and criminal cases there is no analogy: the defect of some counts in criminal cases could only go to the length of lessening the punishment, and could not disturb the verdict. The modem practice of framing several counts in an indictment

is intended to meet the difficulty of describing an offence in one count, which might differ in complexion from the offence proved in evidence. In no case can a prosecutor prove two crimes in the same indictment ; and the amoant of punishment is discretionary in the Judge. A misdemeanour so far differs from a felony, that several offences may be proved ; but the result amounts to the same thing; for the moment the verdict has been pronounced, whether guided by one or more counts, the discretionary power in the Judge confirms the punishment as a fixed judgment; and in a court of error there is no right to presume that such judgment was wrong because one or more counts of the in- dictment were unsustainable. There is no instance on record where a writ of error has been brought under their Lordships' consideration with a view to dis- turb or reverse a judgment on such a ground. It had been argued that the judgment would prevent the defendants from availing themselves of the present proceedings as a bar to a second prosecution for the same offence; and secondly, that there would be a difficulty in their availing themselves of a pardon for an offence wrongly charged. But in order to the plea of autrefoys convict, it is only necessary to prove the identity of the coypus delicti ; and as to a pardon, there is no doubt that any court before whom the parties might be brought would discharge them upon its being proved that the offence imputed to them was not sustainable by the counts of the indictment. In his opinion, there was no sufficient ground for reversing judgment on the third question. The fourth question proposed by their Lordships was this—" Is there any sufficient grounds to reverse the judgment by reason of the matters stated in the pleas in abatement, or any of them, or in the judgment upon such pleas ?" The law requires a plea in abatement, which is a dilatory plea, to be stated " with precise and strict exactness " : in the present instance, the plea failed in precision in many particulars—such as not stating the names of the wit- nesses who had not been sworn. The pleas therefore appeared to the Judges to be bad.

The fifth question was—" Is there any sufficient ground for reversing the judgment on account of the continuing the trial in the vacation, or of the order of the Court for that purpose." This was unanimously answered in the negative.

The sixth question put to the Judges was—" Whether there is any sufficient ground for reversing the judgment on account of the judgment of the Court overruling and disallowing the challenge to the array, or any or either of them, or of the matters stated in such challenge ? " The ground, and the only ground, on which challenge to the array is allowed by law, is the unindifference or default of the Sheriff. But no uniudifference or default of the Sheriff or his officers was assigned on this occasion. The array of the panel is challenged in this case on the ground that the general list from which the Jurors' book is made up had not been completed in every respect in conformity with the statute, but that fifty-nine names had been omitted. No advantage could have accrued from the challenge on such grounds ; for if it had been allowed, the Jury-process must have been directed to some other officer, who would have been obliged to choose his Jury out of the very same Special Jurors' book on which the Sheriff had acted, for there was no other : there would have been the same objection to that panel, and so on toties quoties ; so that the granting of this challenge would have effectually prevented any trial at all. The very same difficulty might occur in England, if, through accident, carelessness, or design, a single Jury-list directed to be returned by the overseers of any parish within the county were not handed over to the Clerk of the Peace, or if a single name should have been omitted in any list actually delivered to the Clerk of the Peace. The Jury-book must necessarily, in either case, be deficiently made up. But if such deficiency were allowed to be a ground of challenge to the array, the business of every assize in the Kingdom might effectually be stopped. That there must be some mode of relief for an injury which arises from non- observance of an act of Parliament, is undeniable ; but the only question before them was whether that was a ground of challenge to the array ? They all agreed in thinking it was not.

The seventh question was this—" Is there sufficient ground to reverse the judgment by means of any defect in the entry of continuances from the said trial to the said 15th day of April, regard being also had to the appearance of the defendants on the said last-mentioned day." This also was answered in the negative.

The eighth question put by their Lordships was this—" Is there any sufficient ground to reverse or vary the judgment on account of the sentences, or any or either of them, passed on the respective defendants, regard being had particularly to the recognizances required and to the period of imprisonment dependent

upon the entering into such recogaizances ? The question was, whether the order was against the law : no other question could be argued on a writ of error : even in the most unreasonable amount of punishment, legal in its nature a court of errorhas no right to interfere ; and the eighth question wasanswered in the negative. The ninth question put to the Queen's Judges was this—" Is there any sufficient ground to reverse the judgment on account of the judgments on the assignments of error coram nobis, or any or either of them or of the matters stated in such assignments of error, or any or either of timm ? " The de- fendants, except Mr. Steeleodleged that various witnesses were not sworn in court, as required by the 56th George III.; which they argued to be unrepealed by the 1st and 2d Victoria, c. 37; because the Clerk of the Crown (an officer of the Queen's Bench) is not mentioned in the second act. Mr. Steele alleged that the names of the witnesses were not stated on the back of the indictment, authenticating the fact that they had been sworn as required by the act of Victoria. As to the former allegation, although the act of Victoria, an act of relief and amendment, only mentioned the Clerks of Assize and of the Peace, they were mentioned as specimens of the officers in the several counts, and therefore the act must be construed to extend to the similar officer of the Queen's Bench. The enactment respecting the endorsement of the witnesses' names on being sworn was only directory, for convenience on the trial, and could not affect the legal operation of a true bill. The ninth question, therefore, was answered in the negative. The tenth question put was this—" Is there any sufficient ground for re. versing the judgment by reason of its not containing any entry as to the ver- dicts of acquittal ? " After a careful search in the Crown-Office, no instance could be found of such an entry where a party was found guilty on one part of an indictment. The question must be answered in the negative.

The eleventh question had already been in part anticipated, in answering the third. [This is the eleventh question, which appears not to have been read aloud—" In an indictment consisting of counts A, B, C, where the verdict is guilty of all generally, and the counts A B are good and the count C is bad, the judgment being, that the defendants, for the offences aforesaid, be fined and imprisoned, which judgment would be sufficient in point of law if confined ex-

preesly to counts A and B, can such judgment be reversed on a writ of error ? Will it make any difference whether the punishment be discretionary, as above suggested, or a punishment fixed by law ? "] The only portion, therefore, of this question remaining to be considered, was, whether the entry on the record, being "that the defendant for his offences aforesaid be fined and imprisoned," was in itself a ground for reversing the judgment ? The plain interpretation of these words was this—such offences as were set out in those counts of the in- dictment that were free from objection, and of which the defendants bad been found guilty by a proper finding of the Jury. These were the offences in the fifth, eighth, and all subsequent counts ; and he saw no objection to the word "offences" in the plural number. He did not think that, in point of law, the words as they appeared in the record formed a ground of objection.

Mr. Justice Patteson and Mr. Justice Maule expressed their concur- rence with ChiefJustice Tindal.

Mr. Justice Coltman delivered his opinion on the third and eleventh questions, respecting which he differed from his brethren— In his humble opinion, where an indictment consisted of three counts, A, B, and C, and counts A and B were good and count C bad, and judgment

were given against the defendant for the offences charged, and he be fined and imprisoned, such judgment was insufficient in point of law, unless confined ex- pressly to the counts A and B, and ought to be reversed on error. The de-

fendant was entitled to know on which count he was sentenced : and the rea- son why he was entitled to claim that right was, that if convicted of an offence on an insufficient indictment, and if judgment was passed against him, he might plead the conviction to any other indictment on the same charge.

Mr. Justice Williams, (who remarked that the questions turned en- tirely upon technicalities, for upon the merits of the case there was no difference of opinion among the Judges,) Mr. Baron Gurney, and Mr. Baron Alderson, successively supported the view entertained by Chief Justice Tindal.

Mr. Baron Parke, delivering his opinion with the greatest diffidence, concurred with Mr. Justice Coltman in thinking that the judgment ought to be reversed on the third and eleventh questions— There were in this case two counts of the indictment bad ; there was no legal finding on three, the Jury having found the parties guilty of more than one offence upon counts which charged them with one only ; and the judgment was

that the defendant for his offences aforesaid be fined and imprisoned. But it could not be said how much of the punishment was awarded for the offences of which the parties were not legally guilty. There were two modes by which, apparently, this error might be rectified,---the first was, that the Court below had awarded punishment only upon the good counts ; the second was, that the

same punishment, the same imprisonment, and the same fine, was inflicted for each and every offence. With regard to the first, it appeared to him impos- sible to maintain that the Court must be taken to have given judgment on the counts which were good, and on those counts only. With regard to the second, it could not be supposed, from the language of the record, whatever might be said of the sentence and of the imprisonment, that the same fine was inflicted

for each and every offence. Prima facie, part of the sentence was given for one

offence and part for another ; and the court of error could not apportion it, as they did not know the facts for which the fine was imposed. Allusion had

been made to the inconvenience which would arise if that opinion were decided to be erroneous. Be could not see in what that inconvenience would consist. The only result would be this, that the defendants being entitled to an acquit- tal on all bad counts, the counsel for the prosecution would have to examine

the record to see that judgment was not entered upon the had counts. For these reasons, notwithstanding the respect which he entertained for the opinions of his brethren, he was compelled to differ from the majority of them on these points, and to answer the third and eleventh questions in the affirmative.

Lord Chief Justice Tindal said that Mr. Justice Coleridge, who was unavoidably absent from illness, had requested him to state to their Lordships his entire concurrence with the majority of the Judges.

The LORD CHANCELLOR thanked the Judges for the care and con- sideration which they had bestowed upon the case ; and the further con- sideration of it was adjourned till Wednesday.

The House met at ten o'clock on Wednesday ; when the galleries and other parts accessible to "strangers" were crowded. The attend- ance of Peers was not numerous, and for a good part of the morning Lord Wharncliffe was the only member of the Government on the Mi- nisterial benches.

After disposing of some preliminary business, the LORD CHANCELLOR moved that the judgment of the Court below in this case should be affirmed.

The Judges, after having attended with their accustomed patience to the long, able, and elaborate arguments at the bar of the House, had communicated the result of their deliberations : except upon what was substantially one ques-

tion, they were unanimous : on that question seven of the Judges expressed a distinct, clear, and decided opinion against the objectkins urged; the two other

Judges expressed an adverse opinion, accompanied; however, by much doubt and hesitation. Under such circumstances, unlef convinced that the opinion of the great majority of the Judges was palpaby founded in error, the House would feel bound by their decision. Of the ehrgen counts in the indictment, some were unanimously declared defective in point of law ; others were defective from the nature of the finding upon them ; and the question was, whether, there being defective counts in the indictment, a general judgment could be sustained?

It was a purely technical question—not calling in question the judgment in sub- stance, but arising entirely out of the manner in which the judgment had been entered by those whose province it was to discharge that part of the duties of

the court. It was distinctly laid down by Lord Mansfield and held to be a general rule of the criminal law, that in cases of such nature a general judg- ment should be given ; and until now the rule had never been called in ques-

tion. Baron Parke said that the rule only applied to motions in arrest of judgment : but there was no authority for that exception. In civil action, where there must be damages upon each count, the counsel for the plaintiff always deliberately examined the record, to see upon what point the verdict should be entered, lest it be entered on a technicality. Does any such pro- ceeding take place in a criminal case ? Are the parties Jess interested—the

counsel less acute ? No. Yet, so far from paying any attention to it, the ver- dict is entered as a matter of course, without inspecting or examining the

record. And why ? Because it has been always accounted by the profession to be the law that any defective count upon the record cannot affect the judgment provided that there be one good count on the record to sustain that good judgment. In criminal cases, no one who is not in the confidence of the

Judges can tell in respect of what part the judgment has been awarded. "There is no similarity in the eases. You cannot reason or argue from one to

the other. You must assume, unless it is clearly and distinctly shown to the contrary, that what the Judges have done in this respect is right; and that their judgment, if there be any part of the record to support it, is in reference

to the valid count. In writs of error we are not allowed to conjecture—we are not to decide upon probabilities. We must look to the record ; and unless that shows on the face of it that there has been manifest error in appropriating the

punishment, you cannot reverse the judgment. You cannot go out of the re- cord." In this case, the Court adjudged the parties to be fined and imprisoned " for their offences aforesaid ": two counts in the indictment are de- fective—in them there is no offence charged; others were rendered null by

erroneous findings; and when the judgment is awarded for "the offences aforesaid," it must be understood as confined to those offences upon the

record which are offences in the eye of the law and those of which the defend- ant has been found guilty upon the record, namely, those upon which the find- ing has been properly taken. Lord Lyndhurst proceeded to cite cases in support of his view. In the case of the King wrens Powell, the defendant was tried

under an indictment of two counts, severally charging an assault and an assault under aggravated circumstances ; he was found guilty of "the offence and mis- demeanour aforesaid," and was sentenced to two years' imprisonment and hard labour "for the offence and misdemeanour aforesaid "; importing only

one offence, whereas two were stated in the indictment. As the punishment was not justified by mere assault, a writ of error was brought ; but it was de- cided that misdemeanour was a nomen collecticum, and that the Jury had found the prisoner guilty of the whole offence in the record—the offences stated in both counts ; and both the finding and judgment were held to be right. Baron Parke said that in that case the present objection was not taken : but it lay upon the surface, and must have been taken either by conned at the bar or by the Judges, if it were tenable in law. In the case of the King against Rhodes, some of the assignments of the verdict were objected to as bad: but Chief Justice Holt would not allow the question to be argued ; as, he said, if only one assignment were good, it would suffice to support the judgment. Other cases were cited to show that such an objection could not prevail either in arrest of judgment or on a writ of error, and that it had never been urged by counsel of the greatest acumen. It bad been said that there had been no ex- press decision on the subject : but practice, usage, and recognition are the basis of the law ; and the authority of the Judges as to what is the practice could not be rejected. Difficulties apprehended in a plea of autrefois convict or a pardon had been satisfactorily answered by the Judges. As to the challenge of the array, the only grounds for such a proceeding are the unindifferency "or misconduct of the Sheriff or officer returning the Jury : but in this case no misconduct was alleged against the Sheriff; and there was therefore nothing on the record to raise the question of challenge to the array. The parties might go to the Jury-book of the previous year if none had been made up : but in this case the book had been made up ; and as it is impossible, considering the number of Jurymen in Dublin, but that mistakes must occur, the last book would contain similar mistakes. He did not say that this case was without remedy ; but a challenge to the array was not a proper one. There was only one other fact to which he wished to refer. The traversers say that they knew nothing of the making up of this list, and they snake oath that it was not with their wish or concurrence that it was made up in the manner it was : but if they thought it right to clear themselves from responsibility as to the list, they should have gone further, and say they did not participate in the making up of the book from which the list was taken. On subordinate points, such as the alleged discontinuance of the trial, and the plea of abatement and demurrer, the answer was complete and satisfactory. On these grounds he sub• mined that the judgment ought to be affirmed, and he moved accordingly.

Lord BROUGHAM concurred with Lord Lyndhurst.

While he expressed the utmost respect for the Judges' opinions, be allowed that the House was not bound by them ; and it must not be guided by particular precedent, but by the general course of precedent and by every usage. He minutely criticized Baron Parke'a manner of giving his opinion ; recallug how much hesitation that Judge had displayed. No fewer than eight times had that learned Baron expressed his doubts. Be said he must pause—he doubted if he could answer those questions in the affirmative; and he concluded by stating, according to the opinion which he bad delivered viva voce in their Lordships' House, and which differed in that respect from the written opinion,

that he doubted whether he ought to advise their Lordships to affirm the judg- ment,—au incorrect expression, as the-Judges were there to communicate in- form:6a: to their Lordships, and not to give them advice. As to the validity of the sixth and seventh counts Lord Brougham differed with all the learned Judges. Be must say, that the argument of the learned Lord Chief Justice on that point had failed to satisfy him that the offence bad not been set forth with suffi-

cient certainty in those two counts; perhaps he ought to say that he felt so doubtful on the point, that he was unable to agree. The Latin word for fear, or causing to fear, was sufficiently clear and precise; and he thought the object alleged showed with sufficient precision on whom the intimida- tion was to be exercised. That object was to procure a change in the laws. Now, that change must be produced either by means of the Parliament or in

opposition to the Parliament. If it were to be brought about by means of the Parliament, then it was clear that it was the Parliament which was

to be intimidated. If the change was to be brought about in opposition to the Parliament, then it was in itself an offence. But when he con- sidered how much greater was the experience of those learned Judges in criminal jurisprudence than was his own, be was bound to suppose that be was wrong, and that they were not wrong ; and he could not set up his inexperienced judgment against their experienced ones. Coming to the point disputed among the Judges, he dwelt on the appalling consequences of de- ciding that in all those cases, without number, in which verdicts had been re- turned upon several counts one of which was bad, and in which sentences had been passed and executed, e■ sry one of those judgments would have been re- versed if brought before their Lordships. He referred to the cases cited, clearly showing that the same decision would have been given as on those in arrest of judgment had the question come before the Courts on a writ of error ; pointing out the absurdity of the Judges' refusing to arrest judgment, and then, the Judges sitting on the other side of the wall, in the Exchequer Chamber, reversing the judgment on the selfsame objection. The judgment is upon each -of the counts severally rather than upon all jointly. He insisted strongly on the weight to be attached to the cases and to the decision by the majority of the Judges, and on the total absence of authority on the opposite side. The consequence of allowing the challenge to the array, he said in discussing that part of the question, would be, that for twelve months they must go on in Dublin altogether without Common and Special Juries, because they had this defective book. He finished by declaring, that, less learned than any others of his learned friends in criminal matters, he had consulted authorities ; and he bad come to the conclusion that judgment ought to be given against the plain- tiffs in error.

Lord DENMAN opposed the motion. He began by considering the question raised on the challenge to the array. " I am the more induced to bring forward this point in the first instance, not only because it is a preliminary one in the proceedings, but because I think it an important question—important in so high a degree that it does not admit of exaggeration—in regard to the administration of justice through- out the United Kingdom ; tor if it be possible that such practices as

have in this case been admitted to have taken place should occur and to pass without remedy—and up to this moment I have heard no other remedy sug-

gested—trial by jury, instead of being a security to the accused, will become a mockery, a delusion, and a snare. The traversers to the indictment in question challenged the array, on the ground that there had been a fraudulent omission of sixty names from the lists of the Jurors for the county of the city of Dublin. The Attorney-General demurs to this challenge, admitting at the same time the fact so challenged. It appears to me that the challenge ought to have been allowed." On this point he differed from all the Judges : "1 think the principle of the law in this respect is not as they have stated it to be, and that the question is not merely whether the Sheriff has done right or wrong, but whether the parties accused had on their trial the security of a lawful jury." g e had not sat in consultation with the other Judges, but, struck wit nee of the question, he had written to Mr. Justice Coleridge, that he 4aigh ubmit it for consideration ; and although prevented from at- tending the ad ultation by sickness which confined him to his room, Mr. Justice Colerid4 had dictated a reply ; extracts of which Lord Denman read. Taking the factfr s stated in the challenge, said the writer, " the Recorder had taken no list at all, but a spurious Jury-list was put forward by some one or other who is Ins nown ; a list was thus transmitted by the Recorder to the

Sheriff, in wh- he names of certain qualified Jurors were entirely omitted," as it was a]leg , "fraudulently and with intent to prejudice him [the traverser]

on his " Here," said Mr. Justice Coleridge, " is confessed a serious

wrong"; and the reply that the Sheriff was not in fault, and that there were no better materials for a Jury, was no answer : " It is far better, t he added, " that no trial should be taken than that the Court of goeen's Bench at Dublin should submit that suspicions should exist which the knowledge of these facts must inevitably create." Lord Denman differed from those who said that there was no remedy. By recent statute, the responsibility which once rested with the Sheriff had devolved upon the officers who now perform the duties—the Recorder, the tax-collectors, and others. The Recorder's duty is judicial ; he has to decide upon the admission or rejection of claims to be inserted in the list, and thus to settle the list which is the basis of the Jury-book. The complaint in this case, the challenge to this array, WAS, that after the Recorder had exer- cised his judicial functions—after he had determined what should be the Jury- list for the ensuing year for the county of the city of Dublin—somebody else said, " That shall not be the list, but this [here Lord Denman tore a piece off a sheet of paper] shall be taken as the list, and from this other list the Jury in this case shall be struck." The handing over a perfect list to the Re- corder by the Sheriff is a ministerial act, but that act has been improperly and incorrectly performed. The parties accused ought to be tried out of the book : if the traversers are satisfied with the Jury, they will not challenge it ; if they are dissatisfied, they will challenge it ; and if it be discovered that the proper book has not been returned, then the former book of the preceding year may be resorted to. This is the practice in England, and the law has been assimi- lated as closely to it in Ireland as the circumstances admitted of being done.

Sir Nicholas Tindal said that there must be a remedy; noble Lord on the Woolsack said so ; but he did not say what the remdy was. "Now, my Lords, if we are to be told there is no remedy existing for this great wrong—if there is no means of preventing it—I must express my opinion that the consequence would be to create the greatest confusion and uncertainty in the proceedings of our criminal courts. But I say, that unless the good old principle recognized by the practice of the courts and the constitution—that, namely, of challenging the array—be still permitted to prevail in all trials in- volving the criminality of the subject, there will be no security for a fair trial. Nor shall I ever believe that this great and long-recognized remedy for the evils in question does not still exist, until I find that it has been solemnly and de- liberately repealed by law. The absence of all other remedy, my Lords, proves that this remedy still exists, and is in full vigour : consequently, the challenge to the array ought to have been allowed; and the trial was, in my humble opinion' erroneously suffered to proceed. There is a passage in Coke which fully bears out this view ; and I can point out a case in the Year-book where the case is twice reported, once under the 17th of Edward III., and a second time under the 20th of Edward III., wherein the Sheriff having made an erro- neous return of a jury-list to the Bailiff of the hundred, it was argued that the defendant was deprived of his right of challenge as against the Bailiff. It was alleged that there were good names enough on the list to form ajury: but it was argued and decided that an error, the omission of one individual, vitiated the whole list ; and the proceedings were consequently set aside. In that case, the Sheriff was charged with unindifferency ; for which he was tried and acquitted." Out of the 715 names on the Dublin Special Jury-list, sixty form a very considerable portion of the whole ; the persons selected to try the case might have been drawn from these sixty, and might have viewed it in a very different light. Two of the counts were admitted to be bad : he thought that more were so. " I should be sorry to bind myself by anything that I have heard in this place," observed Lord Denman in passing, "to administer the law in another court upon the ground that a dissatisfaction at a particular state of things, or a desire to effect a change in the law, is an illegal act. I am by no means clear that such may not prove to be very meritorious acts. But it is quite enough for me to assume, upon the authority of my learned brethren, that there are two bad counts." The question was, could a judgment be sustained upon the whole, notwithstanding those bad counts ? He maintained that it could not. It was impossible to assume that the Court had not taken into account the bad counts as well as the good; and indeed it was in direct contradiction to notorious facts. A doubt having been raised as to the legality of such a decision, it was the duty of a Court of Error to consider whether the doubt was well-founded or not ; and Lord Denman cited instances in which cases running over a period of fifty years had been overruled, and in which the Lords had differed from the Judges,— notably in respect to the Irish marriage-law, twelve months ago. The whole of the prevalent opinion as to the legality of general judgments in criminal cases rests on a dictum of Lord Mansfield; and un- doubtedly it bad been considered law in Westminster Hall. "If we look at the various columns of the law we shall find them raised on several foundations : a certain portion of their foundations are acts of Parliament, a certain portion are decisions of the courts, a certain portion are the dicta of judges, and a certain portion are taken for granted ; and there is a great deal that is taken for granted which is no law at all." Nor was it uniformly the practice to take a verdict on the whole of the Counts: his own practice was to point out to the Jury what parts they should strike out in certain cases. That course removes all difficulty. "But why is the verdict to be taken on all the counts, good and bad ? I heard it stated the other day, you have the inconvenience of the Judge forming an opinion on the validity of the counts before he proceeds to pass judgment, unless you take this course. I think this no inconvenience. The Judge ought to take care that the counts are valid, and I think that great good will arise from that practice; and I do not think that great good can arise from those voluminous and unwieldy indictments which are customary. I think that fifty pages of indictment is a great grievance. Most of the per- sons charged in any indictment are in such a line of life that they cannot afford to get a copy of it ; and when the party accused has obtained a copy, the greatest stretch of mind of the most learned person can scarcely find out for days what is the subject-matter of the criminal charge ; and it is quite possible that the pleader who drew the indictment had one view in stating the crime, the Judge who tried the man another view of the crime as stated, the Jury a third, and the Court of Error a fourth. That is, I think, a great mistake in the practice as to indictments. And as to the practice of the Court of Queen's Bench in this country, it is said that when an objection is taken to a par- ticular count, the Court is in the habit of refusing to arrest the judgment on that particular count. Was that the case in the indictment against Mr. Feargus O'Connor ? " No. After argument on one count, it was condemned : Sir Frederick Pollock withdrew another, as verbose and bad in structure ; and judgment was arrested on those two counts. It was said that if the point were allowed, and one count proved to be bad, judgment would be set aside. " So far as the inconvenience goes, it seems to me, that as in the case of damages I have suggested a short and simple mode of getting rid of the whole difficulty, so with regard to several counts in an indictment, the objection may be entirely got over by the Court passing judgment on each count : thus, if found guilty on the first count, the criminal ought to suffer so much, and on the second count being found guilty, he ought to receive such a punishment ; and that whether the count turns out to be good or not, that question to be reserved for the future. That is the proper mode." He proceeded to scrutinize the cases; admitting that they required some explanation, but denying that they bore out the inference put upon them. He should vote against the motion.

Lord CarrErmars admitted the difficulty in which any member of the House was placed in advising their Lordships to come to a conclusion adverse to the opinion of the great majority of the Judges but their opinion was not to bind the House, and he had come to the conclusion that it was wrong. Alluding very briefly to the challenge of the array, he remarked that if the Opinion of the Judges were right, there was no remedy for an acknowledged wrong. But he had not formed his conclusion on that part of the case. He would confine himself to the question of a general judgment founded upon an indictment of which six out of eleven counts were bad, either in the structure or in the finding. The record should be read like any other document, its words receiving only the same construction that they would bear in any other instrument ; and the duty of the House was to see if there was any error in that record. " We find it distinctly stated that the defendants were charged in the indictment with the several offences specified in the several counts ; that the Jury found verdicts of guilty upon all and each of them ; and that each de- fendant, ' for his offences aforesaid,' was sentenced to punishment. Did not the Court below pass sentence upon the offences charged in the first, second, third, fourth, sixth, and seventh counts, as well as upon the offences charged in the others ? The record of that Court tells us that it did ; and if our duty be to see whether there has been any error apparent upon that record, and if we adopt the unanimous opinion of all the Judges that those counts, or the endings upon them, are bad, so that no judgment upon them would be good, how are we to give judgment for the defendant in error, and thereby say that there is no error in the record 2 The answer which has been given to this objection appears to me to be not only unsatisfactory, but wholly inadmissible. It is said we can- not premise that the Court below gave judgment and passed sentence only with reference to those counts as to which, or as to the finding upon which, there was no objection. This would be to presume that which the record negatives. The Court below, by its record, tells us that the sentence upon each defendant was for ' his offences aforesaid.' After enumerating all those which were charged in the indictment, can we assume that this statement is false, and that the sentence was only upon one half of those charged P No authorities have been cited for such a presumption ; and, without referring to the accuracy and strictness required in criminal proceedings, the language of the record, and its natural and obvious meaning, in my opinion, negative it." It was indeed argued, that a Court of Error has only to see that some offence is pro- perly charged, and that a punishment is inflicted in its nature applicable to such offence : hut some punishments, as imprisonment, apply to so large a range of offences, that the restriction of requiring a punishment applicable to the offence is no real limitation. "All the counts in an indictment for mis- demeanour are supposed to apply to different offences. They often do so, and always may. The prosecutor has the option of preferring separate in. dictments for each, or of joining all as one. If he adopt the former course, he must show the indictment right in each to support the sen- tence. If he goes on in one, and one sentence is pronounced upon all the counts, according to the proposition contended for—suppose the sen- tences on all the counts to be bad but one, which may apply to the most insignificant offence of the whole—a Court of Error has, it is said, in such a case no right to interfere ; that is to say, it cannot correct error unless the error be universal, no matter how important the error may be, or how in- significant the part which is right, or what may have been the effect of such error. The proposition will no longer be in nub ° eat erratum, but that the error is not universal." If the different counts of an indictment stated different misdemeanours, and after a verdict of guilty found upon all it was discovered that some of the counts—that is, some of the misdemeanours— must be withdrawn from the consideration of the Court, it could not be sup- posed that the sentence would be the same as if the Court had the duty thrown upon it of punishing all the offences charged. Suppose an indictment for two libels, one slight and one malignant, in different counts; and the count charging the malignant libel bad: is the defendant to suffer the same punish- ment as if he had been found guilty of the malignant libel? The reason given for the rule that judgment will not be arrested in a criminal case, if there be one count good and one bad, assumes that the punishment will be different. In the case of the King versus Benfield, it is said, "The Court wilrgive judgment for the part which is indictable." If the sentence be of a nature to be applicable only to the counts found to be bad, I understand it to be admitted that the judgment must be reversed. In that case it would be clear that the Court has given judgment upon the bad counts as well as upon the good : but what then becomes of the presumption that they rejected the bad counts ? It must be answered, that the presumption in that case is repelled by the record itself; and is it not equally so when the record states that the judgment was upon all the counts, bad as well as good? In seeking for analogies, the rule of rejecting a motion for arrest of judgment if there be one good count has no application ; but the reverse rule in civil cases must govern the present question. The reason why the rule in civil cases does not apply to motions for arrest of judg- ment in criminal cases is, because the Court, having the sentence in its own hands, will give judgment upon the part which is indictable, and the failure of part of the charge will go only to lessening the punishment : but these reasons have no application to writs of error, on which the Court cannot confine the judgment to those parts which are indictable, or lessen it, as the different charges are found to fail. Lord Cottenharn cited several cases, lhence he in- ferred, that in criminal cases the Court ascertains what counts are good or bad, pronounces judgment on those counts only, and judgment is so entered. But in civil cases, if there be one count had and the verdict general, no good judg- ment can be given; because the Court having no power over the damages, or means of apportioning some part of them to one count and some to another, is compelled to consider the whole as bad. It appeared to him that a Court of Error is precisely in the same predicament : it has no more jurisdiction over the question of punishment, and no better means of referring one portion of it to one count and one portion to others, than the civil court has after a general verdict over damages in an action. In both cases the preliminary or inferior jurisdiction has proceeded upon an instrument (the indictment or the declara- tion) found to be in part deficient, and having come to one result upon the whole, which the superior jurisdiction cannot separate or apportion, the same necessity exists in the one case as in the other, of holding the whole to be void. It was urged that much inconvenience would arise from adopting this rule. The inconvenience that might flow from this rule now insisted upon could only be, that the prosecutor would be careful as to the counts on which he would rely : the inconvenience of rejecting it would be, that the defendant might re- ceive sentence for an offence of which he was not legally convicted, a ithout relief—that he would be deprived of his writ of error.

Lord CAMPBELL would strictly confine himself to the questions of Jaw raised by the record.

He hastily glanced at several minor points ; affirming the condemnation of six of the counts, but supporting the fifth as stating a distinct offence—the promotion of hostility among different classes of the Queen's subjects; pro- nouncing the plea in abatement had in form if not in substance ; and generally agreeing with the majority of the Judges as to the continuance of the trial in vacation, the extension of let and 2d Victoria, C. 37, to the Irish Court of Queen's Bench, and the directory nature of the enactment that the names of the witnesses shall be stated as sworn. As to the form of the recognizance. required by the Court "for seven years next ensuing the acknowledgment thereof," he objected, that so vague terms might lead to perpetual imprison- ment, though that was of course not intended: the terms ought to be so framed as to give absolute liberty at the end of a fixed period. Tne most im- portant point in the case was the composition of the Jury. "The facts we must take entirely from the array. It has been truly said that the demurrer to the challenge is not by any means an universal and absolute admission of the truth of the facts there alleged; but we are to take them as true in con- sidering the validity of the challenge. Now, this statement shows most dis- tinctly, that through the designed violation of an act of Parliament the defend- ants were prevented from having a proper Jury. Now, if these facts are true, I consider it quite clear that the defendants ought not to have been tried by a Jury so struck. We have not here a casual omission of names without working any injury ; but we have a positive averment that there was a designed and fraud- ulent omission, and that thereby the defendants were prejudiced. So much they as- sert, and so much they would have been bound to prove if the challenge had been traversed." It might be a question, whether the challenge to the array was the pro- per remedy ; but in transferring the duties of the Sheriff to other officers, the Le- gislature never could have meant that the subject should be left without a re- medy. Be conceived the principle of the common law to be that under such circumstances, upon a challenge to the array, the panel shall he quashed ; and. this principle would equally apply where the panel is framed by new functionaries just as much as when all was left to the Sheriff, although the form of ulterior proceeding would be varied. No other remedy is suggested. It was said by the Judges, that no advantage would accrue by allowing the challenge, because recourse must be had to the same Jury-book: but he took a different view of the duty incumbent on the Court of Queen's Bench, bad the challenge been allowed. The Court, he conceived, would have given redress according to the nature of the grievance. Seeing that the vice lay in the Jurors-book, they would have directed the necessary steps to be taken to have it reformed ; and if this was impossible, and a fair Jury could not be struck by consent, they might have directed the panel to be taken from the Jury-list of the preceding year ; the statute authorizing this step where for the current year no sufficient Jury-list has been framed. He concurred with Mr. Baron Parke, that the judgment was given on the sixth and seventh counts ; and that therefore the judgment was bad. The presumption that the Court below must be taken to have known which counts are good and which are bad, and to have awarded punishment only in respect of tbe good counts, is wholly at variance with the spirit of our jurispru- dence, which supposes the Judges are fallible, and anxiously provides the means of correctin,,a their mistakes, by motions for new trials, bills of exception, writs of error, and appeals ; and would sometimes be a presumption not only con- trary to the record, but contrary to the fact—as in this very case, in which it appears by the reports that all the Judges of the Court of Queen's Bench in Ireland held the sixth and seventh counts of the indictment to be unexception- able, and could not have excluded them from consideration in making out the punishment. There is no authority to support a doctrine so contrary to prin- ciple, as that one good count in an indictment is sufficient notwithstanding bad counts, and that a general judgment cannot be disturbed by a writ of error. Strictly speaking, where only one felony is proved, there ought to he a verdict of guilty only on one count : but in cases of felony it never can be worth the prisoner's while to avail himself of this right ; and the present practice would not be at all affected. In cases of misdemeanour more care might be required in framing indictments and entering up verdicts and judgments; but I have no hesitation in saying that this would be a great improvement in criminal pro- ceedings. According to the present loose system, the framer of an indictment, having got one count good in law, goes on to draw others more and more vague and attenuated, and requiring less and less proof, till be involves the accused in the most perplexing generalities, and there is the greatest difficulty in knowing what is the charge to be repelled. But even if bad counts are inad- vertently introduced, the mischief of them may be easily obviated by taking a verdict of acquittal upon them, by entering a nolle prosequi to them, or by see- ing that the judgment is expressly stated only to be on the good counts, which alone would prevent the had counts from invalidating the judgment upon a writ of error." Respecting the unauthorized findings on the first three counts, on which the Jury had taken such unexampled pains to go wrong, it was admitted that the judgment could not be supported : " but those counts contained the most serious charges, and several—such as conspiracy to excite disaffection in the Army—which are not repeated in any of the good counts on which there is a valid verdict. We cannot resort to the palpably incredible fiction that the Judges, in violation of their duty, did not consider the guilt of the defendants aggravated by the charges in these three counts, and proportionally increase their punishment. I allow the Court of Error is wholly incompetent to in- quire whether discretionary punishment for an offence, of which the defendant is lawfully convicted, is reasonable or excessive; but a Court of Error may and is bound to inquire whether punishment has been inflicted for that which is no offence in point of law, or for offences of which the party has not legally been found guilty." Lord Campbell finished by reminding the House that the appeal was not from the Irish Judges to the English Judges, but to that chamber of the Imperial Parliament.

The LORD CHANCELLOR rose, and in the usual form put the question, "Is it your Lordships' opinion that the judgment of the Court below in this case be reversed? As many of your Lordships as are of that opinion will say ' Content '—as many as are of an opposite opinion will say' Not content.'" Some Peers signified their votes ; but the Lord Chancellor hesitated; for two Lay Lords (Lord Stradbroke and Lord Winchester) voted against the motion ; and there was no declaration of the result. After a pause, the question was again put ; and again Lord Lyndhurst hesitated, apparently because still some Lay Lords voted. Another pause.

Lord WHARNCLIFFE now rose, and said- " My Lords, in this state of things, I cannot help suggesting that your Lord- ships should not divide the House upon this question, as the opinion of the Law

Lords has been already taken upon it. In point of fact, my Lords, this is a con- stitutional court of appeal ; and if noble Lords unlearned ia the law were to decide such questions by their votes, instead of leaving them to the decision of the Law Lords, I fear that the authority of this House as a court of justice would be very greatly lessened throughout the country. Under thre circum- stances, and with these views, I beg leave therefore humbly to suggest that such of your Lordships as have not heard and cannot be supposed to be ac-

quainted with the whole of the reasoning upon this case, and who are there- fore not qualified to form a judgment upon it, should abstain altogether from voting. it would be far better that the character of this House, as a court of appeal and a court of law, should be maintained, even though the opinion of your Lordships should be contrary to that of the Judges, and although it

should prove inconvenient in this particular instance—it would, I say, under such Circumstances, be better to concur in the opinion of the Law Lords, than reverse the judgment of those whose education and station render them best able to decide upon subjects of this nature."

Lord BROCCHAM perfectly agreed in Lord Wharncliffe's opinion and advice.

Lord CAMPBELL also concurred, with some qualification- " With reference to the distinction between Law Lords and Lay Lords, which has been made in speaking of the decision or the judgment, it is one which is not known to the constitution : but, nevertheless, I think that no Lay Lord ought to decide upon a case, all of which he has not heard, and of which he can know comparatively nothing."

The Earl of STRADBROKE said, that he had considered the subject most attentively, and he was desirous of giving an opinion with respect tc it.

The Marquis of CLANRICARDE said, that in case any noble Lord, be-

sides the Law Lords, were to vote, he should reluctantly be obliged to vote also.

The Earl of VERULASS declared that he should retire until the deci- sion was pronounced. He did so, followed by all the Lay Lords, who retreated behind the Woolsack.

The question was a third time put : Lord DENMAN, Lord CorrENHAm, and Lord CAMPBELL answered, " Contest ; " Lord BROUGHAM, " Not content." The LORD CHANCELLOR declared that the vote was carried by the " Contents," and that the decision of the House was that the judg- ment of the Court below in this ease ought to be reversed. [This announce- ment was received with evident approbation by the " strangers" below the bar.] The House proceeded with a number of other appeals, and adjourned about six o'clock.

THE LAST DAY IN THE COMMONS.

The House of Commons met at half-past twelve o'clock on Thursday, merely to be prorogued ; and while waiting for the summons to hear the Prorogation Speech, passed the time with some odds and ends of busi- ness and discussion.

First, Mr. Benbow took the oaths and his seat for Dudley ; and a new 'writ was issued for North Lancashire in the room of Lord Stanley, who had accepted the Chiltern Hundreds.

The Earl of Jermyn, in the Windsor uniform with his wand of office, appeared at the bar, with the Queen's reply to the address of congratu- lation on the birth of a Prince ; in these terms-

" I return you my hearty thanks for this dutiful and loyal address. I re- ceive with satisfaction this new token of your affectionate attachment to me and my family." [A similar reply was made to the Lords.] A few petitions were presented, a few returns ordered, and a few. no- tices given. Mr. THOMAS DUNCOMBE gave notice, that early next ses- sion be would call attention to the unsatisfactory and evasive nature of the report by the Secret Committee on the practice of opening letters at the Post-office, with a motion ; and that he would introduce a bill to repeal the rate-paying clauses of the Reform Act Mr. HAWES gave notice, that, next session, he would call attention to the expediency of establishing a system of Colonial Representation, with the view of se- curing further responsibility in the administration of Colonial affairs, and rendering the union of those dependencies with the Mother-country more intimate and satisfactory.

Sir CHARLES NAPIER questioned Sir Robert Peel on the state of our relations with France. After alluding somewhat indignantly to the bombardment of defenceless Tangier, and to the possession of Mogador island—the town being krase—he asked whether France had made the reparation that Sir Robert Peel had demanded for the gross outrage on the British Consul at Tahiti ; and if not, whether the Navy was to be left in the neglected state it had been in so long?

Sir ROBERT PEEL replied-

" I must state, that her Majesty's Government have no reason to doubt that the assurances they have received relative to the proceedings taken by the French in Morocco and on the African coast will be strictly fulfilled. As to the other events to which the gallant officer has referred, I have to state, that discussions have taken place between this Government and the Government of the King of the French with regard to events the occurrence of which was calculated to disturb the friendly relations between the two countries. I have the satisfaction of stating that those discussions have been brought to an ami- cable and satisfactory termination. (Loud cheers from both sides of the House.) The communications that have passed between the two Governments will, of course, at a future period be laid before this House and the country; and I trust I shall not be pressed at the present time for any further statement on that subject."

Mr. HINDLEY wished to know Sir Robert's opirion of Mr. Pritchard's con- duct ; which had been much maligned.

Sir ROBERT PEEL repeated, that the discussion had been brought to a satisfactory termination—satisfactory to both countries; and he hoped that he should not be pressed for any further statement. When be said " satisfactory " termination, of course he meant one perfectly consistent with the interests and honour of this country.

Mr. DuNccornR recurred to the subject of the writ issued that even- ing: he wished to know whether it in any way affected Lord Stanley's seat in the Cabinet? whether he was still at the head of the Colonial Department?

Sir ROBERT PEEL—" I have great satisfaction in stating, and I hope the honourable gentleman will derive equal satisfaction from learning the fact, that my noble friend's position in the Colonial Department is not in the slightest degree affected by the writ which has been moved for." (Cheers, and a laugh.) Mr. DUNCOMBE testified some annoyance at Sir Robert's facetious manner, and at the laughter elicited by a very proper question ; and he turned to another subject—he would move for copies of the opinion of the Judges and the judgment of the Lords in the case of O'Connell versus the Queen.

With respect to the judgments, he understood that some of them would re- dound greatly to the credit of the noble and learned Lords who delivered them ; one in particular—that of Lord Denman—ought to be laid on the table and printed in letters of gold. (Cheers.) He recollected the vapouring early in the session about bringing "convicted conspirators" to condign punishment : but now it hunt out that the "convicted conspirators" are no conspirators at all; and the" condign punishment" turns out to be one of the grossest cases of false imprisonment ever perpetrated against any individuals. "The whole proceedings were a disgrace to the Government, and particularly to the Home Office, where it is believed they were concocted, and to the Court of Queen's Bench in Dublin, where they were enacted. There appears to be no doubt of that fact whatever. And when I think of all the unfair advantages which the Go- vernment took of Mr. O'Connell and his companions in prison—when I recol- lect their fraudulent Jury-list, the packing of the Jury, the partisanship of the Judge, the employment of spies, and the subornation of reporters-1 rejoice to know that the matter has ended as it ought to end, to the disgrace and de- feat of those gentlemen I now see opposite, the original concoctors of those proceedings, and conspirators against the rights and liberties of the Irish people. I cannot but condemn in the strongest terms the precipitate manner in which the Government have acted in actually imprisoning those gentlemen for three months. I have called the case one of the grossest instances of false imprisonment : from the beginning to the end it has disclosed a vindictive feeling on the part of the Government, and party malice against individuals." What reparation was to be made to the Irish people for the gross insult offered to their leaders ? ".

Mr. OTWAY CAVE seconded the motion ; rather deprecating, but imitating, Mr. Dancombe's strong language.

" When the right Numerable Baronet, after having tried packed Juries and partisan Judges, and an Attorney-General who set an example of taking the law into his own hands, likely to be too well followed by a peasantry apt to admire the ' wild justice of revenge '—if, after having tried these and other things but too well known to all who have to do with Ireland, instead of attempting to take a more conciliatory line of policy, he should still persevere in the course indicated by this prosecution, I will tell him and the English people, that (though it is not yet utterly impossible he may conciliate) he wilL never reconquer Ireland."

Sir ROBERT PEEL was reluctant to enter upon a discussion that might be interrupted before he had finished his observations ; but at proper opportunities he should be prepared to vindicate the conduct of Government.

Mr. Duncombe seemed to forget that seven out of nine of the English. Judges affirmed the decision of the Court below. As to the accusations about packing Juries, he would not by them be provoked into any partial discussion of the subject ; but be utterly and emphatically denied the charges implied in the harsh language used. He had no objection to the motion; and the papers should be produced as soon as possible—now, if there were time to send a mes- sage to the Lords.

Lord Jolts RUSSEII. said a few words ; repeating his former opinion; that Mr. O'Connell had not had in Ireland a trial which could give an impression of fairness and justice.

" lf Government had appealed only to law, and bad given the defendant the full benefit of the trial by jury as administered in this country, no ones could have complained of their prosecution, whatever the result. But I think, that it was not a trial by a fair Jury, but by a Jury elaborately put forward for the purpose of conviction, charged by a Judge who did not allow any evidence or any considerations in favour of the accused to go to them, but who charged more violently than the Attorney-General had accused, and who there- fore fore prevented justice being done. I trust the effect altogether will be that the recurrence of such trials will be prevented, and that the people of Ireland may feel that they have still the benefit of English institutions—if not in their own country, at least in this ; that they will see that there is in the highest quarters in this country, and among those of the highest attainments, a determination to do what they conceive to be justice, on the principle that all the subjects of the United Kingdom should enjoy those inestimable pri- vileges of which we as Englishmen have so long been in the possession."

Sir THOMAS WILDE agreed as to the inconvenience of at present dis- cussing the judgment delivered in the House of Lords ; but was pro- ceeding to say "one word as to the effects of the decision on the laws and liberties of this country "; when The Black Rod entered, and summoned the Commons to the House of Lords.

CLOSE OF THE SESSION.

Shortly after one o'clock, the Lords Commissioners—the Lord Chair cello; Lord Wharncliffe, the Duke of Baccleuch, the Duke of Welling- ton, Earl Delawarr, and the Earl of Dalhousie—took their seats at the foot of the Throne. As it was known that the Queen would not prorogue Parliament in person, there was little bustle. The Duke of Cambridge and Prince William of Prussia sat near the Throne ; and a few Mies were on the back benches of the Opposition side ; but the spectators were not numerous in any part of the House.

The Commons having been conducted to the bar, the Royal assent was given to several bills,—namely, the Joint Stock Companies Registration and Regulation Bill, the Joint Stock Companies Remedies at Law and in Equity Bill, the Joint Stock Banks Regulation Bill, the Art Unions Bill, the Merchant-Seamen Bill, the Law Courts (Ireland) Bill, and the Fisheries (Ireland) Bill.

The LORD CHANCELLOR then read the following speech-

" My Lords and Gentlemen—We are commanded by her Majesty, in re- lieving you from farther attendance in Parliament, to express to you the warn' acknowledgements of her Majesty for the zeal and assiduity with which you have applied yourselves to the discharge of your public duties during a labortotte and protracted session. "The result has been the completion of many legislative measures calculated to improve the administration of the law and to promote the public welfare. " Her Majesty has given her cordial assent to the bill which you presented to her Majesty for regulating the issue of bank-notes, and for conferring certain privileges upon the Bank of England for a limited period. Her Majesty trusts that these measures will tend to place the pecuniary transactions of the country upon a sounder basis, without imposing any inconvenient restrictions on com- mercial credit or enterprise. "We are directed to inform you that her Majesty continues to receive from her Allies, and from all Foreign Powers, assurances of their friendly disposition. " Her Majesty has recently been engaged in discussions with the Govern- ment of the King of the French, on events calculated to interrupt the good un- derstanding and friendly relations between this country and France. You will rejoice to leach, that by the spirit of justice and moderation which has animate& the two Governments, this danger has been happily averted. "Gentlemen of the House of Commons—We are commanded by her Ma- jesty to thank you for the readiness with which you voted the Supplies for the service of the year. " Her Majesty has observed with the utmost satisfaction, that by the COMM to which you have steadily adhered in maintaining inviolate the public faith, and inspiring a just confidence in the stability of the national resources, you have been enabled to make a considerable reduction in the annual charge on account of the interest of the National Debt.

"My Lords and Gentlemen—Her Majesty desires us to congratulate you on the improvement which has taken place in the condition of our manufactures and commerce ; and on the prospect that, through the bounty of Divine Provi- dence, we shall enjoy the blessing of an abundant harvest. "Her Majesty rejoices in the belief, that on your return to your several dis- tricts, you will find generally prevailing throughout the country a spirit of loyalty and cheerful obedience to the law. "Her Majesty is confident that these dispositions, so important to the peace- ful development of our resources and to our national strength, will be con- firmed and encouraged by your presence and example. "We are commanded by her Majesty to assure you, that when you shall be called upon to resume the discharge of your Parliamentary functions, you may place entire reliance on the cordial cobperation of her Majesty in your endea- vours to improve the social condition and to promote the happiness and con- tentment of her people."

The commission for proroguing Parliament was read ; and the Loan CHANCELLOR declared Parliament to be prorogued to Thursday the 10th October next.