COLONEL J. HAY MACDONALD'S METHOD OF INFANTRY ATTACK.
[TO THE EDITOR OF THE "SPECTATOR.")
Sin,—In the recently-issued number of the "Journal of the Royal United Service Institution," the very interesting paper read on February 11th by Colonel J. H. Macdonald, of the City of Edinburgh Rifle Volunteers, together with a report of the dis- cussion which followed, are at last published.
The expression by a military officer of an unfavourable opinion respecting regulations promulgated by the Horse Guards Autho- rities is always felt to be ungracious, and is often stigmatised as presumptuous. Nevertheless, two distinguished Generals have not hesitated to state publicly, in very decided language, that they consider the existing regulations for the attack of infantry erroneous in principle, and likely, if carried out in presence of an enemy, to produce very mischievous, perhaps very disastrous, effects. General McMurdo is reported to have said, "I do not approve of a principle of attack which culminates in confusion, even if we are successful, and which might end in disaster, if we are not successful." The opinion pronounced by Lieutenant- General Sir Garnet Wolseley was not less explicit. He said :— " I think of all the great mistakes which can be possibly made in tactical formations, the greatest is to send out a captain and to tell him to look after a company of 100 or 125 men, extending over 150 or 200 yards The drill-book, as nowpublished, recommends to the officers of the Army a system which, I believe, it would be impossible to carry out in the field." These opinions may be just or they may be mistaken, but let no one say that the words spoken were not opportune. They represent ideas almost uni- versally prevalent among officers of all ranks, and when officers distrust the expediency of orders they are bound to obey, he who makes known that distrust to the military authorities, and dis- tinctly states its reasons, renders to them a very useful, though it may be a thankless and somewhat invidious, service.
As regards Colonel Macdonald's method, the result of the dis- cussion was to point out that the order of formation was too close to be safely carried out under fire. In an appendix which has been added to his paper, Colonel Macdonald has recognised the justice of this criticism ; by a simple, but very ingenious, modi- fication, quite consistent with the general principles of his method, he has converted the four-deep formation originally proposed into a six-deep formation, and has increased the intervals between the files of the first and second (i.e., of the attacking and supporting)
lines from one to three paces, which is precisely the interval pre- scribed by existing regulations. Thus modified, Colonel Mac- donald's system complies with conditions which have hitherto been deemed incompatible, and secures every advantage which theory points out as desirable, for first., whether the company be large or small, whether it consists of 50 or of 250 men, the system provides sufficient intervals between its files without increasing the extent of its front by a single pace, and second, the system arranges that the reserves for closing these intervals shall be the very men with- drawn from them, so that the processes of reinforcing the attack- ing line and of reconstructing the companies of which it is com- posed are absolutely identical. Nothing can be simpler than the
means by which these hitherto undreamed-of tactical marvels are accomplished. A company, say, of 100 men, having formed four deep, and the men of the 1st and 2nd ranks having been told off right, left receives the command, "Advance in order of attack." At this command, No. 1 rank moves to the front, and the left numbers, having been instructed to double in rear of the right num- bers, form a line of 121 files, with intervals of 72 inches (or 3 paces) between them, and therefore exactly 33 yards in extent; No. 2 rank follows in support, in the same formation ; and in reserve directly in rear of No. 2, come Nos. 3 and 4 ranks, each consisting of 25 men, with intervals of 24 inches (one pace) between them. At the command "reinforce," No. 2 rank doubles to the front, and each man forms in his proper place in the intervals between the men of No. 1, and thus the front rank of the company is exactly recon- structed. Similarly the rear rank is reconstructed by Nos. 3 and 4 ranks doubling to the front, and by the men of No. 4 rank stepping up into their proper places between the men of No. 3 rank. The advance of the reserve, therefore, completes the concentration of the company in its normal formation of two ranks at close order, ready for a final rush and bayonet struggle.
Contrast the compactness and order of this simple method of
concentration and reconstruction with the diffusion and confusion of the complicated process of dispersion and disorganisation pre- scribed by regulation. Each company of the first or attacking line is extended in a single rank, with intervals of two paces between the men ; when the company consists of 100 men, it will there- fore form a line 132 yards in extent. The second, or supporting line, consists of another company, formed in two ranks, with in- tervals of two paces between the files. The third, or reserve line, consists of two companies, formed in close order in line or column.
At the command "reinforce," the supporting company doubles
to the front, extends to rank entire, and the men form up in the intervals between the men of the attacking line ; the two com- panies in the reserve line also extend, form rank entire, and close on the two intermixed companies in front of them; thus, when these complicated arrangements for the final charge are com- pleted, the result is a front rank consisting of two inextri- cably confused and intermingled companies, each diffused over a line 132 yards in extent, and a rear rank, consisting of two companies, formed rank entire on the same alignment. Dividing the whole line laterally into groups of four files, each group would contain men belonging to three different com- panies. It will be asked, I will not say, what is the advan- tage, but what is the object of this singularly contrived arrange- ment? The following was the explanation given in a semi-official communication from the Adjutant-General's Department to a General officer, who pointed out the disastrous confusion likely to be the result of a system constructed in complete dikegard of the first principle of military action,—" Keep your men together." This officer was informed that confusion being an inevitable con- dition of warfare, it was thought desirable that parade movements should be so arranged as to result in confusion.*
To estimate correctly the merit of this method of attack, and the degree of ingenuity shown by those officers who devised it, we must therefore, I suppose, consider the system prescribed by the Drill Book as the result of an attempt to devise a formation which should combine the extreme limits of diffusion with the utmost possible amount of disorganisation.-1 am, Sir, &c., A. C. R.
* *Let it not be supposed that I do not recognise the great utility, or rather, I should say, the absolute necessity of exercising troops during thee of peace under as nearly as possible the same conditions as those which In time of war produce not necessarily confusion, if the troops be of good quality and well trained, but certainly broken ranks and a disordered formation. That is to say, I recognise the necessity of training troops to keep up a heavy fire while moving rapidly in order of attack over 1,500 or 2,000 yards of broken ground, and also of causing a con- siderable proportion of the men of each company to fall to the rear, so as to Imitate the gaps in the ranks caused by the enemy's fire; but most assuredly I fail to perceive the advantage of establishing by regulation a formation destructive of organisation and cohesion, and inconsistent with unity of effort. Such an expe- dient for creating artificial confusion on the drill-ground would, on the field of battle, be transformed into that impotent disorganisation which results in disaster and ruin."
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