Too Late to Hedge
By T. R. NI. CREIGHTON
WHY. when delay is so dangerous, does Butler hedge? This was the question I heard most often from liberal Europeans and, sometimes in less polite language, from the leaders and followers of the main African political parties during a recent tour of the Rhodesias. The days of white supremacy are evidently numbered. Not only Nyasaland, but Northern and Southern Rhodesia will soon be governed by a majority of the population, which means an African majority. Federation as we have known it is a political impossibility. The Only open question is whether these changes Come about peacefully, as they still can, or through European obstinacy being met by African violence and leaving only run-down economies, embittered race relations and ex- hausted countries for the new governments to build on. Europeans stand to suffer as much as anyone else from a destructive transition.
Why has Mr. Butler allowed the dangers to mount during precious months by sending out advisers to answer questions to which everyone already dy knew the answers? Will the British Government act now that they have been given Yet again? Unless ft ceases expecting Central African developments to wait upon a timetable dictated by Commonwealth, European and above all British politics, and treats Central Africa as a top priority, it may be confronted with a de- structive situation there which may well (as France found in Algeria) knock all its other Policies sideways. If it can assert itself quickly, recognising how few and disunited the 'ultras' are, how reasonable and conciliatory the Africans and how expectantly rudderless most Europeans, nothing of the sort need arise. An Algerian situation can be produced only by British ignorance. There are types of colonial situation where procrastination and the appoint- Ment of protracted commissions give feelings time to settle down. (Uganda has been a case in Point.) Central Africa is not one of them. Feel- Ings will not abate in the present situation; but if n can quickly be changed, most of the necessary conditions for an easy move to majority govern- ment exist in Northern Rhodesia and more than have ever existed in the past or can be hoped for again in Southern. Even if this were not so, it would be fruitless pausing to consider whether either country is 'ready for self-government.'
There conies a time when the majority's resent- Tent of minority rule, of having all the important decisions taken by someone else, of the intoler- able situation it calls oppression, can no longer be contained. To resist by force can only lead to a progressive deterioration of the position and the of both sides. This point has been reached ached in the Rhodesias. Delay can only render rem less ready than they are now. The gradualist temper rests on a complete misreading of the Africans and politically conscious unity of the and ignorance of what, in the past, they have had to put up with. Sir Edgar Whitehead's pc icY of 'preparing' them for self-government (wh Ich he concedes is inevitable in a few years)
by still more oppressive security laws to hold them down and hamstring their leaders mean- while is an admission of this. Delay can only dis- credit their present sane and eminently reasonable leaders, because they will have failed to deliver what their followers urgently and justifiably want, and replace them by wilder men. Gradualism is the seedbed of insurrection and violence, not of reconciliation, because of the continued affront it offers to the self-respect of the majority.
What, in this situation, is Britain to do? It is a pity that Mr. Butler did not decide months ago to change the racial clauses in the Northern Rhodesian constitution, which make it no more than an artificial gadget for preventing the ex- pression of the majority will. Now there is no alternative to holding the October elections in accordance with it. In accepting its almost im- possible conditions Mr. Kaunda and UNIP are not acting from weakness nor banking, on a cer- tainty but accepting a most hazardous risk in the hope of avoiding another clash. The wish of the majority is clear but the outcome of the elections utterly unpredictable. if by chance they produce a stable government founded on a UNIP-Liberal coalition (which is the most that can be hoped) the way ahead will be safe if difficult. Most of the Europeans will accept it with relief and the only dissentients, the terri- torial UFP and Mr. Nkumbula's Congress, are too weak to challenge it. But if, as is quite as likely, there is no clear result at all, if many of the crucial 'national' seats are frustrated by its racial provisions, Britain must be ready to scrap the whole thing and introduce a popular constitution and popular elections at once; for the only alternative would be destruction and violence. It would bring a touch of reality into an at present unreal election, in which a small number of Europeans has the power to frustrate the whole affair, if Britain were to announce this intention in advance.
In Southern Rhodesia a wide extension of the franchise to Africans before the elections next year is essential to peace. The present constitu- tion, awarding fifteen seats to three million Africans and forty-five to 200,000 Europeans, is not the progressive measure it is supposed to lust whose side are you on,. Stacey? be but a means of offering Africans the illusion without the reality of political influence and is unacceptable to them. They arc demanding uni- versal suffrage. but would probably even now compound for something like parity provided Britain gave up the pretence that she must respect the traditional independence of the local settlers. She has the powers to initiate a change and the means of pressure to enforce it if she can find the courage and firmness to do so. (Margery Perham's letter in the Times of August 30, calling for the appointment of a British Com- missioner to tide over the difficult years ahead, indicates authoritatively how this should be done.) If she cannot, the forthcoming election will mean nothing, having taken place without African participation, and the next year or two will hold nothing but dissidence and strife.
British intervention. if it is firm, will not be resisted by the European population. The most striking change in Central Africa is their general acceptance of the principle of African majority rule in a short time. It has not come about by a change of heart, but been borne in by the pres- sure of outside events and the severe economic slump at home caused by continued political in-
stability. They view the prospect certainly with little enthusiasm but, like a man who knows he must undergo a major operation as the only remedy for a serious complaint, would accept the services of a kindly surgeon to lead them firmly to the operating theatre and prevent their timorously postponing the operation till later when, as they know in their hearts, the disease will have got worse. Even if such generalisations about a whole community cannot be universally true, the Rhodesia Front and its predecessor the Dominion Party, instead of being the rallying- points they looked like three years ago appear as a lunatic fringe with diminishing support.
If Britain were prepared to set matters right in the Rhodesias, what would be the reaction of the Federal Government? To do so would, by implication, be to dissolve the Federation. But there has always been a settlement with Sir Roy Welensky somewhere ahead for the British Government, and it has been sidestepped too often. No amount of evasion or appeasement can disguise the fact that his form of Federation has no popular support and is an anachronism. No amount of either bluster or charm from Sir Roy can conceal that it is doomed. If Britain made it perfectly clear any resistance would be regarded as insurrection and treason, there would be less to fear than there has ever been before. Sir Roy's credit has diminished, and his colla- borators are dispirited by the events of the last year. The European public is tired of the Federal struggle and of a Federation which has brought in both countries few of the benefits it promised and many unforeseen troubles. The prospects of successful resistance are negligible —of any resistance at all, minute. And delay does nothing to make them less. Any risk there is had better be faced. 'I he Federal Government's negotiations with Mr. Tshombe, the alleged com- plicity with them both of Mr. Nkumbula in Northern Rhodesia and other measures in pro- gress to strengthen the forces of illiberalism are not intended to make the situation easier. The auguries for firm British action will never be as good as they are now.
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