TOPICS OF THE DAY.
DIRECTION OF THE EUROPEAN WAR.
IT is scarcely a question any longer of peace or war—war must come, unless some very unexpected change should take place in Europe; but an ulterior question remains, of the utmost import- ance both to the fortunes of Europe and to the immediate inte- rests of this country—the direction that the war may take. That the war should find its active field in certain quarters ra- ther than in others, is a matter that more nearly concerns us than it did when we touched upon the subject some two years ago. We need not particularize the quarters in which war would be specially inconvenient. Moreover, the direction is a matter not altogether beyond our own control. Our statesmen in power, if they see their opportunity and have the will and tact to use it, can help in turning the course of warfare away from injurious directions political and geographical. No doubt, such an effect is not to be produced by any blind observance of the dogma of positive nonintervention. Nor yet is it necessary that our Government should make or meddle, dictate or subsidize. The immense material power which this country possesses in reserve lends so much force and weight to our moral influence, that a merely negative or per- missive intervention would suffice to turn the current of affairs. Only, to comprehend the case effectively, our statesmen should relinquish the puerile fashion of ignoring whatever lies beyond the pale of existing treaties however obsolete, and should learn to scan present affairs by their living merits. It were wise, practical, and beneficent statesmanship, to do so. The existing, we might almost say the late treaty system of Europe, has been broken up, mainly by two influences,—by the breaches which Austria, Prussia, and Russia made ; by the fact that events have outgrown the provisions of the treaties. They have lost their virtue and utility. Lord Aberdeen has spoken as if this country were bound to maintain the old status quo in Lombardy ; and Lord Lansdowne seemed to feel it incumbent on him to admit such a responsibility. The assumption is an anachronism in point of time, a gratuitous concession in point of moral obligation, a practical injustice in re- spect to the actual merits of the case, and a mistake in the policy which we are considering. If present calculations are to be trusted, the dominion of Austria in Italy is no longer practicable, and was not so innocent as her friends would have us believe. Austria was not quite so enlightened in her despotism as she affected to be. She resisted the endeavours of intelligent Italians to promote the material welfare of their country : she impeded the early efforts to promote a purely commercial league ; she obstructed the formation of the great Italian railroad. When the commercial league was first broached, Austria formed a counter- league with the smaller dutchies ; under the pretext of an alliance with those insignificant states, reciprocally offensive and defensive, she obtained the right to throw all her forces in to the dutchies, and so cut off the communications between the native states that sought to form the league. She thus gave an impulse not only to the national feeling against her alien rule, but to the discontent with the Governments that submitted to her dictation. Her presence in Italy kept alive reactionary in- fluences and hopes even in the reconstituted states—especially Naples ; whose Monanch was naturally suspected of contemplating the paltry game played by Ferdinand and his son in 1821. Charles Albert is blamed for entering Lombardy ; and he is ex- cused on the plea that his subjects compelled him. He was com- pelled by other motives : he entered Lombardy, not only by invi- tation of the Milanese, but to defend Monarchy in Italy : it was only by taking the lead in the national movement against Austria that Italian Monarchy vindicated its own existence. Had Charles Albert refused the application from Milan, Milan repudiating Austrian sway, must have declared itself a Republic ; Florence would then scarely have resisted the example and its appeal to her Own traditions; and France would have had inconvenient emula- tors in Italy—perhaps also in more countries. The other Prin- ces of Italy have felt the same compulsion with Charles Albert ; and troops from Tuscany and Rome impart to the Anti-Austrian movement the aspect, not of a Piedmontese encroachment, but of an Italian movement. It is so. Austria will probably resist, and there may be war in the plains of Lombardy. It is a site not near enough to injure us, not too remote to evoke the energies of Italy and fructify in her regeneration. The success of Italy will be a gain to Europe. There will be contest in Germany. Jealousies between the states already appear, and threaten evil to the people—unless they find vent against a common enemy. Russia will probably sup- port Denmark against Prussia. Frederick William, with the rashness pertaining to a "provisional government," such as he now is, went too far in his promise to abet Schleswig-Holstein. But if Russia warred upon him, it would only be to enter Ger- many through Schleswig-Holstein, and to war upon German nationality and freedom. Russia is the natural foe to freedom; it is her policy to sap the nationality of her conterminous neigh- bours, that she may continue her encroachments. It is the policy of Germany, of Europe, to provide safer work for this common foe. Poland offers that piece de resistance. France is preparing all increased army, not knowing how to dispose of her restless Citizens. To concentrate a strong allied arm in Poland, would bate raise up a barrier for the.efeuce of shelter be- hind which the "tree of liberty" would grow unnipped by the ice-blasts of the North. England might have diplomatic influ- ence enough to hinder such a concentration of allied forces: she would mistake both policy and humanity if she acted so.
Austria detests her patron-ally Russia—the giant that, like the cannibal in the Arabian Nights, nurtures her to devour her. Austria purchases present protection at the cost of future de- struction. Nevertheless, she will probably try hard for her Ita- lian provinces, and may appeal to those treaty alliances which Lord Aberdeen would have England uphold. It would be much more fortunate for England, and for Europe, if Austria were to forget those alliances; to resist, not invite Russia ; to abet, not refuse the restitution of Poland; to facilitate, not impede the re- organization of Europe ; and to seek her compensation through independence of Russia and renewed influence on the lower banks of the river that flows by her capital.
In the oscillating balance of tottering empires and wavering purpose, England, for the advantage of her own interests and of mankind, without active intervention—without outlay of mil- lions—without responsibility—might direct the course of warfare. A simply permissive act would carry, by adventurous English. men, the moral aid of England to the great Italian people newly reappearing among the powers of Europe; and it would send a great French army to aid, as allies, not enemies of Germany, in restoring Poland to be a vanguard for the civilization of the world.
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