OFFICIALISM. T HERE is a general disposition to undervalue in- terested
evidence. Because a man speaks with a bias, it is often assumed that he has no claim to be listened to. People forget that speaking with a bias and speaking with knowledge are very commonly inseparable ; that if you insist upon absolute impartiality, you must be content to forego all intimate acquaintance with the subject. The Report on the spread of officialism, which a special committee has just presented to the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, is an example of this combina- tion. It is natural that solicitors should object to see their occupation taken away from them by a constantly in- creasing army of Government servants, and natural that they should look at the work of these Government ser- vants with a severely critical eye. This is a reason, of course, for making due allowance for professional feeling ; but it is certainly not a reason for altogether disregarding what the Committee has to say. After all, the solicitors, as a profession, have just that practical experience which enables them to form an opinion on the working of the official system. They are familiar with the work, because it is work which formerly would have been entrusted to solicitors. They know what are the qualifications it demands, and what are the tests of good workmanship. If we reject their testimony, we shall be no better- off. than before. We shall have to rely exclusively on the evidence of the officials concerned,—upon evidence, that is, which is equally prejudiced with that we have insisted on putting aside. The wise course is to welcome information as to the facts, no matter from what source it is derived, and to make the proper allowance for disturbing influences.
The Committee begin by laying down a principle which no longer secures universal recognition. " The interference of the State with the private business of the public ought," the Report says, " to be confined to the narrowest limits compatible with the public interest." If this principle is lost sight of, private enterprise must in the end be stifled by State competition; and as the officials to whom the work is transferred are themselves protected against com- petition and secured in the possession of their salaries, they " have no great personal inducement to maintain a high standard of efficiency." The success of the opposi- tion to the growth of officialism will depend entirely on the extent to which this last statement can be made good. It is true, indeed, that Government competition bears with especial harshness on solicitors. They see themselves deprived of a livelihood, and taxed for the support of the officials who have displaced them. But hard as their case may be, the public will pay no heed to it if they are satis- fied with the work the officials do. If it answers our purpose better to employ officials than to employ solicitors, we shall more and more give the preference to those whom we find most useful. The plea of the solicitors, so far as it is framed solely in their own interest, is a Protectionist plea. The public are asked to forego the officials they presumably prefer in order to protect a par- ticular industry with which they are quite willing to dis- pense. But the argument from official incompetence is one of real weight, because it is quite possible for the community to find itself saddled against its will with an army of Government servants which it is very difficult to get rid of. Official people naturally think that official work is the best work, and as it mostly rests with them to draft Acts of Parliament, they naturally place the execu- tion of these Acts in official hands. We are yet a long way from the state of things in which one-half of the nation will be salaried and pensioned to watch over and regulate the other half ; but, undoubtedly, every year brings us a little nearer to its realisation, and it would be well if, before we go any further, we could arrive at some intelligible theory as to the proper limits of State action. As a contribution to this result, the Report of the Incor- porated Law Society's Committee is of real value. One important and far-reaching distinction between the objects of State action at once suggests itself. State action may be directed towards securing the due execntion of laws made for the protection of classes or iadividuals. This is the explanation of the constantly growing number of inspectors of all sorts, and so far as we see, it is not possible to place any check upon their multi- plication, unless we are to give up passing protective-laws. The very necessity that exists for passing them involves, if they are to be of any use, the provision of some machinery to ensure that they are carried out. We prohibit the employment of children for more than a certain number of hours in the day, or we insist that a workshop shall satisfy certain conditions in the way of ventilation or drainage. How are we to make certain that these provisions will be attended to ? The employer has no interest in this being done, for it means additional trouble, if not additional outlay. The parents have no interest in its being done, for it means either unwillingness to employ their children or a disposition to pay them lower wages. The children themselves feel no interest in its being done, for they will not be the better for it in any way that they care for. How is it possible, then, to enforce the law, except by appointing inspectors to see that it is carried out ? This, however, is not the kind of State action that the Incorporated Law Society deprecates. What the Report deals with is the tendency to undertake more and more "official conduct of or interference in private business." The registration of charges on land ; the clause in the Agricultural Holdings Act of 1892, which makes it compulsory on every County Council to register land bought under the Act in a London office ; the compulsory provisional liquidatorship of all limited companies ordered to be wound up; the obstacles thrown in the way of creditors who wish to make private arrangements with their debtors ; the proposal, which is very much in the air, to appoint a. public trustee and executor, are instances of this tendency. It is obvious that there is all the difference in the world between these two forms of State action. In the one case, the State intervenes to insure the fulfilment of its own wishes, as embodied in an Act of Parliament. In the other case, the State intervenes to do for individual citizens what they are quite capable of doing for them- selves. Both forms may be useful ; but the second form is not shown to be useful by proving that the first is useful. The contention of the Incorporated Law Society is, that there is no sufficient evidence of any public demand for this increased official activity ; on the contrary, they say, "the parties interested are desirous, as they have always been, of managing and controlling their own affairs." But the persons directly interested in supporting and extending the system " have by virtue of their position special means of access to the great officers of the State and to the Legis- lature," and thus are able to get statutes shaped in the way they like. We agree with the authors of the Report that it is very desirable that this process should not be suffered to go on unnoticed. It may be a good thing or a bad thing for the State to manage the affairs of its sub- jects; but it can be only a bad thing for the State to manage them more and more without its subjects realising what is going on. We are inclined to think that one result of the fuller consideration of this subject would be the setting-up of a distinction between various forms of intervention, even in private business. When the community can get what they want done by paying for it, we know of no reason why they should pay an official rather than a solicitor,—who will probably do the work better, and certainly do it with more regard to the wishes of his client. But there are some services which are not paid for, though they may involve much trouble and responsibility to those who perform them, and much risk of loss to those on whose behalf they are performed. Trusteeships are an example of such services. Long custom has made it difficult to refuse to be a trustee, while every day's ex- perience shows that many of those who consent are wholly unfit for the office. We would not make the appointment of official trustees obligatory ; but the arguments of the Incorporated Law Society's Committee have not convinced us that it would not be a very convenient arrangement if there were an official trustee to whom the public could confide trust-funds.
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