TOPICS OF THE DAY.
" PER MARE, PER TERRAS, PER COELUM."
".1:111Y sea, by land, by air." The past week, in spite of 1, the air raids, has not been one of capital events in any of the theatres of war, or in any of the three elements in which men are now fighting. That makes it an opportune moment for taking stock of the situation. What urges us specially to such stock-taking is the very general and, we do not doubt, well-founded feeling that we are on the edge of great events, or, perhaps it would be more accurate to say, on the edge of movements which must produce great actions by sea, land, and air. We will take the sea first. Here the moral pressure which the force of circumstances is exercising on Germany to do something becomes stronger and stronger. The old tag that the man who dies a millionaire dies disgraced, because he has not used his " talent" to the best advantage, applies with equal force to a State which is beaten with her sea force still extant, and therefore unemployed. It is unthinkable that the war can end without Germany having tried to use her sea power. She cannot wholly forget the fate of the man who wrapped his talent :n the napkin. The notion of keeping back something to bargain with is, as we have often pointed out in these columns, r:diculous. A cheque- book is of no value to a man whose balance at the bank has been sequestrated by an order of the Court. When that has happened he can only impotently regret that he did not attempt to stave off ruin by using it before it was too late. What no doubt troubles the Gerinans just now is how best to use the sea force at their command. Two ways present themselves. One is to use their ships boldly in order to obtain the complete local control of the Baltic. By doing this, even though it involves considerable risks owing to the necessity of bringing the Russian Fleet to action, they would, if successful, acquire certain great advantages. They would be able to take Joint naval and military action against Riga and other positions on the Baltic. They might, and no doubt would, lose a good many ships while destroying the Russian Fleet ; but, after all, warships are built to fight, and not to float on the placid surface of the Kiel Canal or to paddle about inshore waters. The other alternative is for the Germans to accept the status quo in the Baltic, and to go on using their ships in what we may call "decoy duck" enter- prises in the North Sea after the manner of their more recent operations. By "decoy duck" enterprises we mean series of evolutions intended to entice our Grand Fleet into a position of danger, and then deal it a blow which might for some time immensely reduce the efficiency of our command of the sea, and possibly open the way for a military raid. The Germans' scheme has always been to induce a considerable British naval contingent to give them battle in some place previously sewn with mines and also prepared for submarine action. If (a very large "if ") a British squadron could be thus caught in the toils, it is calculated that rescuing squadrons would have to be sent into action by us seriatim. Through these tactics, supplemented by a a fleet of Zeppelins acting with the bulk of the German battle-fleet, a really great coup might, it is believed, be achieved. The answer is, of course : • In vain the net is spread in the sight of any bird." Our naval commanders fully realize the nature of the German plans, and also are fully determined to avoid them. They have, indeed, been successfully avoiding them during the past eight or nine months, and there is no reason to suppose that they will be less successful in the months to come. In a word, these elaborate and highly complicated plans for combining secret minefields, concealed submarine flotillas, battleships, and Zeppelin squadrons have been tried and have failed. And this has not been due to special ill-luck, but in the last resort to want of power. No matter how clever the cooking, you cannot give a really satisfactory banquet if you are hopelessly short of food-stuffs.
The only real chance for the Germans to make a big naval coup is for them to run enormous risks, and especially risks to their aircraft. It is just conceivable that if they were to resolve that their Zeppelins, backed up by their battleship squadrons, should attack the Grand Fleet in force, and should not break off the attack until they had either destroyed our ships or been themselves destroyed, they might accomplish great things. They will never accomplish anything worth accomplishing by means of half-measures. In all probability, however, if they tried for the big stake, they would be first destroyed themselves. The kind of action we are suggesting could only be carried on by the Zeppelins offering themselves as targets for our naval anti-aircraft guns. - "We do not, of course, suggest for a moment that the Germans are cowardly in not trying to play a big, bold game. We merely point our that, things being as they are, they must either try a forlorn hope, or be content to admit that all their preparations for a naval battle on the offensive side must be written off as Use- less. So much for sea matters looked at from the German point of view. If the naval situation is considered from our side, the freedom of handling which we can allow ourselves in dealing with German prospects is forbidden. Although our naval authorities are clearly not going to play the German game by letting themselves be drawn into a naval decoy, there ob- viously remains a considerable field of action not yet covered. As our recent action off the island of Sylt slowed, the riddle of the sands" still offers many interesting solutions.
In reviewing the land situation, our first thoughts this week necessarily turn to the Mesopotamian campaign and the gallant efforts for the relief of Kut. At the close of last week and the beginning of this, the position of General Townshend's force caught in the loop of the river at Kut was the cause of grave public anxiety. On Thursday, however, came the welcome news that the relieving force had made an excellent beginning by carrying the very strong Turkish position at Umm-el-Hannah, on the left bank of the river. A few days, or more probably a few hours, will show whether we have been able to make good this success, or whether the Turks, as So often happens in this type of fighting, have fallen back to stronger positions. We have to write, and of course quite rightly, without knowing the facts, but we should guess that a great deal depends not merely upon the fortress but also upon whether we have sufficient and suitable river-craft to support our advance on land. If we have, our local command of the water should prove of the greatest service. It must be remembered, however, that the Tigris, like all Eastern rivers, looks much more useful on the map than it is in reality.
Sandbanks, eddying currents, constant turns almost at right angles make Asian river navigation a veritable nightmare for those who have to undertake it. Speaking generally, though we realize the great dangers and difficulties of the situation, we find no small consolation in the thought that soldiers of British race and soldiers led by British officers are always at their best in operations such as we have to carry out in and around Kut—i.e., the double operation of holding a fortress to the very last moment, and of pressing on the relief in spite of difficulties raised well-nigh to the point of impossibilities. If active valour on the one side and stubborn- ness on the other can achieve victory, they will achieve it on the Tigris. If they prove unavailing, then the nation must, make up its mind to endure its loss with dignity and without recrimination. Nothing could be worse than an unseemly attempt to distribute the blame of failure in the face of the enemy. To say this is not, of course, to urge that no conse- quences should follow from the blunders which have been committed. The time for distributing censure, however, is not during a war, but when all the facts are known. Mean- while General Townshend has not surrendered, and for ourselves we do not believe that he will surrender. Not merely our hope but our instinctive belief is that in our next issue we shall be able to chronicle either the actual relief of Kut or else a situation which is continuing to develop in our favour.
We have left ourselves little space in which to deal with the situation in the air. To put it broadly, the week of raids, for such it has been, gives sure ground for the view, always held by us, that the very worst the Germans can do in the way of Zeppelin attacks is negligible from the military point of view. They are a great and grim annoyance, but nothing more. Even if we accept the estimate that the Germans can now turn out, and are turning out, a couple of Zeppelins a week, there is no reason to suppose that they will be able to make any more effective use of their airships than they made this week. Now that the novelty of the raids is wearing off, the poverty of the results is becoming obvious. Since their attacks are levelled against civilians, men, women, and children, as well as against our soldiers, and since they cover practically the whole of the United Kingdom, the number of persons actually or potentially exposed to injury is very large. But if this number is com- pared with the number of persons killed and injured, even in the biggest raid, and the percentage is calculated, it will be seen that the risk run by any individual in the United Kingdom is infinitesimal. A scientific betting man, if asked what were the odds on John Smith or Mary Brown being killed in the next raid, would put it, we presume, at something like a million to one. That is not a risk which is- going to deprive any of us of our sleep.
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