It is almost impossible to understand the motives of M.
Challemel-Lacour and M. Ferry in thus deceiving the public. They cannot have wanted a war with China, yet they did all they could to provoke one, and this in the teeth of their own Agents' warnings. We suspect they both believed that war might come, but that if they could conquer Tonquin, France would be delighted, and could easily defend the province against a Chinese invasion. It seems certain that the most peremptory orders to act were sent to the Military and Naval chiefs in Tonquin, and that the Government does not even now understand why Bacninh is not taken. The Departments entirely under-rated the extent a the local resistance to be expected, the losses which would be incurred before the advance could be attempted, and the reluctance of their officers to risk defeat. The history of the affair, even should it end in a compromise, will not raise European opinion as to the efficiency of the French adminis- trative machine. There is a want of imagination visible in the central Bureaux, while their orders, at a certain distance, lose their force. Is there, perchance, any secret wish anywhere that the Republic should not be solidified by success ?
