DECLARATIONS OF WAR.
DURING the discussion of last year upon the Channel Tunnel, it was discovered that most civilians in England believed a sudden spring upon the Tunnel to be morally im- possible. No nation, it was thought, could be guilty of such a treachery as to make war without declaring it formally, or indeed without long previous warning, unless it was prepared to encounter the distrust or hostility of the civilised world. What the civilised world could do to punish such an outrage was never explained, but the sanguine relied, no doubt, on the magical influence of "opinion," and on some vaguely-remem- bered traditionary principle of international law. Even so able a man as Sir T. Farrer was penetrated by this conviction, and showed, by his questions on the Committee, that he thought any fear of a secret spring without pourparlers an absurd anachronism. It was of the first importance to the settlement of the question that this point should be cleared up, and ac- cordingly, Lieutenant-Colonel F. Maurice, of the Intelligence Department, was ordered to draw up a Report on Declarations of War, which was at first circulated privately to heads of Departments, but has now at last been given to the world. We do not remember ever to have read a document more con- clusive. Colonel Maurice disposes at once and for ever of the theory that modern nations hold themselves bound to give formal notice of their intention to make war, even by with- drawing their Embassies, or are accustomed to hold long pre- liminary pourparlers, or to consider that there is anything wrong, when they have a quarrel on hand, in seizing "material guarantees" for the redress of their real or imaginary grievances. So unfounded is this theory, that previous declara- tions of war may, if precedent is to govern, be considered irregular, only ten such declarations having been issued in all the wars be- tween 1700 and 1870; while in the present century alone there have been sixty cases of European war unpreceded by any declaration, the tendency, as mechanical improvements advance, being to seize more eagerly on the immense advantages which a surprise offers to the attacking side. Railways and tele- graphs offer such opportunities, that it seems to Generals in command monstrous to forego them. "In only the single instance of 1870 is there a case of notice formally sent to the Court of the assailed Power, prior to hostilities on the part of any one of the contending Powers." The regular course has been to attack suddenly, seize some important fortress or some fleet, and then announce to the people of the attacking country that their Sovereign is at war. Thus, in 1801, England de-stroyed the Danish Fleet off Elsinore, in reprisals for a treaty
entered into between Denmark and Czar Paul, without notice of any kind to Copenhagen, the Governor of Elsinore when fire opened having absolutely no information of British intentions. In 1802, Napoleon, without any quarrel with Switzerland, seized Soleure, Zurich, and Berne ; and though, no doubt, he was especially unscrupulous, yet on October 5th, 1804, without any warning, the British Fleet seized four Spanish frigates, and Parliament sustained the Ministry, Lord Westmoreland in par- ticular declaring that "war without a previous declaration was neither contrary to the law of nations, nor unprecedented in his- tory." In 1806, Prussia seized Hanover in silence, and her com- merce was instantly swept from the seas by England, in reprisals, and also in silence. Napoleon, in 1806, entered Saxony and fought the Prussians while the King of Prussia was expecting his ultimatum. In 1807, the British Government, while negotiating with Constantinople, seized Egypt, then a province of Turkey. In1807, the British seized the Danish Fleet in the midst of pro- found peace, because Mr. Canning believed, probably with justice, but without anything like certainty, that if he did not, France might. In 1812, the United States Congress seized all British vessels in harbour, in order that they might not convey news of coming war ; and on June 18th declared that "war existed," in order to seize the British West-India Fleet, and the fact of war was not known in England for a month after. In 1816, Portugal, during profound peace, invaded the 'Spanish Colonies on the Plate ; and in 1826, Spain invaded Portugal itself, the Envoy of each Power still remaining in the capital of the other ; while Mr. Canning, the instant he heard of the invasion, dispatched troops to Portugal to fight the Spaniards, expressly denying that in doing so he declared war on Spain. In 1827, the British, Russian, and French Fleets destroyed the Turkish Fleet off Navarino, though the Sultan had been explicitly assured that these Powers would not intervene in the war between him and Greece ; and in the following year the French, while still at peace with Turkey, seized all the Turkish for- tresses in the Morea, and occupied them with 20,000 men. In 1831, both France and England sent fleets to dictate terms to King Miguel in Lisbon, while refusing to declare war ; and in 1840, England, Russia, and Austria agreed that Mehemet Ali anust be put down 'without warning ; while Thiers, on receipt of the news, 'urged instant war on England, and resigned because his advice was not accepted. In 1848, the King of Prussia invaded Denmark six days before the Frankfort Assembly authorised him to take up the cause of Schleswig,
and the Danish Minister remained in Frankfort three weeks after Holstein had been occupied. In 1850, Lord Palmer- ston sent a fleet to dictate terms to Athens without any de-
claration of war, and seized all Greek merchant vessels, while explicitly stating in Parliament that "diplomatic relations between this country and Greece had not been suspended." In 1854, the British Fleet entered the Black Sea with orders to com- pel the Russian Fleet to return to Sebastopol, before the British Ambassador had left St. Petersburg, or the Russian Ambassador London; and in 1859, Napoleon III. entered Piedmont, before tie act which he had said he would consider an Austrian declaration of war, viz., the passage of the Ticino, had been performed. We all remember the Piedmontese march into Naples in 1860, but we do not all remember that Holstein was occupied in 1863 expressly without a declaration of war ; and that in 1866, Prince Charles issued a manifesto to the Prussian Army even then in march upon Vienna, saying that,—" To-day I have caused a public declaration to be sent, and to-day we enter the territory of the enemy, in order to defend our own country." We have omitted several cases from the list, but they are not necessary. The truth is that the Powers, England included, have been accustomed hitherto to surprise the enemy, if they could, and that international law does not prohibit the practice, still less lay down any means of enforcing the prohibition. If the French Government intended the conquest of England, it would seize the Tunnel as a material guarantee of its "rights," and then send away the British Ambassador. Europe might pro- nounce that sharp practice, bat Europe would not interfere. Indeed, Europe is growing more accustomed to the idea of sur- prises, for the subject of rapid mobilisation is incessantly discussed in military journals, and the whole object of that marvellous organisation is to reap the advantage of entering a momentarily defenceless State. A gain of four days may mean the acquisition of a province. There is no reason whatever for us to believe that Germany and France, if they had decided on war, would give each other one day's warning.
It did not fall within the province of the Intelligence De- partment to consider whether the circumstances of modern life make surprise more difficult, but it is worth while to discuss that question for a moment. We cannot see that any im- provement of modern days tends greatly to alter the old con- ditions, while two or three of them make surprises very much easier. Mobilisation has been reduced to a science. Armies have become so large that heavy corps d'armde can be collected without exciting remark, while provisions and munitions can be sent after them by railway with a previously unknown facility. Staff secrets are more rigidly kept than ever, while the collection of a Fleet at a specified date, at a point known only to the Admiral, can be reduced by the use of steam to a mathematical certainty. There are telegraph wires, it is true, but a State intending war would not trust Baron Renter, and all telegraphs are at Government disposal. We can see no reason why a French President should not collect 30,000 men at Boulogne for some manceuvres, order a Fleet to rendezvous there silently, and reach the British coast before a single Englishman was aware that the French Government, in conse- quence, possibly, of agreement with some other Power, or of news received from Chinese waters, had suddenly become hos- tile. Certainly, if France, when intending war, could surprise us, she would, and her whole people would consider the dis- pensing with declarations an act of adroit vigour. We should pronounce it "treacherous," but that would not help us much ; while French statesmen would argue that, with the whole future of their country at stake and a great war to wage, they "could not stop to discuss the least settled and most obscure propositions of international law."
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