Zimbabwe: what is success?

Xan Smiley

Success for whom? Almost all Zimbabweans, black and white, have been scarred and saddened by the war, and to the vast majority of them the signature by all protagonists of a peace treaty, however shad owy its aftermath, would be a miraculous suc cess. For those, however; who believe Robert Mugabe is not just a Marxist but also a bloodthirsty villain, it matters not whether he wins in the bush or at the polls.If he were to win at all, the attainment of peace at that price would —in the eyes of many, including, one may suppose, Mrs Thatcher—constitute a comprehensive disaster.

Others define success differently. For some in Whitehall, it matters not what happens afterwards, so long as the legal problem is resolved and Zimbabwe — bloodily fractious as ever, but incontestably 'independent' —falls once and for all outside Britain's formal responsibility. But, for those of us still naive enough to take our last imperial obligations seriously, independence followed by sectarian slaughter can barely be termed a 'success' either..

For what, then, did Thatcher and Carrington pray, when the conference began?

There were several options. The Patriotic Front could have ruled itself out of court by making demands that clearly went beyond the terms of the Lusaka Agreement: Britain would have been left free to tinker with Muzorewa's constitution, 'then back him (not quite to the hilt but at any rate with the loan of a few rusty swords) and hope for the best.

Option Two was to arrange great enough prizes for the PF co-leader Joshua Nkomo to overcome his distaste for Bishop Muzorewa (Vie Shona cookboy', as he is alleged once to have called him) and split the PF. But that idea evidently failed to materialise. The third option, in whose feasability many Tories are overconfident, is that the PF can fight an election but will be routed by the bishop. He might then receive the international legitimacy (and arms and money) for a renewed onslaught upon the PF guerrillas.

The currently most fashionable choice, number four, is that an indeterminate election result, with no single group holding a majority of seats, will necessitate a broad coalition of the Big Three (Muzorewa, Mugabe, Nkomo) in the hope that such an enforced consensus would see the 'voices of moderation prevail': in other words, that 'Josh and the Bish will cool Bob down' and the 'extremist mumbo jumbo' of the past will surrender to 'pragmatism', very much an in-word at Africanist pow-wows these days, to describe the need for Marxists to go easy on the ideology to get cash out of the West. But there is yet a more brutal option: number five. What if— to borrow from Ian Smith — 'these people who know how to play to the gallery and shout the odds' win outright? Can the British, amid the inevitable charges from Smith and the bishop that the PF's use of roubles and mass intimidation made monkeys out of the British electoral commissioner (hauled out of retirement in Cheshire), allow the South Africans to counter a PF victory by launching a putsch to 'restore law and order' (and the bishop)? Will the British watch the bishop, the undoubted choice of the Tory party, being swept away? Can the British accept that the conference, set up (in the eyes of many Tories) to validate the bishop's rule, may have led to British ratification of the advent to power of a Marxist?

The PF, it has to be conceded, has itself been asked to overlook genuine worries about the British ceasefire plan. Most keenly do they feel that, once the guerrillas are corralled in just 15 spots, the bishop — especially if he wins an election — will be itching to bomb them out of existence, just as two camps containing hundreds of obstreperous Sithole men were massacred by the Rhodesian army this summer. I dislike several facets of Mugabe's guerrilla ideology and tactics, but his last-minute complaints have contained some substance. If he is to be brought into an agreement at all, he must not be unfairly disadvantaged. The British have to face the ironical fact that, although the PF's own interpretation of 'democracy' is far from Western, the guerrilla parties should be given a fair chance at the British-supervised polls.

In addition, if the British will neither tamper with the old Rhodesian civil service institutions nor disband the old Rhodesian forces during the transition, it follows that the number of 'monitors' should increase still further. It is not enough for a British general to see eye to eye with General Walls, and hope that orders are passed down the line. Surveillance of both sides must be rigorous.

One area in which `monitoring' is certainly insufficient is broadcasting. You cannot 'monitor' people who have spent 15 years ardently propagating Smith's gospel of racial superiority. Those who have distorted the 'news' and perverted 'debate' for so long cannot plead both innocence and competence and then be allowed to continue their highly influential work during the delicate transition.

I have seen Salisbury commentators explain triumphantly that the strengthening of Pretoria's ties with Paraguay and permission for South African cripples to participate in the paraplegic Olympics were momentous diplomatic breakthroughs. I have heard Salisbury's `TV experts' solemnly discussing whether Dr Kissinger is a KGB agent: he possibly was, the verdict went. No, I do not joke. It is essential that a BBC heavyweight (Andrew Boyle is ready, I gather) and a few sprightly sidekicks go out there and direct, not monitor, Salisbury's comic yet pernicious radio and TV. In this, as in other aspects of the election, Britain cannot be pussyfooted.

It is remarkable — and lucky for the incoming governor — that despite Britain's past impotence and lack of will very many blacks still trust the British to 'play fair'. Despite the torrents of abuse, the PF would probably not have agreed to so much without similar secret, (almost guilty), trust. Even this year, pitiful as it sounds, Zimbabwe villagers have asked me to 'tell the Queen to come and make peace'. It would be tragic if that seeping reservoir of faith in Britain were suddenly empty. It may seem ludicrous to hand power through a free election to people who, once in power themselves, may never hold an election again. But the ultimate test of British honour is to make the elections so eminently fair that the PF cannot claim that Britain muzzled a predominantly anti-British voice.

For mathematically it is hard to see how the PF, if it fights together, can fail to notch up the largest number of seats, especially since one significant defector from Muzorewa's camp — James Chikerema — looks poised to hop on the Nkomo bandwagon. But there are several factors that could defeat the PF and certainly prevent it from winning the magic 51 per cent of the seats.

Gallup and NOP, however, would be advised to steer clear. For the fear that has engulfed the whole country has prevented even the most diligent analyst from knowing with certainty what any villager really thinks. For instance, what proportion of Zimbabweans believe the bishop's auxiliaries are more brutal than the guerrillas? Do villagers truly accept the need for allnight pungwes, the meetings which the guerrillas often insist upon, and which frequently bring army reprisals against the villagers after the guerrillas have slipped safely away? Do the villagers really hate tbe, (undoubtedly gloomy) 'protected villages or do they consider them lesser evils than their old kraals, unfenced but open to the blandishments of army and guerrillas? 1)0, the villagers genuinely accept the right 01 the young guerrillas to displace the author; ity of the older men? 'Land to the people may be a winning slogan, but how marl people are secretly wondering whY. Mozambicans, despite the nationalisation of land and enterprises, were still crossioi the border a year or two ago in search food, free medicine and employment !a Rhodesia? How many blacks believe tha'.„ continuing (albeit fading) white presence; desirable? No one can be certain of thte answers, which a secret vote should to a°"' degree reveal. My guess is that the Shona vote will be thoroughly split, but that would probably not prevent an Nkomo-Mugabe alliance from gaining a larger percentage than the bishop, if he fought singlehanded. But there will be three or four Shona-based splinter groups (and perhaps one extra Ndebeledominated party) which could well win enough votes — say 20 per cent — to hold an electoral balance. If they all sided with the bishop, he might regain the edge. But whatever coalitions can form a government, the losers will not just fade away. Each of the Big Three has an army, none of which is likely to take electoral defeat lying down. If the PF loses, the bulk of its guerrillas can be expected to take off for the long grass, the hills and caves, to embark upon a yet more ferocious bout of fighting. Any Shona leader knows that instability will persist unless the Ndebele /Kalanga, the 20 per cent of the population which votes for Nkomo and his ZAPU party with its 12,000-plus guerrillas in and out of Zimbabwe, are bought off with a slice of government. But that is not the only ethnic problem. Whites generally see the 'tribal conflict' simply as `Ndebele versus Shona' (or ZAPU against ZANU), whose mutual animosity has indeed been keenly felt. But long-term stability in Zimbabwe is probably more dependent upon reconciliation between the leading Shona-speakers, principally Mugabe and Muzorewa. The key ethnic group is arguably the Karanga (not to be confused with the Kalanga), who are the largest of the five main Shona-speaking groups and inhabit the centre of the country. Although he is an easterner, Muzorewa's principal military muscle is now provided by the regular Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR), whose bulk is Karanga, while — strangely enough — Mugabe's leading guerrillas are also Karanga. A rapprochement between the RAR Karanga and Mugabe's ZANU Karanga military men is not out of the question, and would certainly provide the toughest military bloc in the country. Some of Nkomo's guerrilla leaders have also been Karanga. There are the makings of a powerful broad Karanga military faction that could underpin any government of national unity.

If there is to be peace after the elections, a broad-based government will have to emerge. In no large African country (with a Population as big as Zimbabwe's) has an open multi-party system ever worked. Out of 50 black African countries, there are three such places, all of them with tiny Populations: Gambia, Botswana, Mauritius. Strictly controlled multi-party Systems also operate in three others: Egypt, Senegal, Upper Volta. A shaky multi-party experiment has recommenced in Ghana. Nigeria has embarked upon a complex and courageous plan — unique in Africa — to establish a presidential system amid rules of election and government designed to prevent competition being conducted by tribal blocs, as has nearly always happened in large African multi-party states.

I see little prospect of the open multiparty party system bringing stability to Zimbabwe, unless there is a more or less voluntary merger of parties all drifting towards a de facto one-party state. Otherwise, one group or coalition is likely militarily to polish off the remainder.

Last month, one-party Kenya held vigorous elections which unseated 40 per cent of the MPs. The 'bourgeois' freedoms of the press, academia, economic enterprise, collective bargaining are —by Third World standards — respected. Zimbabwe, with its virile and efficient independent institutions, could well emulate Kenya, which itself banned and absorbed minority parties.

There is still a small chance that Mugabe, undoubtedly talented, can be jostled by fellow party leaders, whose electoral support he may need, away from the ultraaustere political course which he threatens to pursue and which has succeeded now here in Africa. In any case, he might be better within the bosom of an enlarged party than in the wilderness outside it, where his men have learnt to live with the gun. Nkomo is likely to join any government (and may well head it). But the real question is whether the bishop and Mugabe can ever come to terms with each other. I do not rule it out.