East-West relations
Kissinger, détente and the EEC
Gerald Segal
A series of questions, arising from recent Speeches of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger cry out to be asked — even though they cannot accurately be answered.
Why has Kissinger apparently again changed his attitude towards the outcome of the Geneva-Helsinki Conference on European Security and Co-operation? In his latest statement (January 28) on the subject he claimed that progress has been made on all issues including general principles and human contacts and went on to give it as his belief that "if the conference is concluded along the lines that are now foreseeable, a summit conclusion is highly probable." The tone is very different from that which he adopted at the NATO foreign ministers' meeting some seven weeks before (The Spectator, January 19) when he took the lead in persuading the French publicly to retreat from a clear commitment they had entered into in the communique signed by Giscard d'Estaing and Leonid Brezhnev to the effect that conditions were already ripe for the conclusion of the CESC at the summit level. The Russians were and are anxious for such a conclusion, but the West has been holding out for the acceptance by the Communist countries of the democratic principle of free exchange of People and information as the precondition. The effect of signing without insisting on the free exchange principle would be to confirm the existing status quo in Europe in regard to state frontiers, which is acceptable to the West, and, more important, would confer upon the East the right to engage in a one-way penetration of influence and ideas via the International Communist Movement and the World Federation of Trade Unions aimed at undermining the Western systems. When it seemed that the French had abandoned the Western position they were Speedily brought back into line. Nothing has changed in the past seven or eight weeks on this question which can account for Kissinger's new found optimism (his general position is now back where it was last July, he having moved to a tougher line in the meantime). On
the contrary the cancellation of the US-Soviet trade pact and the publication last month of the letter of October 26 from Soviet foreign minister Gromyko to Secretary of State Kissinger, which the latter had concealed and Which rejected any link between the emigration of Soviet citizens and the expansion of US-Soviet trade, would seem to justify a Pessimistic appraisal.
The issue arose from the attempt by Senator Henry 'Scoop' Jackson to make the grant of 'most favoured nation' status to the USSR and of loans for Soviet development programmes conditional upon the Soviet government allowing such Jews as wished to emigrate to do SO. For Jackson this was not an end in itself but a test of how the Soviets understood détente ssinger argued all along, and perhaps rightly, that more Jews could be got out of Russia if an
ISsue of principle were not made of the matter. But that, although it might well suit Kissinger's Style of diplomacy, would have avoided the issue osuef principle and its implications which, finally Gromyko in his letter focused upon. Jews are not referred to at all (only a "certain C..ategory of Soviet citizens") and Kissinger is pnrily told that the published correspondence between him and Senator Jackson purporting to link the grant of exit visas to the trade bill "is a distorted representation of the Soviet position." Gromyko adds, "in explaining, in response to your wishes, the actual state of
affairs, we emphasised that this question belongs entirely to the internal competence of our state. We advised moreover that in this matter we have acted and will continue to act in conformity with our existing legislation." In writing thus Gromyko was in fact confirming that Soviet legislation, restricting the rights of citizens as understood in the West, is in fact totalitarian. He was also warning that in regard to the larger issues of East-West détente as symbolised by the Security Conference, the Soviet Union would not move in any way to accommodate the Western position; the validity of their laws is not to be challenged — ours may be. But then why in these circumstances has Kissinger changed his own mind? One possibi lity is that he received some signal from Moscow indicating that the Soviets were prepared to go ahead in a spirit of co-operation and goodwill with the Strategic Arms Limita tion Talks. At the Brezhnev-Ford summit in Vladivostock in November an agreement was reached (it has never been published in full) to attempt, in Kissinger's words, "to put a cap on the arms race for a period of ten years." The two leaders signed a tentative accord which allows both sides equal numbers of delivery vehicles (2,400) and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (Mirvs). The unprecedented meeting last Saturday of the two negotiating teams at Geneva may be interpreted as symptomatic of the urgent desire of both sides to get down to the difficult business of devising rules for the working of the Vladivostock agreement in order that a comprehensive treaty can be signed when Brezhnev visits Ford in Washington later this year. The SALT negotiators will have to decide such questions as the kind of missile covered by the agreement, should the agreement extend to weapons fired from movable ground platforms and how to guarantee that each side will honour their agreement. Kissinger may calculate that a compromise of the original Western position on the Security conference is justified by the gains which will accrue in terms of world security if a cap can indeed be put on the arms race. It is possible to define all this as détente, but is it not more rational to postulate the pursuit of nuclear equilibrium between the US and the USSR as a desirable end in itself and not to confuse it with détente? Other intriguing and less awesome questions arise from some recent remarks of Kissinger about intra-western relations. He asserted a couple of weeks ago, "in April 1973 I called for the economic unity of the industrialised countries. At that time this was rejected as carrying the alliance much too far," and implied he was justified by the fact that today "every one of our friends insists that we co-ordinate our economic policies." As I recall at the time he was talking about a new 'Marshall Plan' but if he really had an "economic unity" in mind, what else can it mean but that Kissinger is in fact working for some kind of Atlantic Economic Community? And if that is correct should we not be asking what does this mean for EEC-UK renegotia tions. And again if, regardless of whether
Britain is in or out, the EEC becomes a sub-branch of a new AEC should we not be *thinking about the proper relationship between the US firms, which will find it easier to
dominate one unified market rather than nine separate ones, and the European including the British? And those such as Mr Peter Walker and EEC Commissioner Soames, when they talk of the EEC as including two nuclear powers and being the largest trading unit in the world (for the time being, this is merely an aspiration based upon too simple addition tables) are they not in fact looking ahead, hopefully or fearfully, to a time when the Americans withdraw from Europe or else Europeans decide they wish to abandon the Atlantic alliance and take the risk and bear the cost of going it alone?
And are not these the real questions we ought to be asking and arguing about?
Gerald Segal, a specialist writer on East-West relations, has been The Spectator's correspondent in Brussels
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