There is little news from Natal, beyond the confused despatch
from Lord Chelmsford on the disaster at Isandula, which is criti- cised elsewhere; and a mass of letters, giving many details of the same affair, but adding very little to our previous knowledge. All agree in recounting facts which prove Lord Chelmsford's profound ignorance of his own position and the resources of his enemy, and all are marked by that absence of bitterness in comment on his failure which, so far as we can remember, is without a precedent. A very loud cry has gone up from the country and the Army for his supersession ; but the Govern- ment, though sending him a chief of the Staff in whom they confide, have decided, if we may trust an announcement in the Standard, to leave him in supreme command. Although we feel a painful sympathy with the personal character revealed in Lord Chelmsford's despatches, we cannot regard this decision as fair to the soldiers, whose lives will depend on their leader's capacity, or to the English people, who must sacrifice so much to succeed, in an enterprise for which they never called. The question is one for the Executive alone, but a less demoralised House of Commons would have insisted on the Ministry stating its decision ; and if there is a second failure, the penalty should be visited direct on Colonel Stanley. High character, by itself, constitutes no claim to high command.
