BRITISH COLONIES AND WAR
By SIR DONALD CAMERON*
THE probable reaction of the native inhabitants of our African colonies, if they are invaded by a foreign Power with all the dreadful appliances of modem war, has recently been discussed in the Press, and the latest turn of events in France may have brought
the possibility nearer. Let me take as basis of discussion one colony, Nigeria, in which I worked for many years. We should recollect in the first instance that there is not, and never has been, such a thing as a "Nigerian nation" or a " national " spirit rooted in the soil from which these people spring ; that Nigeria as to 99 per cent, is still in the tribal stage, and that the growth of a national consciousness must be a gradual process from within, which, I claim, we have not retarded. Even the term " Nigeria " is ours, not theirs. Secondly, that even after 40 to 50 years of occupation (in many cases less), the shock to a primitive native society of being brought so abruptly into collision with another much older world-order has not even under peace conditions been absorbed to a substantial degree. Far from it ; and it seems to me vain to suppose that at this stage in its evolution such a society could be expected to stand up, with standards parallel to our own, against the shocks of totalitarian warfare brought suddenly into its midst with such shattering effects. Notwithstanding these considerations, my faith is that the reaction would generally be favourable, certainly amongst the sections of the community in a position to appreciate the vital issues at stake.
When Italy savaged Abyssinia, and when later the evil report was put abroad from external sources that we were thinking of trading Nigeria to Germany as part of an appeasement policy, the people of Nigeria as a whole definitely sought shelter under our wing. The British flag did—and I believe does—mean something to them. The issue now, I submit, is not one in vague and general terms, whether the African population in Nigeria would assist the war effort if the country were invaded, but whether they would desire to do so if the means at their disposal could be made effective. In the last war organised and disciplined labour forces from Nigeria did not fail ; in the East African campaign they died by thousands at their posts, alas! handing down excellent traditions testifying to their fortitude and endurance. In both wars the West African soldier has earned the highest commendation from his superior officers, fighting in conditions of mechanised warfare that were almost wholly new to him.
What of the rest of the population, whose means to resist could
not be made effective? If an African coast town were bombed it would probably be better for the ordinary population, apart from those trained for and assigned to specific duties (A.R.P. work, fooddistribution, dock-labour, &c.), to clear out of the place as rapidly as possible ; there is no reason whatsoever for thinking that they would willingly assist the enemy. So far as Malaya is concerned, it may be the case that apart from the relatively small number of Malays in the local regiment, no use had been made of the Asiatic population generally in building up the war effort. Where the Malays were not organised and trained to stand up against foreign aggression they may not have appeared willing to assist the war effort actively, but even that has not been definitely established. If the proposition is correct, however, it reveals a defect in ordered planning in one plane (civil defence), not a failure of the Malayan administration as a whole over a period of six to seven decades, much less a failure in our whole system of colonial administration, its outlook, and the principles on which that administration is based. It is not suggested, I trust, that we have failed in our system of colonial administration because we did not raise in the dependencies large native standing armies to repel foreign aggression. Armaments and munitions do not grow on tropical trees, and even if such a policy had been sound from the broad strategic point of view, I can conceive no course which could have brought our administration a larger measure of disrepute and obloquy. We should, moreover, have had to embrace such a policy at a time when we were not prepared to organise ourselves on a full scale against aggression.
* Governor of Tanganyika Territory, 1925-31; of Nigeria, 1931-35. The case of the older dependencies—such as the West In Mauritius, &c.—is a different one. Although their people will a natural pride in the land which gave them birth, and for 1% I have no doubt they would be proud to fight ; although one them—one of the smaller—thinks of itself as a nation (more po to it), can they be viewed and treated as nations? Can a cou of some 350,000 inhabitants, with 8,000 aborigines, 142,000 Indians, 3,5oo Chines; 8,5oo Portuguese, 2,200 other Europeans some 17o,000 coloured folk, be regarded as a nation or am likely to fuse into a nation within the space of another few ge tions? These communities are too young, like detrital tin, wine valueless: they have not " deposited " long enough.
I submit that any national pride in such circumstances must the form of national pride in being a citizen of the British Emp that it is that pride we should seek to fortify. We do evervon grave injustice if we pretend to ourselves and the people cone —in a groping, fog-bound manner—that a West Indian island r,000,000 inhabitants (there is but one of that size), with no g natural resources, can by itself ever be strong enough economi and financially to carry the burdens (including the burden tha imperative if -a country is a Sovereign State, that of making adequate contribution to its own defence), the enormous burd that real sovereignty must involve.
Some day the West Indies might together attain to Dom status, and it is unnecessary to rule out that conception, but the present it can be no more than a vision. This realisation, h ever, does not afford excuse for an attitude of mere negation; cannot leave such territories indefinitely suspended in the air tween Crown Colony government and a future that is vision It is realised that the most urgent problem is to build up a sou economy in such countries as rapidly as possible, in order that material and social conditions of the people may be apprec improved. This must be done at the expense of the British payer, a principle already accepted by Parliament, and the tas being actively grasped at the moment, particularly in the West In substantial grants having already been made for the purpose.
On the political side, in line with my suggestion of endeavou to make these peoples more actively conscious of their placerights—as citizens of the British Empire, my conception is that might now, earnestly and without further delay, explore the po of regarding such dependencies not as disjointed entities, bu integral parts of the Mother Country, although separated from geographically, and granting them, as such, autor.samy in their affairs by a progressive policy of devolution of powers. This gestion has a tincture of pre-war French colonial policy in it, it is not in fact the same thing, inasmuch as we should r in our minds a different ultimate issue—that is, Dominion sta Is it on that account illogical? I should be prepared to argue point ; but what if it is? We cannot keep valuables locked u boxes indefinitely merely because something may occur in visionary future which might render their extraction now se illogical. Under such a system representation of the dependen in the Mother Parliament would be logical and would, I believe of immense value in fostering the spirit of solidarity which I Difficulties? Yes, if we retain too many of the old shibbol Somewhat revolutionary? Why not?
I incline to devolution of powers in given fields of public aff in a progressive manner, in preference to a policy of enlarging legislature on the popular side with a purview over the whole —with arbitrary powers reserved in the background in the h a Governor. Complete responsibility, even if the field be affords much the sounder school of training, and the alterna method inevitably leads to a sense of frustration and ul embitterment. We were supine too long in the matter of the Colonial peoples to something better ; but in the last el there has been a quickening of spirit in Downing Street and growing sections of the British public ; we see more clearly and longer vision. The charge of laissez faire is demonstrably no true. I do not defend our principles and methods in colonial stration in all their aspects ; apart even from the war and its in able effects, they call for a new orientation and a new t itan major respects ; for a new principle even, as I have ventured ,suggcst. What I do particularly crave at this juncture is that, the light of recent events, we should approach the situation in a go balanced state of mind, and that people like the Malays should
so readily traduced on evidence of such a flimsy character.
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