MR. GLADSTONE'S DEFENCE. T HERE can be no doubt that Mr.
Gladstone's speech made a great impression on the House of Commons,—the more impression perhaps that there were so many there who wished to be convinced that the Government deserve to be tolerated, though not to be respected, by the country. The more the House have heard of the Tory foreign policy the less they feel inclined to prefer it even to the helpless bluster of the present Cabinet, and we have not concealed our own im- pression that the Tory leaders are more disposed to play directly into the hands of the German aggressors than any other party in the country, unless it be the insignificant section represented by Mr. Bernal Osborne. Hence we can- not pretend to regret the blinding effect of Mr. Gladstone's persuasive advocacy, or the intellectual paralysis which 'appears to have pervaded the plunging rhetoric of Mr. Disraeli. But we have too much regard for the true issue, which stands high above all party questions, to refrain from explaining clearly why Mr. Gladstone's string of clever special pleas, if on some points it almost reached the height of an excuse for the Cabinet, never even approached the dimensions of a justification.
Mr. Gladstone professed to maintain that Lord Russell was justified in the many menaces he addressed to Germany, and the many encouragements he gave to Denmark up to the very end of last January, by the legitimate hope which he entertained of the co-operation of France, and therefore of the power of England to make good those threats and to satisfy the expectations he had raised. And the House in its eager- ness to believe his case was, we believe, impressed with the very slenderest show of evidence that it ever fell to the part of a great orator to spread out into a semblance of significance. In the first place, we may remark that when England threatens and encourages, merely on the chance of aid from another Power, she does what is morally quite indefensible and politi- cally more than undignified. If the Cabinet had said from the first to Denmark, as Sweden said, "This is not a ease in which we should think it right to assist you without help, and you must explicitly understand that aid from us entirely depends on our success in getting some other great Power to act with us," it would have been exculpated ;—but to hold out time after time hope of help without any such pro- viso, when the Danish statesmen could have Judged for themselves, better probably than Lord Russell, of the extreme improbability of that proviso, was to incur all the responsibi- lity of giving encouragement that was not provisional. And to plead that it was quite reasonable, dignified, and right to menace independently, when our only chance of carrying out oar menace was the aid of a stronger Power on the action of which our own was dependent, is another way of saying that it is reasonable, dignified, and right for England to threaten in the name of France. This is very strange and novel doc- trine of Mr. Gladstone's, which almost deserves a term we should be unwilling to apply to any speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's,—it is almost silly ; yet this is the sum and substance of his defence of Lord Russell's encouragements and threats. "We have never disguised," he says, "that after the failure of our application to France and Russia our tone was altered." "Where does the right honourable gentle- man find the language of menace used after the time we be- came aware that menace could not practically be carried out?" Is it possible an English Minister can wish the House of Commons to believe that England encourages and threatens on speculative resources to be derived from the help of other countries,—that when we say, as we did say to Germany, "should it appear that Federal troops enter the Duchy of Holstein on international grounds, Her Majesty's Government may be obliged to interfere," we mean only "in the wake of France or Russia Her Majesty's Government may venture to interfere ?" Is it conceivable that a great English Minister can wish to interpret such language as Lord Wodehouse's, " If the Danish Government rejected my advice, Her Majesty's Government must leave Denmark to encounter Germany on her own responsibility," to mean "in that case Her Majesty's Government must suspend even their supplications to the Governments of France or Russia to lead the way in intervention, for as to any independent help they could give to Denmark that is of course a dream ? " It is almost an insult to the common sense of the House of Commons to maintain that all the high language Lord Russell and his agents have used both to Germany and Denmark was the language of a minor Power, like that of Sweden, which never even conceived the possibility of acting alone. What right had we to dictate to Denmark under pain of our displeasure, if all that we could offer in the most favourable case possible was aid contingent on an alli- ance with France or Russia ? Mr. Gladstone knows well that the whole correspondence up to the last week of January con- templated clearly the probability of our lending aid to Denmark, without any assistance from these great and in- different patrons.
But next, Mr. Gladstone wishes us to infer from his speech that England did in fact use language no stronger than that of France or Russia, and that therefore if England is guilty in launching idle menaces or deserting an expectant friend, Franco and Russia share her guilt equally. With great deference to Mr. Gladstone, we must say that no orator ever tried to suggest, without venturing directly to be respon- sible for, an impression more miserably false or misleading.
The solo evidence he has been able to produce is, that in a dispatch written long before the critical moment of the death of the King of Denmark, and long beforo the refusal of the Congress by England, viz., on the 18th September, M. Drotlyn de Lhuys, while declining to repeat the blunder which the Western Powers had committed in the case of Poland, said to us that France could not "remain indifferent" to the invasion of Schleswig. If England had never used stronger language of menace than this it would be well for us, and it is the strongest language which Mr. Gladstone can cite from the French diplomatists;—but the truth is that from the moment at which we began to threaten and to encourage, France began to stand aloof and adopt the language of the coldest neutrality. The motive was obvious even to a baby in diplomacy. We had offended France bitterly in the interval by declining the great scheme of her ruler for a Congress in curt and pungent language. But the motive is of no consequence, except as rendering the affected blindness of our Cabinet the more inex- cusable. The fact remains that from and after the death of the King of Denmark our language of menace to Germany grows warmer and more frequent up to the middle of January last, when Lord Russell plainly told the Prussian Ambassador that "he could not doubt that he [the King of Denmark] would be assisted by Powers friendly to Denmark in its [Schleswig's] defence," and it is equally certain that the language of inducement addressed to Denmark to make conces- sions grows warmer and more frequent up to the great conces- sion of Bishop Konrad of the promise to repeal the Schleswig constitution, a promise given at the same period. Yet during the whole period of high language on the part of England, France and Russia were continually administering rebuffs to our enthusiasm, and giving Denmark to understand expli- citly in General Fleury's own words that "France would not go to war to support Denmark against Germany." Against this explicit declaration Mr. Gladstone can only quote M. Drouyn de Lhuys' declaration to Lord Cowley that General Fleury had said nothing which did not "leave the Emperor free to take any course which events might render expedient." Why, of course not. Who- ever supposed that the Emperor had promised Germany not to defend Denmark ? The question simply is whether we, who were trusting all the time to the chance of French help, had the smallest reason to assert that France was using our language and going on pan i pastu with us in the tender of that help. Mr. Gladstone knows as well as we. do that it was otherwise; that from the moment of the King's th France professed nothing but pacific intentions,—encotaned the Duke of Augustenburg, smiled at the sanguine character of the proposed English expedients, gently discouraged all her advances, professed her willingness to join in any pacific advice that was asked of her, and to take part in any intellectual discussion that was suggested, but always and in every case without giving a shadow of encouragement to the idea of an alliance with Denmark. And yet Mr. Gladstone can venture to say that France and Russia used the language of menace about not being able to "view with indifference" the aggression on Denmark "at the same period." At what period? France and Russia used this language as the maximum of their menace long before the crisis of the King's death, and never after it. England used it as the minimum of her menace at that period, and used language far stronger when the matter became practical and the danger imminent. This is scarcely common candour in Mr. Glad- stone.
Finally, Mr. Gladstone makes much of the delays of Den- mark in yielding to our advice. Two months, he says inter- vened between our advising her to withdraw the Holstein patent and her doing so,—though he does not deny that she did it in plenty of time to prevent the federal execution in Holstein, had the Germans shown any respect for their own law. Also a considerable time intervened before the Danish Ministry could be got to promise an honest attempt to cancel the Schleswig constitution. This loss of valuable time, says Mr. Gladstone, with little generosity and less reason, cancels Denmark's claim on us. The argument would have great weight if we had held out a promise of protection in case of her compliance. But is it not obvious that as we did not give any promise of the kind, but only relied on the influence which the hope of that protection gave us, —only worked upon the fear of Denmark that, if she refused, we might finally desert her,—we had no claim at all for such instantaneous acquiescence in our suggestions ? If Mr. Glad- stone argues that Denmark took our advice too tardily to give her any claim on us, he should show that we had ceased to press that advice as passé, before it was taken. This is so far from being the case that in each instance we were urgently pressing Denmark to yield at the moment when she did yield, and that at the time of her yielding we were very well satisfied with her flexibility. Again, it was notorious that our statesmen pressed advice on her almost as much for their own sake,—for their own views about the balance of power,—from their own wish to avoid a war in which they thought they might find it necessary to engage in order to preserve the balance of power,—as from disinterested regard for Denmark. Indeed there is nothing which our Ministers more eagerly maintain than that their futile attempt to intervene in this matter was not purely disinterested, but was due to a prudent international foresight. Hence Denmark had clearly a right to look for some equivalent for her many and great con- cessions, even if they were not given instantaneously on our first application. Nor can the fact be got rid of, that by fluttering the hope of aid before her eyes we did her a serious injury, which we either cannot or will not repair. Had she known from the first that she could count on no eventual help, she would have early made terms with her unequal antagonists, and far better terms than she can now hope for. By doing all in our power to suggest to her the high probability of aid in the last resort, without affording it, we have actually lured on to destruction the Power we had half promised to save. We think, then, we have shown that Mr. Gladstone's ungenerous use of Denmark's brief delays in yielding to our advice will not avail him ; that his endeavour to persuade his audience, without exactly venturing to assert, that France and Russia used language as strong as England, or used strong language at all at the critical moment, was a nearer approach to simulation than we like to admit that so noble a mind as Mr. Gladstone's can approach ; and that he has injured materially the cause of the Government by the strange, novel, and discreditable doctrine that England may menace and encourage freely in her own name when her course is con- sciously contingent on the help to be afforded by more power- ful allies,—in other words, that she may brandish the terrors of France or Russia to the world instead of her own.
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