SIR FRANCIS HEAD'S DEFENCELESS STATE or a REAT BRITAIN. * THIS

volume is not only altogether below its very important subject, but its exaggerated views and inflated style are more calculated to injure than to advance the cause which the writer professes to advocate. This in part arises from a deficient logic, which draws similar conclusions from contradictory premises n part from the kindred fault of exaggerating truths into clapt in and falsehood, but chiefly from a pervading spirit of bookmaking.. The Defenceless Stole of Great Britain does not emanate from the impelling sense of duty of a public servant, whose vocation it is to consider the subject, or from the strong convictions of a man whom professional impulse has driven to examine the question with a cool judgment and sufficient knowleke, and who puts forward clear and fresh views, if he cannot bring originality to the task. It is the work, and the not very clever work, of a littiir' atear, who selects the subject as a " tak-mg" one, but advances no new facts; whose views are mostly either beside the mark or they overshoot it; and who seems to exhibit, in a forced and artificial mode of treatment and a turgid exuberance of style, manifest signs of exhaustion.

The conjoint characteristics of the bookmaker and the bad logician are shown in the general plan, which introduces -various subjects that have no relation to the matter in hand, or that even tell against the argument,—as a review of the defects of the Navy formerly, many of which defects the reader at last finds out have been remedied. These characteristics, however, are more completely shown in particular arguments. For instance, in an account of the staff of an army, Sir Francis tells a very long but not very new story of the Duke of Wellington and the Peninsula; how the Duke trained his quartermasters, and formed a corps of guides and another of military police ; all which is without the slightest bearing upon the ostensible subject of the book. Whether the enemy in ease of invasion landed at Brighton or at any other place, there can be no fear but that the British army would have officers enough familiar with the country, or that the general or other officers in command would be able to communicate with the peasantry and others, without calling for an interpreter from the corps of guides. In fact, the writer is oontinnally confounding the defence of London from a sudden invasion with ourpreparationa for waging an offensive wax in a foreign country.

The economical effects of an invasion so far successful as to occupy London cannot well be exaggerated ; nor, while he inflates the matter, does the author of Bubbles exaggerate them. Though the country, or the owners of houses or land, might not be ruined by a French occupation and a subsequent campaign, most of the existing merchants manufacturers and traders would be rained. The moral evils would be great, from the licence of both armies, the occasional violence of one, and the demoralization which always attends upon the congregation of such large masses of men, with the encouragement they give to the dissipated and vicious of both sexes. We believe, however, that the author's description of "the treatment of women in war" is exaggerated. -Violence, no doubt, takes place on the march; in the case of an assault, the inhabitants of the plane are abandoned to the maddened assailants; but we should doubt whether force is permitted in large towns, regularly occupied by convention,—especially where the object of the invading enemy would be, as Sir Francis Head states, to make terms as quickly as possible, and get away from the volcano on which he was placed, and therefore he would not be too exacting. Yet this -writer says, if his words mean anything, that force is perpetrated in towns regularly occupied, and that not only by Frenchmen but the officers of all armies. Read with the context, there is no meaning whatever to be put upon the following passage but such as we have intimated.

"It would not be fair to conceal that an English army has often in the moment of victory committed very dreadful excesses : and yet, in 1815, after Waterloo, several of the ladies at Paris used to say of the British officers that they were doux comme des demoiaelles,' as compared with the Prussian; Russians, and Austrians."

As the capitulation of Paris was not signed till the 3d of July, and as the Duke of Wellington's army reached the neighbourhood of Paris on the 29th of June and Louis the Eighteenth made his entry on the 8th of July, we hardly know how the Austrian and Russian officers managed matters. The meaning of the phrase as applied to the British officers, if any" lady ever uttered it, would seem to be a sarcasm on their reserve.

The nominal division of the book is into three parts; but it really consists of many more, being in fact a lot of articles not exhibiting any peculiar knowledge, or a peculiarly trained mind applied to the consideration of known facts, but of that common kind which consists in sucking books, pamphlets, and newspapers, and reproducing the information • which in this case however, is poorly done and stuffed out. That portion which strictly relates to the "defenceless state" is really no more than a spoiled 13zpansion of the Duke of Wellington's letter to Sir John Burgoyne, with quotations from pamphlets by nautical men. The account of the French in London resembles a paper that Punch published at the time the Duke's letter was running the round, the points being left out. The following account of the treatment of a contumacious editor might really have done for Punch, had the first of

• The Defenceless Stale of Great Britain, By Sir F. B. Head, Bart. Published by Murray.

critical rules been followed and the manner been proportioned to 1

the subject. • the subject. •

"Besides providing food and comforts for the army, one of the first ditties I of the ' commissaire' is to send for the editors of the leading journals; whom. he briefly informs that it will be requisite that they should state, 'that, al-. ' though the aristocracy are suffering severely, the people at large offer no complaint, and that, on the whole, the "morale" appears to be favourable to I the new system.'

"If these orders are not complied with, the ' commissaire,' either by' word of mouth or by a very slight movement of one eye, directs that the offender be made an example of. Accordingly, with the butt-ends of muskets the invaluable printing apparatus is smashed, the type cast into the street, and the editor, falling into the hands of the soldiers, undergoes treatment which nothing but the ingenuity, ferocity, and frivolity of a Frenchman could devise. For instance, they will perhaps, first of all, cut off one or both of his mustachios—strip him—plaster him over with thick priuter's ink—curl his hair with it—dress him up in paper uniform and jack-boots made from the broad sheet; if he open Ins mouth —' Tiens, petit! tiens !' feed him with pica; in short, by a series of innumerable and ever-varying strange methods of what they cep. ' joliment arrang6ing ' any refractory subject they wish to victimize—our military readers will, we are confident, corroborate these facts—they would so intimdate the press, that, like every other power in the country, it would be obliged to bend to the storm."

One of the sections contains an account, after Alison, of the three invasions associated with Napoleon Bonaparte; the first of which Napoleon refused (the Directory) to undertake, as too riskful ; the second was a mere ruse; the third, if he ever did contemplate it, has no bearing upon the present case, because steam, we are told, has changed he mode of operation—for both parties, be it re membered. en there is a review of Nelson's battles and tactics, and their inapplicability to the systems of America and France since his time : but as we have changed our system too, it seems a mere "bit o' writing." Then there are statistics, common enough, of the Continental armies compared with the British, but not a word of the difference in circumstances and of the impracticability of moving the greater portion of them. But to come to the main point, the author of Bubbles anticipates an invasion by 150,000 men, to be followed by 50,000 during or after the march to London. To obviate the risk of this, he proposes a permanent increase of 100,000 infantry, and an increase of 100 guns in the artillery, fully horsed, with sundry lesser matters, at a cost of from four to Eve millions a year ; a proposition which, so far as its attainment goes, might also have been put in Punch. In speaking lightly of this book, it must not be supposed that we think lightly of the subject. A proper state of defence is of the first necessity ; and though something, if not enough, may have been done to prevent the surprise and destruction of our arsenals and dockyards, nothing has been done to prevent the second danger pointed out by the Duke of Wellington—the occupation of London by a coup de main: and the possession of the capital with its enormous wealth and interests might enforce a disgraceful peace from the dread of its sack or destruction, even though the means might have been got together to meet the enemy in the field. It is a surprise—a desperate dash at London—which is the thing to be dreaded, not the invasion of 200,000 men,—unless steamers have changed all past experience on land as well as at sea. Such an army exceeds by 70,000 men the entire numbers that Napoleon could bring together to fight the battle of Borodino. It is very considerably more than the numbers on both sides that fought at Austerlitz or Waterloo. It is nearly double the number with which Napoleon, when his throne was at stake, crossed the Sambre to attack Blucher and Wellington. To embark such a force at once, would be impossible, without long and notorious preparation. To send it over by relays, would be a very riskftd measure : nor could it be done quite so quickly in practice as it can be managed on paper.' for if all the troops were to be brought in steamers, France must have got together a very large number; if the sailing-vessels were all to be towed, the steamers must stil be numerous ; and if any sailing-vessels were to be employed alone, the speed of a fleet, like that of an army, must be regulated by its slowest body. As for this writer's calculation that the 150,000 French would be transported "at intervals of six or eight hours," (page 319,) it either implies that naval means would be collected ic. receive the whole force—which is impossible without long preparation, or it means that the transporting fleet could go and return to Cherbourg from the English coast in six or eight hours—a still greater impossibility. Passenger-steamers, built for speed and lightly laden' do not make the passage from Portsmouth to Havre under ten or twelve hours. If slow war-steamers are to tow, or to be stowed as full as they could hold of soldiers, horses, artillery, and munitions of war, a double passage with its delays could not be made under a week. If any large portion of the fleet is to sail, the voyage would be as long and as uncertain as ever ; for the mere presence of steam-vessels among a convoy does not add to their speed. Unless they carry, or tow the whole of the fleet, steam-ships are no more an element of calculation now than they were fifty years ago. In either alternative, the speed of the steam• era is diminished • in bad weather their power ; in very bad weather, heavily laden, they could furnish no assistance to sailingvessels, perhaps not save themselves.

As the Duke of Wellington, in his celebrated letter, had no par

ticular call to mention numbers and yet a of forty thousand , men, he would seem to consider numbers, as the forcewhich could readily be thrown upon our shores : and that appears to be about the number that might be embarked without, as we say, long and notorious preparation. There should certainly be in Great Britain an available force sufficient to overwhelm forty or fifty thousand men at once. The actual number of regular troops, including sick, &c.—the total

of the muster-roll--is under 40,000. At the lowest calculation, we require more than double the number of men which Lord John Russell, in obedience to an economical clamour, discharged not long since. To meet the enemy if he could establish himself, the Duke's suggestion is the cheapest, the most feasible, and, as he says, the "most constitutional "—embody the Militia.

After all, however, our main reliance must be, what it ever has been, the Navy. A. force of men-of-war and steamers, sufficient to maul an invading fleet so terribly as to destroy the expedition for practical purposes, might be kept at Plymouth and Portsmouth, by a new distribution of our ships, and by Parliament determining to see to a proper application of the sums voted for the Navy, with probably little additional expense; but we believe that any expense for the Navy would be freely granted by the country, if it were certain that the money is skilfully and honestly applied.