THE NEW SITUATION IN EUROPE. T HE German Emperor is asserting
successfully the new position in which he is placed by the paralysis of Russia. He intends to use it to promote the interests of Germany and his own grandeur, and as a beginning he has practically dismissed M. Delcass6 from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Other causes, no doubt, have contributed to that great change in the personnel of Europe. M. Delcasse in his seven years' tenure of office has made many enemies. M. Rouvier has never heartily approved his policy, the Socialists have always suspected him, and between him and the Nationalists there was a great gulf fixed. It is, however, the enmity of Germany that has brought him down. William II. believed him to intend by a slow but persistent policy to secure the isolation of Germany, and the moment that the battle of Mukden gave him a free hand he announced his hostility in ways which there seems to be no doubt created profound alarm in France. It was not that the people positively expected an invasion, though the Eastern Departments watched certain movements of the German Army with growing distrust, so much as that reflecting men thought that M. Delcasse's policy might in the end irritate the German Emperor into a declaration of war. The temptation to him was obviously great. His Army is probably superior to that of France— at any rate the Emperor believes it to be so—it is always more ready for mobilisation, and if once set in motion a single victory might enable him to demand all the French colonies, including Madagascar and Indo- China, as the price of peace. Then, indeed, Germany might become in a few years as powerful beyond the sea as she now is within the Continent of Europe. The members of the French Cabinet thought it unwise to retain a Minister whose policy, real or supposed, was regarded by the Emperor as directed against himself ; and M. Delcass4, who had detached Italy from the Triple Alliance, who had assisted Russia to seize her last chance of victory at sea, who had contended with Germany at Constantinople, and who had helped with consummate skill to engineer the entente cordials with Great Britain, was allowed to fall. M. Rouvier, who succeeds him, for the present at least, will, it is understood, display towards the new Referee of the Continent a consideration the absence of which has for two years been felt as most galling to the Emperor's peculiar pride. , The diplomatic triumph for Germany is exceedingly great. The Emperor has not, indeed, been able to break the entente cordiale between Great Britain and France, but he has undoubtedly humbled more or less all the Powers of Europe not already bound to his own chariot-wheels. He has by a single blow shown Russia that he no longer fears her, has " tested " France to see if she would risk a war, and has induced Great Britain to acknowledge that even she would rather avoid, if it be possible, a conflict with the dominant Power of the Continent. It is already announced—for we imagine the carefully worded article in the Daily Telegraph of Wednesday is oquivalent to an announcement—that if France accepts the demand for a European Conference put forward, on advice from Count von Tattenbach, by the Sultan of Morocco, England also will accede, doubtless with strict precautiOns against any reopening of the Egyptian question. It is possible, nevertheless, that the Conference will not be held. It is the policy—possibly, their situation considered, the wise policy—of the Hohenzollerns always to prefer concrete and visible gains to purely diplomatic triumphs, and it is rumoured that a, concession will be made which will placate Germany, and induce her Sovereign to advise the Sultan to • accept most of the French demands. This concession will, it is said, take the form of an acknowledgment that Germany has exceptional interests in the extreme South of Morocco. This region, which is large and, it is believed, fertile, supplies a road to the far Hinterland of Northern Africa, and is occupied by tribes which pay only a nominal sub- mission to the Shereeflan Throne. They may possibly be reduced to order without any great expenditure of force, in which event Germany would have one more colony, while in any case she would obtain a defensible port on the Atlantic. Throughout, in truth, the Emperor, from the point of view of Continental diplomatists, has so far done well; while his ruse Chancellor has so managed details, and the hidden intrigues which must have pre- ceded the fall of M. Delcasso, as fully to deserve the title of Prince which the Emperor bestowed on him on the day when the fall became assured.
We do not know, so long as the entente is continued, that the interests of this country are in any way. com- promised by anything that has occurred, though her pride may have suffered some slight wound. So long as Tangier is safe the future of Morocco is a French rather than an English affair, and we shall not loosen our grasp of Egypt under any pressure short of a great defeat, nor shall we shrink back from the Japanese Alliance, which undoubtedly offends the Kaiser, who greatly dislikes the rise of an Asiatic Power to a position in which she can at least defend China from further depredations, and can insist that no Power shall enjoy a monopoly of any portion of the Far Eastern trade. But we trust that the country will at last perceive that our warnings have not been fancies, and that William II. has succeeded in acquiring for himself, if not throughout the world, at least on the Continent, a position which only throe years ago would have seemed impossible. If we leave Great Britain and America out of the question, he has by far the strongest Army and the most formidable Fleet, and he is himself a man too strong not to obtain from his position every advantage it can secure. It is difficult to see, unless Austria breaks loose from his leading-rein, or the great discontented forces within his own Empire succeed in checking his career, whence resistance to his policy is to come, or what is to remove the spell by which he holds captive the imagination of so many Courts. British diplomacy will feel his influence in the Balkans, in Con- stantinople, and at Paris as it has never been felt yet since Bismarck was dismissed, and that influence may not be of a kind agreeable either to our interests or to the humanitarian ideas which still affect BO large a sec- tion of our people. Within his own country his now and continuous success cannot fail to exaggerate his personal power. There is nothing to do but wait ; but we are heartily in accord with Mr. Balfour when he says, as he said on Tuesday, that the position of Great Britain with regard to maritime power differs from that of every other country, and that it is not for us to suggest any plan for reducing by agreement the fleets of the world. Our Fleet is expensive, but it does not menace our liberties at home, and it is for us, as much as it ever was in the days of Napoleon, a necessary defence.
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