TOPICS OF THE DAY.
PRINCE BISMARCK'S SPEECH.
TO understand fully the drift of Prince Bismarck's enig-
matical speech, it is necessary to remember the relation which, ever since the first partition of Poland, has existed between the Russian and Prussian dynasties. The Hohenzollerns, pressed by the chronic hostility of the Hapsburgs, who never forgave the loss of Silesia, embarrassed by their geographical situation, and always seeking territorial gain, have courted the Romanoffs, who protected their Eastern frontier, who had a common interest with them in keeping down Poland, who acted as counterpoises to the Hapsburgs, and who, above all, were, like themselves, absolute Sovereigns, pledged, as Prince Bismarck says, to keep down anti-monarchical and anti- social ideas. They have deferred to Russia constantly, have waived for her benefit, as the Chancellor mentions in a tone of bitter complaint, their right of asylum, and have on more than one occasion, notably during the Crimean War, sheltered them under temporary misfortune. They have visited them, have intermarried with them, and have helped materially to secure to them their exaggerated place in the great "family of Europe." In return, they have been helped in many serious crises, notably in 1870, and have been treated on all smaller questions rather as friends than as mere allies. They are most unwilling to give up this relation, which for obvious reasons of strategy is highly convenient, and is, moreover, pleasing to a dynasty which has at heart never ceased to be autocratic. The weight of the Prussian dynasty is, therefore, thrown steadily against an enduring rupture with Russia. Prince Bismarck, without, perhaps, sharing all his master's feelings, defers to them, and besides, as he says himself, likes an alliance which, if he can but convince one man, is always secure. If he could have obtained a hearty Russian alliance after the formation of the new Empire, he would have preferred it to any other; and it was only when he found that this was impossible, that a Franco-Russian alliance threatened Germany, and that even war "was menaced from the most competent quarter," that he turned towards Austria and made the Treaty which he now flaunts in the face of all enemies as the security alike of Ger- many and Europe. Even now he would rather not break with Russia, with whom he predicts Germany, bound by a community of interests, will finally become friendly. Even now the alliance of the "Three Imperial Powers" would suit him best, if it could only be obtained on his own terms ; and even now he asks anxiously, and in public, whether, if Russia obtained a dominant influence in the Balkans, that would not con- tent her. She must not, he intimates in most courteous terms, seize Bulgaria by force ; he "could not advise or support that"—because Austria is pledged to resist that—but anything Russia can obtain by diplomacy, or through action taken by the Sultan of Turkey, as the recognised Suzerain of Bulgaria, she may possess with his full consent. Germany cares nothing about Bulgaria, a petty province in her eyes, and in the field of diplomacy will even support Russian claims to the restora- tion of the position created by the Treaty of Berlin, under which Russia, while giving up her project of establishing a great Bulgaria, was invested in practice with an informal protectorate over the more limited State allowed by that Treaty to exist. There is, in fact, throughout the speech an expression of regret at the loss of Russian friendship, and a definite though limited bid for a reconciliation ; and so far the speech makes for peace. If the Czar can content himself with that offer, and can secure its realisation, and will leave off threatening the West, there may be peace ; for Germany will not, and Austria cannot, go to war with Russia merely for demanding the execution of a Treaty which bestowed on the House of Hapsburg two magnifi- cent provinces. The Hungarians might fume if Bulgaria accepted a Russian Prince, but they could not compel a war until force had been overtly used upon the other side. But Prince Bismarck discerns clearly that Russia may not accept his offer—indeed, he must be sure of it, or some of his lan- guage would not have been used—or accepting it, may find that, diplomatically, nothing can be done. The Sultan does not want Russians either in Sofia or Philippopolis, threatening Con- stantinople; he does not desire a rising in Macedonia—which would follow any Turkish invasion of Bulgaria within ten days —and he is not anxious or willing to incur a second bankruptcy in order to increase the prestige of St. Petersburg within the Balkans. Whatever his policy, it cannot by possibility lead him willingly in that direction. Bulgaria, too, will resist, and the Czar, if he negotiates, will be compelled to threaten ; it is to enable him to threaten with effect, or, as Prince Bismarck puts it, "to give his diplomacy weight," that he is drawing his Army westward ; the threat must be addressed to Austria ; and as Austria must reply to armed threats, the very contingency contemplated by the Treaty of 1879 may at any moment arrive. If Austria is attacked, Germany must aid her ; and in that case, says Prince Bismarck, with almost brutal frankness, no French Government is strong enough to prevent the French people from attacking Germany. The Empire, " which was but yesterday," says the Chancellor, a mere federation," is in presence of an imminent cause of possible war, her possible enemy is collecting huge masses of troops in a way which hitherto has always been followed by war somewhere—he gives four instances—and if that enemy. strikes, France will be immediately across the border. "Ger- many lying between France, the most restless and warlike of nations, and Russia, with her growing bellicose tendencies,'" must for her own sake be strong. There is nothing for it but for Germany to arm her last man, to be ready, if necessary, "to send a million of men to each frontier," and to defy the coalition. We can do it, exclaims the Chancellor, if the people will help, and we alone ; for though other States may have the men, we alone possess the needful body of officers,—a great truth, which, when the struggle comes, will be of profound importance. And then rising, as he con- templated the future, to language rarely employed except when campaigns are immediately at hand, the Chancellor burst out almost into song :—" We place our reliance on the strength of our Army. If we have no cause to use it, all the better ; but we must make our arrangements with the idea that we do use it. Threats do not frighten us. The threats of the Press are boundless folly. Such things cannot have the slightest influence upon our action. We Germans fear God, and nothing else in the world. The fear of God makes us wish for peace and foster it. Nevertheless, he who breaks the peace will arrive at the conviction that the warlike and exultant love of the Fatherland, such as summoned the whole population of Prussia to arms in 1813, is the common possession of the entire German nation, and that he who attacks the German nation finds it armed to a man, and every man having in his heart the firm belief God with us.'" "Trust in the Lord," said Oliver, in shorter phrase, "and keep your powder dry."
The effect produced by this speech upon the German Parlia- ment was naturally prodigious. The Deputies did not read it as the Exchanges have done, as a pledge of peace, but as a statement that the Fatherland was in serious danger, which, however, the Government was prepared, if necessary, to face. Leader after leader, the chiefs of every group except the Socialist rose to support the proposal that the Money Bill should be passed en bloc without discussion of details ; and even the Socialists did not venture to divide. The Chancellor was followed home through the snow by cheering thousands of the populace, and on the following Wednesday the Military Bill also was passed "in two minutes" with similar unanimity. So far as laws can secure such results, the German Government is the stronger by 700,000 soldiers, and a loan of £14,000,000 sterling which will be raised almost as easily and cheaply as if England were the borrower. The Prince has stirred Germany to its depths ; and if the Russians are wise, they will wait for many years a more favourable opportunity. The only doubt is whether they are wise, whether they can bear to retire, whether they are not as certain as Prince Bismarck that France will aid them, and whether they will not hold it better to risk defeat than to retreat before such open defiance. We confess we doubt their wisdom, and so must both the German and Austrian Govern- ments at heart. The German, professing to anticipate no war, asks for an " addition " vaster than the host which followed Napoleon across the Niemen ; and the Austrian, to be sure of peace, makes preparations as if war were immediately at hand. The uncertainty is as great as ever, the armies are growing greater than ever, the era of plain-speaking which precedes war has almost begun ; but it is true that the German Chan- cellor has pointed out to the Czar a road along which, if he feels it safe to retreat, he can move without humiliation.
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