BOOKS.
NATIONALISM IN THE NEAR EAST.*
Tin author of Nationalism and War in the Near East veils his identity under the title of a "Diplomatist." He is not an American, but he sympathizes strongly with American institutions and habits of thought. One of the first points to be borne in mind in dealing with the views of the advanced class of politicians to which "Diplomatist" evidently belongs is that they have an inveterate habit of indulging in sweeping generalizations which very often embody a half of the truth, but very rarely the whole truth. Numerous passages, for instance, might be quoted from this book to show that, in the opinion of the author, the instincts of the public in democratic countries are generally right in their treatment of foreign affairs, whilst those of the rulers, and especially of the diplomatists, who " all underestimate moral forces," are almost invariably wrong. Instances from recent English history may, in fact, be cited in support of this view. During the American Civil War " the masses," to use the classification to which Mr. Gladstone gave currency, were generally more correct in their appreciation of the true issues at stake than " the classes." Again, during the Italian Wars of Liberation the English democracy warmly favoured Italian aspirations, although in this case their views were shared by statesmen, such as Lord Palmerston, Lord Russell, and Sir James Hudson, who were typical diplomatists, and who, ender even the most liberal interpretation of the term, could scarcely be classed as "democrats." On the other hand, the sympathies of the Court and those of a large section of English upper-class society were distinctly pro- Austrian. Against instances such as these, which may be credited to the side of democracy, there must be balanced so significant a fact as that, up to the very last moment before the outbreak of the present war, the English democracy generally believed in the pacific intentions of Germany, and were disposed to regard all those who held an opposite opinion as scaremongers who were unworthy of credence. Many important democratic leaders, indeed, distinguished them- selves by the insistence with which they dwelt on the desirability of effecting sweeping reductions in our naval
and military armaments. In this case, it was the few, rather than the many, who were true prophets, and it is perhaps rather fortunate that one, at all events, of " the electorates of Western Europe " failed in some degree " to impress on its Government its own instincts of common-sense and con- science." The mistake on the part of the special representatives of democracy was very pardonable, for they were ill-informed of the facts of the ease, neither were any adequate steps taken to awaken them from the fool's paradise in which they were living. But it is somewhat leas excusable on the part of a "Diplomatist" who, as Lord Courtney tells us in his fore- word, "has moved in and out amongst Chancellories, and knows their atmosphere without ever having succumbed to its asphyxiating influence." It appears, however, that, in spite of his wide experience, " Diplomatist " was so far mistaken in his forecast of the immediate future as to write but a very short time ago that " West-European nations have, broadly speaking, outgrown war," and that, having " become men," they were disposed to "put away such childish things as trial by battle."
Another example of somewhat hasty generalization is where "Diplomatist," basing his conclusion exclusively on recent Balkan history, says that " the development of democratic control over foreign affairs has undoubtedly had the effect of weakening the moral obligations of treaties." The admission is creditable to the author's impartiality, for it shows his desire, although he evidently entertains a strong sympathy for democracy, not to overstate his case. But, if his eonelueion be correct, the outlook as regards inaugurating an era of universal peace is indeed gloomy, for, with the example of the treatment accorded to Belgium and Luxem- burg by the absolutist Government of Germany fresh in our memories, most politicians have been gradually coming more and more round to the opinion that the only way to enhance the value and strengthen the security of treaties is to make,
4 Nationatism, and War in the Nea Past By a Dipl m tiat. Carnegie Rndounnent for International Peace.r dxfo.rd: at the °Clara endon Preen. [12s. 6d. net.]
not only Governments, but also nations, parties to their conclusion.
Notwithstanding these blemishes, however, if blemishes they be, which seem to dictate the exercise of some caution in accept- ing all the author's conclusions, Lord Courtney is quite justified in saying that he has written an " original, thoughtful, and a thought-provoking book, which invites to inquiry and reflec- tion." He is thoroughly conversant with his subject. Ho affords us an admirable clue to guide us through the bewildering labyrinth of Balkan polities. His sympathies move in directions which command, or at all events should command, universal respect, and, in many cases, he asserts principles which constitute, not merely the best, but indeed the only sound, basis for the treatment of Balkan politics in the future.
It is of no use now to bewail the Balkan tragedy, for tragedy it really was, or to indulge in speculations as to what might have happened if Dr. Daneff had been a wise statesman, and if the fatal order to the Bulgarian Army to attack the Serbians had notbeen given. Sir Edward Grey correctly summed up the course run by the Balkan War when he said that it began in a war of liberation, passed rapidly into a war of annexation, and ended in a war of extermination. So far as results are concerned, it is impossible to indicate a single really satis- factory feature in the settlement concluded at the end of the war. Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro were about doubled in size. Roumania also gained something. Bulgaria, on the other hand, which country had borne the brunt of the fighting against the Turks, was deprived of a considerable portion of her conquests, and driven back far within what she claims as her natural ethnological frontier. The only gain to the cause of nationalism was that Albania was recognized as a separate national entity ; but the democratic progress in this case was more apparent thau real, for, even before the war, the allegiance of the wild Albanian clansmen to the Turk never went so far as to allow of an effective administration of Albanian territory by Turkish officials. Moreover, looking to all the circum- stances of the ease, it seems very doubtful whether Albania can for long survive as an independent State. "Diplomatist" appears to look back with great satisfaction to the Ottoman Revolution, which, he considers, was, "morally speaking, as epoch-making an event for Asia as was the French Revolution for Europe." Indeed, though he is not sparing in his criticisms of the Young Turks, whose policy, he says, " in a few months transformed the Macedonian millennium into a pandemonium," his indulgence towards every political movement of a demo- cratic character is carried so far as to lead him to ascribe the "ccrwardly murder" of Maim Pasha, the Minister of War, to "a purely patriotic inspiration and a perfectly sound military judgment." As regards the final results of the Ottoman Revolution, all that can be said is that time alone can show whether or not the regeneration of any Moslem country can be accomplished by purely political changes of any kind. Broadly speaking, "Diplomatist" is apparently justified in saying that the net political result of the Balkan War and the unstatesmanlike Treaty of Bucharest was merely to "leave an aftermath of wars of extermination and the seeds of future wars of annexation." It will be more profitable, however, instead of dwelling any further on the history of a past heavily laden with political error, to inquire whether, from the experience gained, some useful lessons may not be derived for the conduct of affairs in the future. Carlyle, amidst many high-sounding and hasty generaliza- tions, never made a greater mistake than when he declared
that the "swallowing of formulae" was one of the main characteristics of the French Revolution. Vandal was much nearer the truth when he said that no one could thoroughly understand the Revolution if he did not realize the extra- ordinary influence exercised by "words and formulae" during the Revolutionary period. It would appear, indeed, that democracy develops a Shandean tendency to become " hobby- borsical." A fetish is made of ideals, which very often contain the germs of some thoroughly sound principle, and the idealists are over-prone to regard as their sworn enemies all those who, albeit they often agree in the objects to be attained, are inclined to doubt the wisdom of some of the methods proposed for attaining them. It is, however, true that if idealists blossom at times into visionaries, the "practical man" often degenerates into being a mere empiricist. Sound statesmanship is generally to be found in discovering what would be called in statics the resultant between the two extreme lines of thought and action. English democrats appear at present to have adopted two shibboleths, which they think constitute the keys to the proper treat- ment of international relations in the future. These are, first, that the principle of the balance of power should be absolutely discarded; and, secondly, as "Diplomatist" puts the case, that the Governments of Europe should be "immediately inoculated with a strong dose of democratic diplomacy." Both principles unquestionably contain an element of truth. It remains to be considered how far they are capable of appli- cation by the British Government and nation.
In the Balkan Peninsula an attempt was made to arrive at a settlement, not on the basis of the historical, geographical, and ethnological facts of the situation, but on that of the balance of power either of the Balkan States, inter se, or their rival supporters amongst the Great Powers. It has proved to be a complete failure. It is unnecessary to repeat all "Diplo- matist's" arguments under this bead. It will be sufficient to say that he makes out an absolutely unanswerable case in support of his general conclusion that " a democratic movement cannot finally be brought to rest by a diplomatic settlement." Does it, therefore, follow that the principle of the balance of power should be in all oases discarded P Any such inference would, to say the least, be hasty. That principle rests on a psychological basis, which, albeit it involves a some- what humiliating confession of human weakness, is none the loss sound—namely, that all political and economic history teaches us that any individuals or any classes who obtain excessive power are, sooner or later, likely to abuse it. It is perfectly reasonable to infer that nations, which are aggregations of individuals, will do the same, and history furnishes abundant examples to prove that the inference has often been correct. This doctrine will, without doubt, be regarded by some as merely the phantasm of a belated Whig politician. It is, indeed, a fact that the essence of Whig principles was involved in devising a number of checks and counterchecks against an abuse of power, and although those principles were often applied for self-interested motives, and although the Whigs as a political party are now extinct, the fundamental article of their political creed, inasmuch as it is based on the fallibility of human nature and the sway of human passions, retains its validity. A striking instance in point is furnished by the war in which we are now engaged. Even if there bad been no violation of Belgian territory, the British Government would have been perfectly justified in resisting the attempt of Germany to establish an European hegemony. Moreover, it is especially worthy of note that in this case the plea that the theory of the balance of power should be absolutely discarded is wholly irreconcilable with the counter-plea that the principle of nationalism should be substituted in its place. German policy involves the negation of nationalism. The policy of the Allies, on the other hand, although to some extent based on the maintenance of the balance of power, also involves the assertion of the nationalist principle. If this chain of argument be correct, the conclu- sion to be drawn from it would appear to be that the principle of the balance of power, although it has been woefully abused in the past, should not be altogether discarded. It should, however, be applied with greater judgment and statesmanship than heretofore. Notably, wherever such a course is possible, the counter-principle of nationalism should be allowed pre- cedence. The qualification as regards possibility is necessary, for if there is one lesson more than another inculcated by recent events in the Balkans, it is that it is extremely difficult when nationalities overlap to arrive at a satisfactory territorial settlement on a purely ethnographical basis. The world has yet to discover a method, other than that of the employment of force, for dealing with recalcitrant minorities. Almost every nation in Europe has its Ulster.
Turning to the question of how far British diplomacy should be democratized, it is, in the first place, to be observed that since the policy of affording strong support to the Ottoman Empire was abandoned, it cannot be said that the policy of the British Government has anywhere been either anti-nationalist or anti-democratic, but—and the point is too frequently forgotten—its influence has been limited. The force of circumstances has obliged British Ministers to place the maintenance of European peace before all other con. siderations.
Nevertheless, some change is certainly required. "Diplo- matist" and others are quite right when they maintain that the people of the United Kingdom have not been sufficiently associated with their rulers in the treatment of foreign affairs. How can a better state of things be inaugurated ? Certainly not by conducting all the details of diplomacy from the house-tops, or by charging a Committee of the House of Commons to deal with them. The Cabinet is iu reality a Committee of the House of Commons. The democracy, if it is not satisfied with the manner in which its affairs are being conducted, can effect a change of Ministers. Some other remedy has to be found.
Democratic rule, though infinitely preferable to absolutism in any form, has its defects, and one of the principal of those defects is that a democratic Minister labours under a sore temptation to maintain his position by saying nothing but pleasant things to the public. Lord Bryce in his American Commonwealth has remarked with great truth that "perhaps no form of government needs great leaders so much as democracy." The main requirement of English public life at present, notably in so far as the conduct of foreign affairs is concerned, would appear to be to find leaders who, without sacrificing their powers of guidance, will have the moral courage to state unpalatable truths to the democracy. If that courage had been possessed in an adequate degree, the war in which we are now engaged would not,have come as so great a surprise to the mass of the nation. The accusations which advanced politicians bring with some reason against the manner in which our foreign relations have recently been conducted are, in fact, misdirected. They should be brought, not against British diplomacy,' but against British states-
Previous page
